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The present dissertation develops an agent-causal libertarian theory of action and free 
will. The backbone of its argumentative structure is that 1) there can be no agency without 
an agent-cause; 2) there can be no agent-causation without indeterminism; 3) hence, 
libertarianism is the best option for any realist view about action. 
The first step in this argument is a defense of agent-causalism. I develop a taxonomy of 
behavior and agency and argue that both libertarian and compatibilist event-causal 
accounts fail to provide an adequate description of the differences we find between non-
actional behaviors and full-blooded actions. 
Agent-causal accounts, however, are usually met with suspicion because of their 
requirement of an irreducible agent with downward causal powers. My second step aims 
to respond to this concern by presenting a scientifically informed account of emergence 
as a way to show that the natural order of the world is compatible with the existence of 
irreducible and causally effective entities, such as the agent’s self. I defend the thesis that 
natural supervenience does not have to be challenged by this possibility, as downward 
causation requires only the break of causal closure and bottom-level indeterminism. I 
argue that both these conditions are unproblematic. 
The third step is the contention that we have many reasons to believe that consciousness 
is an emergent property. Moreover, the unity of phenomenal experience suggests the 
existence of a unified self as the bearer of conscious properties. The conscious self is the 
irreducible substance-cause who exercises its causal power over the alternatives left open 
by the probabilistic laws governing its neural substrate. When the conscious self 
intervenes, agency happens. When it is passive, bodily movement reduces to mere 
behavior. 
Given that the requirement for fundamental indeterminism renders my account of agency 
an incompatibilist account of free will, the final step of my dissertation is the assessment 
of the classical objections against libertarianism. After analyzing the most important 
arguments for and against contemporary views akin to my own, I respond to all the 
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objections and conclude that agent-causal libertarianism is the most plausible and 
satisfactory view of how actions are possible and free.  
 







Na presente monografia é desenvolvida uma tese incompatibilista acerca da possibilidade 
da ação num mundo governado por leis físicas que escapam ao controlo do agente. 
Segundo esta tese, se as relações de causa-efeito no universo natural forem estritamente 
deterministas, não só não são possíveis ações livres, como não é possível sequer haver 
ações. 
Na Introdução, é apresentado o debate clássico em torno do livre-arbítrio, a sua história 
e o estado da arte do problema no contexto da tradição analítica. Salienta-se ainda a 
importância das neurociências para o renovado vigor do debate na atualidade, 
nomeadamente devido à pressão que o conhecimento detalhado de como certas 
propriedades mentais dependem de funções neuronais exerce sobre posições libertistas 
que queiram reivindicar para o agente uma dose elevada de autonomia.  
No segundo capítulo, intitulado “Setting the stage for agent-causation” (o porquê de uma 
teoria da causação pelo agente), o ponto de partida é a tese de que toda a ação pressupõe 
um self a partir do qual o agente se relaciona com o mundo e dele se distingue. Em 
seguida, essa tese é desenvolvida através de uma taxonomia do comportamento humano, 
em que são distinguidos vários níveis de intervenção do agente na sequência causal que 
produz a ação e, consequentemente, no controlo que aquele exerce sobre esta. Há muitos 
comportamentos humanos que não podem ser considerados ações na medida em que a 
ligação causal entre certos acontecimentos neuronais e o movimento corporal não é 
mediado por nenhuma intenção explícita do agente. Mas há também comportamentos 
intencionais (como os pequenos furtos de um cleptomaníaco, por exemplo) que, embora 
sejam motivados por razões do agente (suas crenças e desejos), não são produzidos por 
ele. Em todos estes casos, o agente não é o autor do comportamento, daí este não poder 
ser considerado uma ação, apesar de aparentar sê-lo.  
Esta visão da ação tem dois pressupostos teóricos: primeiro, uma visão da causação como 
sendo uma relação entre uma substância e um acontecimento (substance-causation), e 
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não uma relação entre acontecimentos (event-causation); segundo, uma abordagem não 
reducionista do agente, na medida em que o poder causal deste sobre os movimentos do 
seu corpo não pode ser equivalente à soma dos efeitos causais das partes que o 
constituem.  
A conceção da ação que aqui se desenvolve identifica-se com a corrente denominada, em 
inglês, agent-causalism (o que, em português, se pode traduzir por teoria da causação 
pelo agente). Ao contrário do que normalmente é tido como certo, a teoria da causação 
pelo agente não é uma versão do libertismo. É uma posição segundo a qual uma ação é 
causada diretamente pelo agente enquanto substância e não pelos seus estados e 
acontecimentos mentais. Como tal, pode ser assumida independentemente da filiação 
teórica que se tenha em relação à questão do livre-arbítrio.  
O terceiro capítulo, intitulado “Irreducibility in nature” (a irredutibilidade na natureza), 
trata do tema da emergência. A motivação para tal reside na necessidade de desenvolver 
uma visão do agente enquanto substância irredutível causadora da ação, que não só faça 
jus às exigências da teoria da causação pelo agente apresentada no primeiro capítulo, mas 
seja simultaneamente compatível com a imagem que a ciência contemporânea nos dá do 
mundo natural. Para que a ideia de que o self do agente emerge naturalmente do cérebro 
sem coincidir com este seja razoável, há pois que baseá-la numa teoria da emergência 
suficientemente coerente e plausível, teoria essa que se procura desenvolver neste 
capítulo.  
Começa-se por rever a história do debate em torno do conceito de emergência e por 
apresentar uma sua definição. Passa-se em seguida à análise de alguns dos casos de 
putativa emergência que são frequentemente citados na literatura da especialidade e 
entre os físicos da matéria condensada (que se opõem a uma visão excessivamente 
reducionista da realidade), após o que se conclui que as teorias físicas que tratam dos 
vários níveis de organização da matéria (mecânica quântica, mecânica estatística, 
termodinâmica, mecânica clássica, etc.), não estabelecem entre si uma relação de 
continuidade. Mostra-se que há fenómenos macro (ex. temperatura) cuja descrição tem 
inevitavelmente de recorrer a modelos que são irredutíveis às teorias que descrevem os 
fenómenos micro subjacentes, o que revela situações de emergência epistémica. No 




entanto, a ciência física não tem ferramentas que lhe permitam partir da emergência 
epistémica e daí inferir conclusões acerca de uma suposta emergência ontológica. Não 
obstante a precaução que se impõe, defende-se que o emergentista teórico pode afirmar 
que, ao contrário daquilo que muitas vezes se supõe, a sua visão da estrutura da realidade 
é compatível com a física atual. 
De seguida, este capítulo dedica-se a estabelecer as condições de possibilidade da 
emergência ontológica. Dado que se opta por preservar a relação de sobreveniência 
natural segundo a qual toda a mudança mental assenta numa mudança neuronal 
subjacente, as condições de possibilidade da emergência terão de ser as seguintes: 1) a 
quebra do princípio do fechamento causal do mundo físico e, 2) indeterminismo 
fundamental. Enquanto a primeira condição é consensual entre todos os defensores da 
emergência, a necessidade da segunda para a plausibilidade da causalidade descendente 
é referida por muito poucos autores e a sua fundamentação é um contributo original 
desta tese. A argumentação apresentada leva à conclusão de que não é possível haver 
causalidade descendente (efeitos causais da entidade emergente sobre o substrato físico 
que lhe deu origem e a sustém) sem que ambas estas condições estejam garantidas, e 
mostra-se que ambas são compatíveis com o conhecimento científico de que dispomos 
atualmente. 
No quarto capítulo, intitulado “The conscious self” (o self consciente), passa-se à questão 
de saber se algum âmbito da realidade nos oferecerá evidência de que a emergência 
ontológica é, não só uma possibilidade, mas um fenómeno efetivamente existente. É 
sugerido que a experiência fenomenológica é uma parte da realidade que é 
simultaneamente inegável e distinta da base fisiológica que a origina. As propriedades 
conscientes têm qualidades que tornam impossível a sua redução ao corpo físico, 
suscetível de uma descrição em termos de estrutura e função. Por essa razão, tais 
propriedades apresentam-se como boas candidatas a fenómenos ontologicamente 
emergentes. 
Por outro lado, a experiência consciente de um sujeito apresenta-se-lhe como 
intrinsecamente unificada e como emanando de um único ponto de vista. Segundo o 
argumento da unidade da consciência, esse ponto de vista não pode ser a soma de pontos 
RESUMO 
 xvi 
de vista parciais, pelo que as propriedades conscientes requerem a existência de um 
sujeito unificado que as contenha. Esse sujeito é o self irredutível cuja existência a teoria 
da causação da ação pelo agente postula. 
O quinto e último capítulo, intitulado “Free Will and alternative possibilities” (livre-arbítrio 
e possibilidades alternativas), aborda os argumentos clássicos que têm sido debatidos em 
torno do problema da compatibilidade entre o livre-arbítrio e o determinismo, por um 
lado, e o livre-arbítrio e o indeterminismo, por outro. Dada a exigência, apresentada no 
terceiro capítulo, de que a estrutura subjacente a uma entidade emergente não seja 
governada por leis exclusivamente deterministas, por forma a que haja espaço lógico para 
o exercício do poder causal da dita entidade, a tese defendida nesta monografia acabou 
por se revelar incompatibilista. Portanto, torna-se pertinente confrontar as objeções que 
têm sido colocadas a uma tese deste tipo ao longo da história do debate em causa, 
apresentando também os principais argumentos usados em defesa do incompatibilismo 
em geral e do libertismo em particular, contra as posições compatibilistas. Nesse 
confronto, verifica-se que o incompatibilismo sai vencedor e que a teoria da causação pelo 
agente permite inclusive solucionar alguns dos impasses teóricos que se apresentam ao 
longo do caminho.  
No final, é possível concluir que o libertismo agent-causalist aqui proposto é a posição 
mais capaz de conciliar, por um lado, a experiência fenomenológica da agência e a 
vantagem prática de conservarmos a nossa corrente classificação dos comportamentos 
humanos consoante a capacidade de autoria do agente, e, por outro, as constrições 
provenientes do conhecimento científico que retiram às posições dualistas tradicionais 
qualquer plausibilidade. Ao contrário destas, a ideia do self consciente como entidade 
emergente, associada a uma visão indeterminista do funcionamento neuronal, é 
compatível com uma descrição naturalista do ser humano e da sua interação com o 
mundo. O homem é um sistema biológico regulado por leis físicas, mas é 
simultaneamente detentor de uma capacidade de tomar decisões e intervir no mundo 
através do seu corpo, cujo espaço de atuação é garantido pelas possibilidades alternativas 
deixadas em aberto pelo indeterminismo subjacente. O self do agente é um ator a pleno 




título no desenrolar da história do mundo, sem que isso implique qualquer quebra das 
leis da natureza. 
 







“To deny the reality or logical significance of what we can never 















“The central question in philosophy at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is how to give an account of ourselves as apparently conscious, 
mindful, free, rational, speaking, social, and political agents in a world 
that science tells us consists entirely of mindless, meaningless, physical 
particles. Who are we, and how do we fit into the rest of the world?” 
 
(John Searle, 2004) 
 
 
I have taught Philosophy in high school for several years. The Philosophy curriculum in 
Portugal includes material relating to the topic of Action for tenth-grade teachers to teach 
in six 90-minute lessons. The problem of the compatibility between Free Will and 
Determinism is only one part of this topic, which means that I, as a teacher, was required 
to cover the Free Will debate in no more than four lessons. However, given the nature of 
the subject matter, I never managed to get through it in fewer than six or even eight 
lessons. I was concerned that the issue, which I found terribly disturbing at an existential 
level, would not be adequately explored if covered in fewer lessons.  
Whenever I sensed that my students were perhaps not sufficiently confused or 
overwhelmed by our discussions, I would try to employ better texts and thought 
experiments in order to get them to realize just how intricate the subject is and how, as a 
result, their self-image as free and responsible agents was being challenged. 
I am not sure whether this excessive compulsion of mine had a positive effect on my 
students, but I do know that the concern I felt during those discussions has had a lot to do 
with bringing me to where I am today. Over the past four-and-a-half years I have struggled 
with most of the philosophers of our time who have discussed the free will problem and 
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tackled its subtleties. I have striven to find my own way out of these conundrums and do 
actually believe that I have succeeded to some extent. 
In this Introduction, I will present briefly the traditional problem of Free Will and the main 
strands of its current debate. I will then explain the reasons why I believe the problem is 
more exciting now than ever and why it is intricately connected with many other fields in 
and outside Philosophy. Finally, I will present an overview of the structure of the present 
dissertation and suggest that the account that is developed here is a new and valuable 
contribution for the debate. 
 
1.1. The problem 
 
The idea we have of ourselves as free agents is based on our introspective awareness of 
having certain beliefs and desires, of forming intentions to act according to those belief-
desire pairs, and from our having the vivid impression that those intentions cause us to 
behave in a certain way. We have the feeling we are in charge of what we do most of the 
time. Despite obvious constraints that prevent us from having the ability to do everything 
we might want to do (humans cannot fly, for example), we are still given a limited number 
of alternatives and we can choose between them (even though I cannot fly, I can still 
decide to either take the stairs or the elevator to go down from the third to the first floor). 
Since we endorse our decisions and perceive ourselves as the causes of our actions, we 
accept the responsibility for their consequences. If I tell a friend some information about 
the schedule of the bus she must catch in order to arrive at a meeting on time and that 
information is wrong and causes her to miss the bus and her meeting, I feel sorry for my 
mistake and apologize. I believe that several occurrences in the world and in my friend’s 
life happened as they did because of me and therefore I assume my responsibility for 
having caused them. So more so when I intended for those consequences to happen. We 
all believe our actions can actually cause changes in the course of events and that is what 
most stimulates us in our everyday endeavors. 
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The problem of free will arises when our knowledge of how the laws of nature determine 
the course of events in the world makes us suspect that we are not the true source of our 
actions, nor the source of our will. Spinoza put it brilliantly: 
“For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a certain quantity 
of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move. (…) Further conceive, I beg, that a stone, 
while continuing in motion, should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is 
endeavoring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of 
its own endeavor (…) would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish. 
This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in 
the fact, that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby 
that desire has been determined.”1 
 
Spinoza believed men are just as constrained in their actions as this stone is in its 
movement and hence their freedom is just as illusory. Spinoza was an incompatibilist 
about free will: according to him, free will is incompatible with determinism. If universal 
determinism is true, then the complete state of the world at each instant is caused by the 
complete state of the world at the instant that immediately preceded it, in such a way 
that no other state could have occurred. The terrible implication of this for human action 
and free will is that the complete state of my body (which includes my neurons and their 
inter-relations, my memory and personality) determines what my wishes, values, opinions 
and criteria for choosing will be every time I have to make a decision. I have no alternative 
possibilities of action: given the person I am, plus my past, all the details of my present 
circumstance and the laws of nature, I cannot choose nor act otherwise. 
Incompatibilism has two horns: Spinoza’s view, which falls under the category we now call 
nihilism or hard determinism, and its direct rival position, which is called libertarianism. 
According to libertarianism, men do possess free will, so the causal processes that are 
relevant for the production of free actions must somehow escape deterministic laws.  
Many philosophers in the past thought the above description of a deterministic world in 
which free will would be a mere illusion just could not be true, it could not be the whole 
                                                          
1 Spinoza, B. (1674), p.390. 
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story. In order to defend libertarianism, they opted for a dualist account of human agents. 
If people are not composed just of a physical body, but have also a deep self or a soul that 
somehow escapes the rigid constrictions of deterministic laws, then free will can be saved. 
René Descartes2 and Immanuel Kant3, for example, defended this type of account. 
However, dualist accounts encountered many problems: on the one hand, the question 
of how could there be an interaction between an immaterial substance and the physical 
world; on the other, the inconvenience of postulating the existence of a supra-natural 
substance, thus challenging Occam’s razor and the reductive tendencies of modern 
science (especially since the advent of genetics and molecular biology). These problems 
rendered this position very unpopular.  
Nevertheless, the advent of quantum mechanics in the first quarter of the twentieth 
century seemed to open new possibilities for libertarianism. Nature was shown to obey 
probabilistic laws at the most elementary level and determinism was called into question. 
Maybe libertarians did not have to postulate an immaterial soul in order to endow the 
agent with alternative possibilities of action after all. Despite the suspicion of some4 who 
claimed that randomness would diminish, rather than enhance, the agent’s control, 
authors like Roderick Chisholm5 and, more recently, Timothy O’Connor6 opted for a view 
called agent-causalism which grounds libertarianism on the agent’s substantial causal 
powers to indeterministically cause her actions. This view was supposed to carry with it 
less controversial metaphysical assumptions than Cartesian or Kantian alternatives, 
without giving in to nihilism about free will.  
By the end of the twentieth century, more naturalistic forms of libertarianism were put 
forward by philosophers such as Robert Kane7 and Laura Ekstrom8. Their goal was to do 
                                                          
2 Descartes, R. (1649, 1664).  
3 Kant, I. (1781, 1788). 
4 Cf. Smart, J.J.C. (1961). 
5 Chisholm, R. (1964). 
6 O’Connor, T. (2000). 
7 Kane, R. (1998). 
8 Ekstrom, L.W. (2000). 
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away with any “extra-factors” that science would not explain, including any mysteriously 
irreducible agent-cause, and to ground the agent’s control on the causal connection 
between her reasons, her intentions and her actions. Other authors, like Carl Ginet9, tried 
to develop accounts of free actions that would simply regard them as uncaused events 
which would nevertheless be non-random, as they would be explainable in terms of 
reasons and purposes. 
All these accounts have problems and face numerous objections, stemming from both 
empirical and theoretical grounds. Some objections are aimed at the specific details of 
each account, while others are directed at the libertarian stance as a whole. The main 
criticisms are the following. On the one hand, there is a strong suspicion regarding the 
possibility that a large and warm system such as the brain may be sensitive to quantum 
fluctuations. Even if it were, it seems implausible that indeterminism should be located 
precisely where it is most convenient (at the moment of choice or immediately before, 
depending on the specifications of different accounts), and never at times when its 
presence would remove the agent’s control altogether (as for instance between the 
formation of an intention to act and the overt action). On the other hand, many have 
considered that if an agent can act in one way and in another under the exact same 
circumstances, then her action cannot be appropriately explained and thus will be 
unintelligible or even irrational. According to this objection, libertarian free will is an 
incoherent concept and therefore impossible, regardless of the truth or falsity of 
indeterminism.  
Because of all the problems each and every one of its versions faced, libertarianism 
remained quite unpopular throughout the twentieth century. Apart from its persistent 
defenders and some open nihilists such as Ted Honderich10, Derk Pereboom11 and Saul 
Smilansky12, most philosophers took the compatibilist stance and argued for the 
                                                          
9 Ginet, C. (1990). 
10 Honderich, T. (1993). 
11 Pereboom, D. (2001). 
12 Smilansky, S. (2002). 
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possibility of free will in a deterministic world (or a world in which all the relevant 
structures such as the neural network work deterministically). 
Compatibilism has its roots in the view, defended by Thomas Hobbes13 and David Hume14, 
of freedom as the absence of constraint. According to this standpoint, the type of free will 
people are interested in is that which can found responsibility ascriptions, and that is 
simply the ability to act according to one’s will, without being subject to compulsion nor 
constraint. During the second half of the twentieth century, however, this position was 
re-elaborated in response to increasingly complex formalizations of the arguments in 
favor of incompatibilism15, which motivated compatibilists to embrace different 
argumentative strategies: Some, headed by Peter Strawson16, chose to dissociate 
metaphysical questions regarding free will from the psychological phenomenon of 
responsibility attribution, and focused on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
latter. Others, led by Harry Frankfurt17, called into question the idea that actions could be 
free only if the agent could have acted otherwise (also known as the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities or PAP). Others still, consented to the truth of PAP but focused 
their attention on questioning the incompatibilist inference from the truth of determinism 
to the impossibility of acting otherwise. 
As usual in philosophy, no position is uncontroversial. Libertarians are accused of 
defending a solution that is either implausible or incoherent, or both. Free will nihilism is 
considered to be an unattainable position as it contradicts our basic experience of agency 
and would have dangerous implications for society, in what regards responsibility 
ascriptions and justice. Also, given our current scientific view about the world (after the 
quantum revolution of the mid-1920s), determinism is much less certain, which gives us 
no reason to embrace a view that relies on its truth. Compatibilist accounts of free will 
are considered to provide too weak a concept of free will and, as Kant noted, to fail in 
                                                          
13 Cf. Chappell, V. (1999). 
14 Hume, D. (1748). 
15 Most notably, the Consequence Argument (see section 5.2.1). 
16 Strawson, P.F. (1962). 
17 Frankfurt, H. (1969). 
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their attempt to solve “with a little quibbling about words, that difficult problem on the 
solution of which millennia have worked in vain”18. 
Despite the ongoing debate, by the end of the twentieth century, we seem to have 
reached a stalemate. 
 
1.2. New challenges 
 
In the last decades, astounding developments in the sciences of the brain have given this 
dispute new vigor. The possibility of identifying the neural correlates of mental processes 
such as intending and deciding opened empirical pathways for approaching the problem 
of human freedom. Benjamin Libet’s experiments19 were a corner stone in the now called 
neurophilosophy of free will. They allegedly showed that our conscious intentions to act 
are a relatively late part of the decision-making process, which is caused and initiated at 
an unconscious level. If Libet’s results and their philosophical interpretations should prove 
to be true, they would have devastating consequences for the libertarian, and arguably 
even for the compatibilist. In fact, it would be very difficult to maintain that an 
unconscious decision is something over which the agent can have a satisfactory degree of 
control.  
Libet’s experiments, as well as the numerous follow-ups20 that purported to confirm its 
results with increasing accuracy, have been long criticized for several reasons21. Above all, 
philosophers have complained that the neural signals that neuroscientists measure in 
these kind of experiments need not be interpreted as the unconscious process of making 
a decision or forming an intention to act. Evidence that the brain’s activity preceding the 
                                                          
18 Kant (1788), 5: 96–97. 
19 Libet, B., et al (1983). 
20 Cf. Soon C.S., Brass M., Heinze H.-J., Haynes J.-D. (2008) and Fried I., Mukamel R., Kreiman G. 
(2011). 




conscious intention to act is predictive of the ensuing action to some degree is not 
surprising if one takes, as most contemporary libertarians do, mental events to have a 
very close relationship with neural events. A conscious intention is part of an ongoing flux 
of mental and neural activity, and it is only natural that some sort of neural preparation 
precedes it and that it will have a higher probability of meeting our unconscious biases. 
Thus, the bold inferences some authors have made from the data gathered in Libet-type 
experiments (which typically deal with spontaneous decisions between indifferent 
options preceded by no deliberation) to the claim that conscious will is an illusion in any 
situation22 have been met with great suspicion.  
Regardless of the actual relevance of Libet’s results, the debate on these experiments and 
their philosophical implications has been useful, as it showed how close we have come to 
having empirical results providing definitive answers to long lasting questions regarding 
free will. Neuroscience is reshaping the philosophical discussion and there is no turning 
back. The idea that the mind supervenes on the brain is corroborated every day by 
hundreds of studies which gather increasingly detailed information about the neural 
substrate of mental processes. We cannot discuss the free will problem without 
addressing also the mind-brain relationship and, in Wittgenstein’s words, the problem of 
identifying “what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I 
raise my arm”23.   
Experiments with animal models throw light on the workings of the human nervous 
system and, more importantly, they are explanatorily efficient even when it comes to 
human behavior24. For example, spontaneous actions like the ones performed in Libet 
tasks can be successfully modelled in mice, and the data gathered in experiments done 
with these small mammals has recently been claimed to have important implications for 
the dispute over the correct interpretation of the brain activity measured in humans 
performing those tasks25. More than ever, we have evidence that biological continuity is 
                                                          
22 Cf. Wegner, D. (2002). 
23 Wittgenstein, L. (1953), p.161. 
24 Cf. Gold, J.I., Shadlen, M.N. (2007) and Glimcher, P. (2005). 
25 Cf. Murakami, M. et al. (2014) and Rigato, J. et al. (2015). 
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the criterion with which to understand human beings as part of nature, to unveil the 
mechanisms of their animal bodies and to interpret their psychological lives. But is there 
any room for free will if human agents are nothing more than animal agents with the 
added upgrade of superior cognitive functions such as language and abstract reasoning? 
Some have embraced this challenge without renouncing to a robust concept of free will. 
According to Helen Steward26, for example, all actions are inconsistent with determinism 
because no action can fail to be up to the agent (and nothing can be up to the agent if 
things are fully settled by the past and the laws of nature). Nevertheless, according to her, 
human agency does not require some mysterious break in the evolutionary continuity we 
find everywhere else in nature. In fact, “the concept of agency is an outgrowth of the 
concept of animacy” and it applies “unproblematically to many animals”27, not just to 
humans.  
I am very sympathetic to this view. People are animals and their behavior is biologically 
constrained to a great degree. Nevertheless, there is an incredible variability in nature 
that scientists classify as noise (i.e. data that their models do not capture) and which on 
my account is the product of the animal’s agential intervention in an underdetermined 
course of events. Free actions come in degrees; they can be very simple in mice, and highly 
complex in humans, but the agent as the ultimate cause is present throughout the 
spectrum. This dissertation is an attempt to show how this agential intervention may work 




The novelty of my account of free action and free will lies in its argumentative structure. 
I defend an agent-causal libertarian theory, but instead of basing it on a priori arguments 
for a certain concept of free will, I ground it in the empirical assessment of how human 
                                                          
26 Steward, H. (2014). 
27 Idem, p.xi. 
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behavior can be classified as actional and sub-actional, together with an analysis of the 
requirements for, and implications of, this distinction. The backbone of my thesis is that 
there can be no agency without an agent-cause, and no agent-causation without 
indeterminism. As my readers can probably guess, I am hoping this will provide an extra 
argument in favor of libertarianism. 
The present dissertation is structured in four steps. First, I will contend that agent-
causalism is required by any realist view about action. In order to show this, I will develop 
a taxonomy of behavior and agency and claim, on the basis of the “disappearing agent 
argument”, that event-causal accounts, both libertarian and compatibilists, fail to provide 
an adequate description of the differences we find between non-actional behaviors and 
full-blooded actions. 
Agent-causal accounts, however, postulate the existence of an irreducible agent with 
downward causal powers, which is usually regarded as an implausible requirement. In 
order to assess this contention, I will develop a scientifically informed account of 
ontological emergence as a way to show that the natural order of the world is compatible 
with the existence of irreducible entities. I define ontological emergence as a relation 
between entities (substances or properties) belonging to different hierarchical levels, in 
which the higher-level entity is simultaneously dependent on and autonomous from the 
lower-level entity or structure. Emergent entities possess novel capacities whereby they 
can have causal effects that cannot be explained solely on the basis of the causal powers 
of the lower-level entities. Given the requirement of natural supervenience, which I will 
contend should not be abandoned easily, these causal effects must be exercised 
downwardly. l will claim that usual objections against emergence can be adequately 
answered if two conditions are met: the break of causal closure and bottom-level 
indeterminism. I will show that the requirement that all causes are fundamental causes is 
unwarranted and that it is plausible to think that laws of nature leave more than one 
alternative open in order for the emergent entity to affect the course of events. Given 
these two conditions, downward causation becomes possible without any risk of 
overdetermination nor epiphenomenalism. 
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After having assessed the theoretical possibility of ontological emergence, I will proceed 
to discuss its actual existence. I will argue that even if one assumes a cautious attitude 
regarding the actual presence of emergent properties in the material world (the world 
that can be described, measured and explained by science), we have many reasons to 
believe that consciousness is exceptional. First-person descriptions of phenomenal 
experience (the only ones we have) are irreducible to third-person descriptions of the 
physical substrate that produces it. After having argued for this, I will contend that the 
unity of phenomenal experience suggests the existence of a unified self as the bearer of 
conscious properties – that same self that we call “agent” in the context of action 
production.  
Given the requirement for basic indeterminism, my account, which started off as merely 
agent-causalist, has become an incompatibilist account. Hence, an assessment of the 
main arguments that have been put forward in the traditional debate about the 
compatibility between free will and determinism is in order. In the last chapter of this 
dissertation, I will present the famous Consequence Argument, the multiple Frankfurt-
type examples and the more recent manipulation cases and will conclude that 
incompatibilism is the best account of free will, not only because of the need for an 
irreducible agent, which fosters the need for indeterminism, but also given these more 
classical arguments. Finally, I will present what I consider to be the two main objections 
against libertarianism, which are based on the idea that indeterminism is inimical to 
control, insofar as it renders the agent’s decision uncertain and unexplainable. I will 
respond to these objections and conclude that agent-causal libertarianism is a plausible 
and satisfactory view of how actions are possible and free, despite our physical nature as 






2. SETTING THE STAGE FOR AGENT-CAUSATION 
 
“When animal agents exist in a world, the unfolding of that world 
through time must wait upon decisions and choices which have to be 
made by those animals – not just temporally (…) but also 
metaphysically.” 
(Helen Steward, 2012) 
 
2.1. Actions and agents 
 
In neuroscience, action is defined in opposition to response28. There is a continuum at the 
farthest end of which we find simple reflexes (immediate and automatic motor 
responses), while at the other extreme end lie voluntary actions (not directly determined 
by any external stimulus). 
“In contrast to responses, actions are behaviours where it is either impossible to find 
an eliciting stimulus or where the latency and/or magnitude of the behaviour vary 
so widely, that the term ‘response’ becomes useless.”29 
The idea of a voluntary action in neuroscience has to do with this freedom from 
immediacy30 by which an animal agent (human or not) makes a decision or self-initiates a 
spontaneous action (like a boy jumping up in the air unexpectedly, while playing31) in the 
absence of clues from the environment that might serve as evidence in favor of it over 
any alternatives. This implies the demarcation of an agent’s self, as the source of the 
spontaneous actions, the controller of controlled processes and, in the case of humans, 
                                                          
28 Cf. Brembs, B. (2011), Haggard, P. (2008). 
29 Brembs, B. (2011), p.933. 
30 Cf. Shadlen, M.N., Gold, J.I. (2004). 
31 This example is used by Brembs (2011), p.935. 
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as the mediator between the animal’s body and the social system32. The agent’s 
recognition of herself as an entity distinct from the environment and from the others, and 
her identification with that part of the physical world that she can control to some degree 
– her body – is a precondition for any voluntary action to take place, as well as for it to be 
interpreted as such by others.  
However, the interdependence between action and the sense of selfhood is a two-way 
entailment, for the demarcation of the agent’s self can happen only if the agent acts in 
the first place. An animal can distinguish its self from the world via a mechanism called 
reafference33, by which it can naturally and unconsciously tell apart those sensory stimuli 
that are consequences of its own actions and thereby are under its control (e.g. the 
darkness caused by its eye blinks), from those that are not.  So, just as “in order to 
understand actions, it is necessary to introduce the term self”, “the concept of self 
necessarily follows from the insight that animals and humans initiate behaviour by 
themselves” 34. 
Similarly, in philosophy, despite the enormous controversy over the definition of every 
concept involved in a theory of action and the relation obtaining between them, the 
distinction between what happens to people and what people do is foundational to most 
accounts. While an infinity of events take place at each instant in the universe (the 
radioactive decay of an atom, the falling of a leaf, the arrival of a photon at my retina), 
only a subset of these can be classified as actions: the ones that are made intentionally by 
an agent, or which at least are the involuntary side-effect of an intentional act (e.g. to 
misread something counts as an action because, in doing it, the agent intended to read)35.  
For an act to be intentional is for it to be the execution of a plan, which is the mental 
representation of the future action to be performed. The plan (which might go from very 
simple to highly complex) is the representational content of the intention. Previous to the 
                                                          
32 Cf. Baumeister, R.F. (2010). 
33 von Holst, E., Mittelstaedt, H. (1950). 
34 Brembs, B. (2011), p.936. 
35 Davidson famously defended the idea that to act is to intentionally do something in his “Agency” 
[in Davidson, D. (1980), essay 3]. 
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conception of that plan, of course, the agent must have certain reasons to do something 
or to act in such a way as to achieve a certain goal. Reasons are usually taken to be pairs 
of desires and beliefs. Thus, the desire to drink plus the belief that water is in the fridge 
and that the enactment of certain behaviors is necessary if I am eventually to swallow it, 
will lead me to form a certain plan and eventually to execute it, opening the fridge, taking 
out the water, filling up a glass with it and drinking it. Note that representational attitudes 
such as intending, believing or desiring have both a certain content and a certain 
orientation36. What makes the attitude I have towards this specific content an intention 
is that its orientation is that of an executive attitude, a disposition to put my plan into 
practice37.  
To make a decision to A is to actively form an intention to A (leaving aside the alternative 
of not A-ing). The intention will thus be the product of the decision that triggers it. This 
does not imply that every action has to be the result of a decision. More often than not, 
there is no need to decide, for there is no uncertainty about what to do (e.g. whether to 
eat or not when I am hungry, there is food in front of me and there are no reasons not to 
eat it). In such cases agents act on intentions that derive from their standing preferences 
(that arise out of habit or are the result of intentions already formed). Likewise, not all 
decisions are the result of a deliberative process (the process of considering the reasons 
in favor of each possible alternative), for there are impulsive decisions made on the spot 
that are nevertheless the settling of previous conditions of uncertainty and bring about 
an intention to act. 
To sum up, an action, as the word indicates, is an event of which the agent is the active 
promoter, not a passive pawn in the game. Sometimes (but not often) the English 
language helps us see this difference: the rising of an agent’s arm is an event (a motion 
that took place in a certain place at a certain time) that could have been caused by a 
myriad of factors, such as strings pulling it up, like a puppet arm. But if that event is caused 
                                                          
36 Cf. Searle, J.R. (1983). 
37 Cf. Mele, A. (2009), pp.3-7. 
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by the agent’s intention to bring it about, then her raising her arm intentionally is an 
action that the agent performed38.  
It is assumed by any action description that the agent is someone distinct from all others 
and that she has a self that is both the subject of the decisions and intentions which led 
to the action, as well as the subject of the action itself: “I opened the door” is an action; 
“the door opened” is an event. I am the subject of the action I perform in the first case, 
whereas the door is not the subject of any action in the second; it is the subject only of a 
proposition that describes an event that just happened to take place without it having 
been done by anyone. 
The difference between acts that simply involve the agent as its locus (“my arm rose up”) 
and actions that the agent endorses as her own (“I raised my arm”) is foundational to the 
phenomenological experience of agency as well. Pathological conditions such as the 
Anarchic Hand Syndrome or the Tourette Syndrome are paradigmatic of situations in 
which the agent’s self is exceptionally not part of the causal process that leads to what 
would otherwise appear to be an action, even though her body is. In cases of anarchic 
hand syndrome, for instance, patients perform involuntary movements with their hands 
and make comments such as “it will not do what I want it to do” or “it does what it wants 
to” 39. In Tourette’s cases, the agent’s “body is animated by a continuous stream of urges 
that demand specific and often complex oral and motor responses”40, which leads to a 
never-ending succession of physical and vocal tics, and sometimes cursing. The 
involuntary bodily movements are so frequent and intense, that it can become difficult to 
tell apart the patient’s self from the phenomena directly caused by the disease: “I consist 
of tics—there is nothing else” 41. 
                                                          
38 Cf. Helen Steward (2014, pp.33-35), who makes a distinction between bodily movements 
(events) and bodily movings (actions), based on Jennifer Hornsby’s analysis (1980, p.3). 
39 Pacherie, E. (2007), p.212. 
40 Buckser, A. (2008), p.167. 
41 Sachs, O. (1998), p.98. 
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Helen Steward has recently proposed an interesting definition of the agent as “an entity 
that has a body and can make that body move in various ways”42. According to her, the 
owner/body distinction that arises when a certain degree of complexity in the biological 
hierarchy of species has been reached is the basis for action, defined as an execution of 
the agent’s power of self-movement. 
“Most animals of any appreciable degree of complexity (…) are possessors of a 
capacity for a kind of top-down determination of what will occur with respect to the 
movement of their own bodies, in such a way that their contribution does amount 
to something over and above the contribution of the processes inside them which 
eventuate in the resulting bodily movements.”43 
The thesis I will develop in this dissertation will be similar in many aspects to Steward’s 
view. I too believe that, for there to be an action, there must be a form of top-down 
determination by the agent herself, of the strictly physical events taking place in her body. 
This means that the agent’s causal power is somehow irreducible to the causal powers of 
her parts, including those of her propositional attitudes, such as intending or deciding. 
Not only is mental causation an ability the possession of which is a pre-condition for an 
agent to be considered such, but agent-causation is a fundamental form of intervention 
is the world, one which grounds the very possibility of agency.  
However, Steward considers that, even though all actions are settlings of matters44 and, 
because of that, they all require top-down causation, not all of them are intentional. For 
instance, absent-mindedly scratching one’s head counts as an action, but a “sub-
intentional” one45. This is a clear point of disagreement between us, since I follow 
Anscombe and Davidson’s view instead, according to which all actions are intentional 
under some description, and thus prefer to consider such behaviors as to unconsciously 
                                                          
42 Steward, H. (2014), p.32. 
43 Idem, pp.16-17. 
44 “The core idea at the heart of this notion of settling a matter is that of a question that is capable 
of being resolved in different ways at all times up until a certain moment – the moment of settling 
– at which point something that happens causes it to become resolved in one particular way” 
[Steward, H. (2014), p.39]. 
45 Cf. Steward, H. (2014), p.34. 
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jiggle one’s foot as events that are the product of the activity of the organism’s body but 
not something that an agent did46. Even if we do not see eye to eye on the extension of 
the set of actional behaviors, Steward and I agree, however, that all actions require a form 
of downward causation and that for there to be such a downward causal link, two 
conditions must be assured: first, the physical world cannot be causally closed (which is 
quite consensual among those who defend downward causation); second, there must be 
indeterminism at the bottom-most level of organization of matter (a condition that 
appears to be much more controversial). I will address both these conditions in chapter 
3. In the remainder of the present chapter, I will develop my account of action as an agent-
caused type of behavior. 
 
2.2. A taxonomy of behaviors and actions 
 
The cases of missing agency that I mentioned before (Anarchic Hand and Tourette 
syndromes) are just two among an endless list of cases that span across a whole spectrum 
of behaviors. Agency, I believe, comes in degrees, and understanding what changes from 
case to case along the spectrum will allow us to understand how the different elements 
involved in action production come into play (Table 1). 
Let us start with the Anarchic Hand syndrome (AHS). People suffering from this disease 
find themselves totally unable to control the movements of one of their limbs, which 
engage in behavior that seems goal-directed and often elicited by inputs from the 
environment, but which is unintended.  The “alien hand”47 will unbutton a shirt that the 
                                                          
46 The question of distinguishing an entirely automatic behaviour such as breathing, from a “semi-
automatic” one such as scratching one’s head is of course a tricky one. I will address it in more 
detail in the next section.  
47 I am using the term “alien hand” here in order to distinguish the hand that is functioning 
independently from the patient’s will, from the one that is still under the patient’s control. 
However, it is important to note that efforts have been made by experts in the past years to 
distinguish the Anarchic Hand Syndrome from the Alien Hand Syndrome, which is a condition in 
which patients feel that one of their uppers limbs does not belong to them – whereas in the 
disorder that is concerning us here, there is no such feeling [Cf. Pacherie, E. (2007)].  
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patient keeps trying to rebutton with the other hand, it will slap the patient in the face, it 
will refuse to cooperate in tasks such as cooking or reading the newspaper. 
TYPE OF 
BEHAVIOR/ACTION 
















alienated behavior Implanted agency 
Utilization behavior  Urge → response  







Tourette’s (tic without 
premonitory urge) 
Neural input → response 
Nervous 
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Emotion → physical  






Tourette’s (tic with 
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Anger Emotion → movement 
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"I'd light a cigarette, balance it on an ashtray, and then my left hand would reach 
forward and stub it out. It would take things out of my handbag and I wouldn't realize 
so I would walk away. I lost a lot of things before I realized what was going on."48 
                                                          
48 Karen Byrne, a patient suffering from this syndrome after a surgery to cure epilepsy in which 
her brain’s corpus callosum was cut (article by Dr Michael Mosley for BBC News Health 
01.20.2011). 
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AHS patients retain the ability to act purposefully with the rest of their body and they feel 
alienated from the behavior of the anarchic limb which, despite belonging to them, seems 
to have “a mind of its own”49. Their phenomenological experience is that of having a part 
of their own body behaving in a way that is not intended and cannot be inhibited, which 
they try to refrain (for example, by blocking it with the other hand) and about which they 
express frustration (they complain that the hand is “always trying to get into the act”50).  
Complex as it might be, this type of behavior is like a reflex, a purely mechanical response 
to a certain input (internal or external), with no conscious mental state involved. A more 
common situation that shares the main characteristics of AHS is automatic behavior. 
Imagine those everyday situations in which people answer questions they are posed 
without realizing what they are saying (when they are watching television, for instance), 
or when people pick up an object (their keys or glasses, say) and absentmindedly put it 
somewhere else without realizing what they are doing – which might make them have to 
look for that object for twenty minutes the next time they have to leave the house. When 
asked why they put the object in the place where it was eventually found, people will say 
they do not know. They do not even remember putting it there, just like people suffering 
for AHS do not know what their hand is doing if they do not see it doing it. The type of 
behavior that is typical of all these cases (AHS, absentmindedly saying or doing something 
that we cannot explain afterwards) is what I call zombie-like behavior. Needless to say, it 
does not consist in actions at all. 
Another interesting condition in which people lose the capacity to inhibit stimulus-driven 
behavior is called Utilization Behavior (UB). Patients that suffer from this disease are 
dependent on external stimuli in such a way that they cannot act unless solicited and their 
perception of an object is taken as an “order” to use it51.  If they see a pair of glasses, they 
will immediately put them on, and if a second pair is shown to them before the first pair 
has been taken off, they will put that second pair of glasses over the first pair; if a hammer 
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and a nail are put before them, they will immediately hammer the nail to a nearby wall, 
independently of the appropriateness of the context, or lack thereof.  
Strangely, though, unlike patients suffering from AHS, UB patients do not seem surprised 
by their behavior and if asked why they did those things, they will give evasive 
explanations such as that “they thought they were duties that had to be carried out and 
that they were natural things to do”52. This means that a very significant difference 
between UB and AHS is that patients suffering from the former do not seem to realize the 
inadequacy of their behavior and so they endorse it as if it were an action they performed 
voluntarily. Interestingly, this difference in the phenomenology of agency is reflected also 
in the inability of UB patients to act purposefully in the absence of cues from the 
environment (they exhibit apathy when not externally stimulated).  
Also, UB patients do not explain their actions in terms of their own intentions or desires, 
which suggests that they are not moved by endogenous motives. They are impelled to use 
objects by a general sense of duty. Together with the apathy patients exhibit, this has led 
authors to hypothesize that the structures that are impaired in cases of UB somehow 
involve the general capacity for “agentive self-awareness”, which prevents patients both 
from engaging in spontaneous actions and from realizing that their automatic behavior 
was not autonomously brought about by their own intentions53. When patients recover 
from the lesions in their frontal lobes that correlate with the disease, their actions regain 
independence from the environment, and they express perplexity at their previous 
behavior and at “the fact that they had no controlling thoughts of their own”54. 
I believe this is analogous to what one might imagine could happen in cases of 
manipulation, such as those that philosophers like to imagine and which I will discuss 
further ahead (cf. sections 5.2.2. and 5.2.3.). If an evil Dr. Black were to manipulate my 
mind and brain in such a way that at the sound of midnight on my clock I would 
spontaneously feel the urge to kill my next door neighbor, my acting on that urge would 
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53 Idem, p.216. 
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seem to be intentional, it would apparently be the product of my mental states. However, 
since that urge would have been caused by Dr. Black’s manipulation, the ensuing intention 
to kill would not be truly mine, as it would have been implanted in me by another. A more 
realistic and frequent case is deep hypnosis. Subjects that are hypnotized report the 
experience of an “absorbed and sustained focus of attention on one or few targets”, a 
“relative absence of judging, monitoring, and censoring”, and the feeling that one’s own 
responses are “automatic (i.e., without deliberation and/or effort)”55. All these elements 
seem to adequately describe what we can infer from UB patients’ reports of their 
experience. The objects that they encounter solicit in them an immediate response, that 
is not subjectively felt as a reflex, but as a voluntary need to use the object, as if there was 
nothing else one could do in that situation. As hypnotized subjects describe, there is a 
“sense of automaticity wherein thinking is no longer felt as preceding action but action is 
felt as preceding thought”56. 
These sorts of cases are different from the zombie ones in that relevant mental states are 
no longer absent from the agent’s conscious field. Patients feel that they are acting and 
that they are doing what they want to do. However, common intuition will exempt these 
patients from responsibility in case their actions lead to undesirable consequences. If I 
end up killing my next door neighbor and in court some brilliant lawyer finds a way to 
prove that Dr. Black manipulated me, I will probably walk free because I did not know 
what I was doing. The same goes for someone suffering from UB or a hypnotized person, 
should they end up hurting someone else when they engage in their compelled behavior. 
Legally and morally, they can hardly be considered imputable, for their specific condition 
(the disease or the hypnosis) is what effectively produced their putative actions. Once 
they “wake up” from that condition (either because they are healed or because the effect 
of hypnosis wears off), they realize what they have done and become mortified.  
Are ordinary people, as well as legal systems, wrong in considering that these actions are 
abnormal and that the agents should not be blamed (nor credited, for that matter) for 
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their consequences, in spite of the fact that during the act they feel that they are doing 
what they want to do? I do not think so. The mental states that led to the action were not 
originated in the agent’s selves, they were implanted in them by an alien element: the 
brain damage, the manipulation, the hypnosis. There was no agential intervention 
because the agent was somehow dormant, passive, incapable of “judging, monitoring, 
and censoring”. The process that led to the action was like a stimulus-response process, 
even if a conscious mental state was perceived to be the cause (an urge, an intention, a 
sense of duty, depending on the situation at stake), instead of a neural unconscious state, 
as in the Anarchic Hand cases. But such a conscious mental state was not a mental state 
of the agent; it just highjacked the agent’s mind for a certain period of time, like a virus 
that uses the host cell’s machinery in order to replicate. Given the particular nature of 
these cases, I call the type of behavior that they describe alienated behavior. And again, 
I consider it to be sub-actional.    
Let us consider now the type of cases that I call reactive behavior. They regard those 
situations in which our own conscious mental states are perceived to be amongst the 
causes of our behavior but not with the conscious consent of our control system. The 
famous “deviant causal chains” associated with cases such as Davidson’s nervous 
climber57 are quintessential examples of such situations. Imagine that an agent wants to 
perform a certain action (to shoot someone, for instance) but, due to her nervousness, 
her body performs the action for her (the involuntary twitching of the trigger-finger 
causes the gun to fire) without it having been her to decide or intend to do it then. The 
agent’s emotions caused her behavior reactively, through a causal chain of which she was 
not in charge, even though she could see the whole process happening “inside” herself. 
This is also what happens to Tourette’s patients, most of the time. A patient suffering from 
Tourette Syndrome (TS) is always self-aware and lives a fruitful life, with a job, a family 
and friends. However, her condition makes it very difficult (often impossible) for her to 
control the outburst of motor and vocal tics, some quite simple such as barking or eye 
blinking, others much more complex, such as punching herself, touching objects or 
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people, bending and twitching her body, uttering inappropriate sentences (coprolalia) or 
repeating what other people say (echolalia). The disease makes her also more prone to 
many other behavioral symptoms such as obsessive thoughts (TS is very often associated 
with Obsessive Compulsive Disorder), negative reactions to novel situations due to 
anxiety, great difficulty in inhibiting impulsive behavior, episodes of incontrollable rage, 
etc. The symptoms vary a lot according to the context, depending on whether the subject 
is alone or with other people, in the intimacy of her home or in a public place, whether 
she is concentrated in a certain task in which the flow of her behavior can follow a 
smoothing rhythm or if nothing in particular is catching her attention.  
When a patient’s tics are involuntary and uncontrollable, her behavior is reactive, like the 
twitching of the nervous assassin’s finger. In those cases, tics just have to be released, like 
a sneeze. That does not happen only with physical movements. Frequently, TS patients 
find it impossible to go through a written text because they feel the uncontrollable need 
to “read each line many times, (…) to line up each paragraph to get all four corners 
symmetrically in [their] visual field, (…) to ‘balance’ syllables and words, (…) to 
‘symmetrize’ the punctuation in [their] mind, (…) to check the frequency of a given 
letter”58, etc. Also in cases like these, which resemble the compulsive episodes typical of 
anxiety disorders, the patient’s mental undertakings should not be considered to be 
actions; they would better be classified as forms of reactive behavior. 
However, Tourette’s is such a complex disease, with so many degrees and variations, that 
it can fit into different levels of behavior/agency. While growing up, most TS patients start 
experiencing premonitory sensory phenomena which might allow them to sense that a 
certain tic is about to arise and to prevent it occasionally, due to some training. This is not 
easy: even when it is possible to prevent the tics, that prevention costs the patient a lot 
of effort, it increases stress and it can only last for a short period of time59. Nevertheless, 
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the possibility of intentionally blocking the tic opens the door for the behavior of a 
Touretter to be much more voluntary than what prima facie might appear60. 
When the TS patient gives in to the tic, she feels that she is actually doing it, that she is 
not assisting passively at the event of the tic coming to be. Imagine Anne is a girl talking 
to a friend while constantly balancing her glasses, patting her friend in the shoulder and 
pressing her foot against the ground in circular movements all around the spot where she 
is standing. All these movements could eventually be stopped, were she to make a strong 
effort to block them. However, she chooses not to because she feels at ease with her 
friend who has grown used to her tics and she might as well store her self-control for 
occasions on which the tics might be much more disturbing or inappropriate. Anne finds 
it very difficult to inhibit her tics, but not impossible. And certainly she endorses the tics 
as something that she does, with varying degrees of awareness and control, depending 
on the circumstances.  
When Anne lets her tics be released with no effort to control them, she undertakes a 
somehow hybrid behavior that I call purposive, which takes place when conscious mental 
states related to desires (urges, impulses, needs) are the direct causes of the behavior, 
without there yet being the control of the agent via her intention to do what she does. In 
these situations, there is a mixture of voluntary and involuntary elements in the agent’s 
performance: the voluntary removal of the inhibitory breaks that might block the tic 
versus the involuntary outburst of the specific tic that comes about. When on the contrary 
Anne blocks her tics, she becomes the helmswoman of her ship – her body – steering it 
according to her decisions, in spite of the highly conditioned elbow room at her disposal. 
In those cases, the transition from sub-actional behavior to a full-blooded action is 
accomplished.  
But one might as well ask why is it that I consider the voluntary tic that a TS patient might 
endorse to be something distinct from the action that the same patient performs when 
she successfully tries to control her tic. There are several reasons that justify this analysis: 
the first is phenomenological. Tourette’s patients themselves perceive their tics as 
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primitive urges that, due to the disease, they find it much harder to inhibit than “normal” 
people61. Tics are like a biological impulse that gives them no satisfaction, but to which 
they must surrender, sooner or later, in one form or another.  
“What is uncontrolled about a tic is not the movement itself, but the need to move, 
the urge to make a very specific gesture or sound. (…)  It means that tics can be 
displaced—they can be delayed or relocated to times and places where others will 
not observe them.”62  
When patients prevent the tic, they do so for conscious reasons that they decide to act 
on, such as the need to avoid the social disadvantages of the tic, like being stared at and 
misjudged by other people. Let us consider some real life cases of such a “displacement”: 
“One woman, growing up on a farm, took several long walks daily in the woods. Her 
family attributed these to a solitary or soulful nature; in reality, she told me, she 
simply needed a place where she could release her tics, which she had to suppress 
in the house. She would walk for miles, ‘twitching and spitting like a maniac,’ then 
return home unsuspected.”63 
“In a situation of close social contact, where satisfying the urge for a facial or neck 
tic would be very noticeable, almost all of [the] informants [of a study on TS patients] 
said that they would occasionally induce a tic in the leg or foot instead. By 
performing that tic intensively—clenching the toes hard or hyperextending the 
ankle, for example—they could divert energy away from the facial tic, and perhaps 
suppress it altogether.”64 
The strategies these Tourettic patients found in order to remain unobserved are clearly 
intentional and rationally motivated. Their tics, on the contrary, are irrational impulses 
dictated by the neurological disorder that they would rather avoid. The difference 
between the phenomenological experiences under these two circumstances must be 
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63 Ibidem. 
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accounted for and it seems to me that the best explanation for this difference must be 
that tics and displacement strategies are two radically different types of events.  
The second reason for putting these types of behavior under two different categories is 
based on the intuitions that guide our common practices of responsibility attribution. For 
example, one of the problems that parents with children suffering from Tourette’s face is 
the difficulty of diagnosing this disease, which is of the utmost importance given the 
behavioral symptoms that are associated with the syndrome. After the diagnose is made, 
the episodes of misconduct of the child can be interpreted not as a behavioral or 
emotional issue, but rather as direct consequences of an abnormal neurological condition. 
Since TS is considered a disability, students suffering from this impairment are fit for 
independent education programs, according with the legislation of each country, and 
“may not be punished or disciplined for behaviors that are caused by or are a 
manifestation of their disabilities”65. This legal protection agrees with the common 
intuition by which we naturally tend to excuse someone who might behave 
inappropriately once we learn that that person has Tourette’s, even if we understand that 
her behavior was voluntary, to some degree. If a TS patient insults someone out of a vocal 
tic (giving in to the urge to shout “fatso” at an obese person, for instance), she does not 
do it in order to meet an object of desire (the pleasure of causing discomfort, say), like a 
malicious person would. She does it to escape the growing tension and discomfort that 
her urge is causing her, as if it were a growing itch that can be alleviated only by scratching. 
The urge that moves her is ultimately the outcome of a neural process devoid of any 
propositional content, while the control she exercises over it is an action made by reasons. 
Those reasons are of course supervenient on their neural correlates and might even be 
identical to them (this is something we will discuss later), but they have a cognitive 
content and express the agent’s character in a way the primitive urges uninhibited by 
Tourette’s do not. Like Timothy Schroeder put it: 
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“The way in which a Tourettic individual resists an urge to tic says much about the 
quality of the individual’s will, but the urge itself says nothing.”66 
Impulsive control disorders like kleptomania, as well as substance abuse, also fit into this 
category of purposive behavior. They too are characterized by the failure to resist a 
harmful impulse that one would rather not have, a failure which is caused by a neural 
mechanism that is much more difficult to oppose and much less expressive of the agent’s 
self than the common psychological mechanism of akrasia or weakness of will67. 
Drug addiction is defined as “the loss of control over the intense urges to take the drug 
even at the expense of adverse consequences”68. The degree to which that control is 
effectively lost is still under some controversy69 and it is an empirical fact that the effects 
drugs have on each person, both at the neural and the behavioral level, are very diverse. 
Some people manage to go through years of recreational consumption without ever 
becoming addicted while others get trapped in the net; many addicts manage to quit 
drugs without treatment while many others do not. Both genetic and social factors have 
been proven to be extremely influential, but still the degree to which each person retains 
the possibility to choose whether to use drugs or not on each occasion seems very hard 
to determine.  
The mainstream view70 is that drug addiction is a chronic disease, caused by the 
highjacking of several brain circuits related to reward, motivation, learning, inhibitory 
control and executive function. Due to the disease, patients lose the ability to value any 
sources of pleasure besides the drug (their dopamine D2 receptors, which are responsible 
for the sense of reward, are reduced) and their behavior becomes compelled, either by 
the need to escape the physical symptoms of withdrawal, which are extremely painful, or 
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68 Volkow, N., Li, T.-K. (2005), p.1429. 
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70 Cf. “Drugs, Brains, and Behavior: The Science of Addiction” by Dr. Nora Volkow, in the National 
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by the psychological mechanisms of craving. Also, growing evidence has shown that drug 
addicts are less capable of acting on reasons reflecting long-term goals than non-addicts, 
as well as more reactive to drug-related stimuli catching their attention and triggering 
automatic motor mechanisms of response.  
“[D]rugs can trigger bottom-up, involuntary signals originating from the amygdala 
that modulate, bias, or even hijack the goal-driven cognitive resources that are 
needed for the normal operation of the reflective system and for exercising the 
willpower to resist drugs.”71 
Once a person becomes addicted, drug-related thoughts become impossible to eliminate, 
while the drug craving makes the desire to take the drug the only motivation that the 
addict can experience. Unlike the pleasure given by the drug, which diminishes over time, 
the craving remains extremely strong even after long periods of abstinence and it is not 
experienced as the reasonable desire for something pleasurable, but as an intense feeling 
of “wanting” that is irresponsive to reasons. 
Probably the objectors to the brain-disease model are right when they claim that, since 
most drug-addicts do eventually quit on their own (most of them do so before their 30’s), 
to say that patients are powerless is neither truthful nor fair (not to mention harmful72). 
Many addicts just choose not to exercise the power they still have to fight their 
compulsion and they are responsible for that, just like the ones that do make the effort 
and succeed should be credited for it73.  
However, these considerations do not change the fact that, when hardcore addicts act out 
of compulsion, they are responding to an urge that is not an expression of their evaluative 
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of alcoholism has been shown to be one of the primary factors in the likelihood of relapse in cases 
of patients treated for their drinking problems [Miller, W.R., Westerberg, V.S., Harris, R.J., Tonigan, 
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(2014)]. 
73 Cf. Satel, S., Lilienfeld, S.O. (2013). 
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system. Their behavior is purposeful as they are doing what at that moment they most 
want to do and they can make small choices about when and how to use the drug – just 
like a TS patient can, when she displaces her ticcing in order to render it more discrete. 
Nevertheless, such behaviors should not yet be considered to be actions, given that the 
subject is not doing what she had previously decided and intended to do. Here, unlike in 
regular cases of weak-willed actions, her capacity for self-control has been severely 
compromised. The tendency for automatic action given the monopolization of attention 
by drug-related stimuli makes the option of resisting temptation so effortful that the 
alternative of just throwing the towel and taking the drug becomes almost irresistible – 
again, just like a Touretter, when she finally cannot control her ticcing anymore and an 
outburst of motor and vocal movements is released. 
The major difference, of course, is that Touretters are born with a neurological disease 
that is part of who they are and can never be cured. Drug addicts, on the contrary, have 
made past choices that led to the neuroadaptations caused by drug use and, most 
importantly, they can improve greatly their condition through abstinence (even if, 
according to the brain-disease model, there is no possibility of their brain ever recovering 
completely). However, despite these major distinctions, at the moment of giving up their 
agential power in favor of their urges, addicts and Touretters are both expressing similar 
purposive behavior. 
Kleptomania is similar in many aspects to the aforementioned disorders, even though it 
has been comparatively less studied and hence its neurobiology is yet poorly understood. 
It is defined as the “recurrent failure to resist impulses to steal objects that are not needed 
for personal use or for their monetary value” (and in which the stealing is not committed 
in response to hallucinations nor can it be better accounted for by other disorders, such 
as Antisocial Personality Disorder, Maniac Episodes, etc.)74. It is currently considered to 
be a chronic disease, with exacerbations and remissions75, the phenomenology of which 
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is clearly similar to what addicts experience during craving and substance use76, as well as 
to the Tourettic need to release the urge to tic: stealing episodes are characterized by the 
experiencing of an “increasing sense of tension immediately before committing the theft” 
as well as “pleasure, gratification, or release at the time of committing the theft”77 and 
the periods of voluntary abstinence are characterized by increasing urges. The 
kleptomaniac behavior is impulsive, repetitive and expresses an impaired inhibition that 
patients resent. They do not steal for personal gain or fun, they do it for “symptomatic 
relief”78, and most importantly for our case, they experience shame and guilt 
afterwards79, which may lead in some cases to considering the possibility of suicide, “to 
stop themselves from stealing”80. As in the case of TS patients’ tics, kleptomaniacs do not 
understand why they steal the particular items they do, which is revealing of the fact that 
their reasons are not what moves them to the type of behavior performed. 
I believe stealing is not an action in the case of kleptomaniacs, just like taking drugs or 
releasing a previously sensed tic in the two aforementioned examples were not. However, 
the behavior of a kleptomaniac is clearly purposive, as the patient has to articulate 
different levels of attention and movement in order to do something that is dangerous 
and shameful but that needs to be done to soothe the increasing tension she feels. She 
knows what she is doing and she does what she most strongly wants to at that moment, 
even though she would rather not want to do it – as the persisting efforts kleptomaniacs 
do to resist their urges confirm81. 
Harry Frankfurt famously argued for a hierarchical view of the human person as someone 
who is capable of having second-order volitions, that is, “capable of wanting to be 
different, in [her] preferences and purposes, from what [she] is”82. This is clearly an 
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element that is present from the level of complexity of purposive behavior on, and that 
was absent before. In cases of zombie, alienated or reactive behavior, there were not yet 
first-order desires or urges about which the person in question might have an approving 
or disapproving perspective. The subject could be annoyed at her behavior, as in cases of 
Anarchic Hand Syndrome, but the object of her disengagement was a mere physical 
movement, not a psychological feature that she disliked about herself. In contrast, in 
cases of purposive behavior, there is an urge that moves the person at the level of desire, 
that makes her want to do something, and that wanting is what is perceived by her as the 
motor of her endeavors. There are degrees inside this level, though. The tic that a TS 
patient chooses to release when nobody else is around is likely to be more primitive and 
uncontrollable than the act of stealing performed by a kleptomaniac. The involvement of 
mental states in the causal process that leads to the behavior is probably variable, the 
Tourettic urge being somewhat more physical (like an itch), the urge to steal being more 
emotional (like the sexual impulse when one is in love), and the craving for the drug being 
something in between, depending on the circumstances (on the type of drug, the level of 
addiction, the phase in which the addict is, etc.).   
According to Frankfurt’s analysis, someone who does not have second-order volitions, i.e., 
someone who does not care about her will, is not a person. He calls that being a “wanton” 
(and he includes in this category nonhuman animals and very young children), which I 
believe is a very adequate name to label patients that suffer from Utilization Behavior and 
act out of spontaneous desires that they do not question. Interestingly, Frankfurt uses the 
example of three different addicts to illustrate better the relationship between his 
concept of a person as a hierarchically willed being and his theory of the freedom of the 
will as the ability to want what one wants to want. I have not yet come to the point where 
I wish to discuss the concept of free will (I will come back to Frankfurt when I do that), but 
these addicts are useful for the previous analysis of degrees of agency that I am 
undertaking here. 
Frankfurt distinguishes an unwilling addict (who has the second-order volition that taking 
the drug would not be – as it is – his first-order desire), a wanton addict (who has no 
second-order volition) and a willing addict (who is happy with his desire to take the drug 
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and would not have it any other way). According to Frankfurt, only the unwilling and the 
willing addicts are persons, and only the latter is free. The aspect I believe it is interesting 
to select from these three cases is whether any of them concerns a type of behavior that 
admits being considered to be an action. The physiological conditions are, by hypothesis, 
the same in all of them, and all three “succumb inevitably to their periodic desires for the 
drug to which they are addicted”83. So how would they fit the different categories into 
which I have been dividing human behavior? The answer is that all of them belong to the 
same category of purposive behavior. The fact that the wanton addict has no upper level 
perspective on his desires, or that the willing and unwilling addicts have opposite second-
order volitions does not change the most important element of the situation, according 
to my analysis:  the direct causal link between their wanting and their consumption 
without the intermediate intervention of their intention-forming power. Even if the willing 
addict intends to take the drug, it is not that intention that moves him, but his addiction, 
since, according to Frankfurt’s scenario, “his desire to take the drug will be effective 
regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will”84. The process of 
bringing about the behavior is produced by this addiction, which is much more similar to 
the Tourettic need to tic than to the process by which the unwilling addict might decide 
not to take the drug, for instance. The fact that one’s second-order volition is coherent 
with one’s first-order desire is secondary relative to the primary factor of the agent’s 
intention not being what determines the action. 
There is one last example of purposive behavior that might help us see where the frontier 
lies between a non-actional behavior and a proper action: very strong emotions. When 
hot-tempered people are furious and engage in a discussion, they often say and do things 
they might regret and that they had explicitly promised themselves not to say or do. That 
is why we often avoid situations that might get out of hand, like choosing not to talk 
personally to people that make us “lose our temper”. These are everyday situations in 
which it is not a drink or a drug that take hold of our reactions, it is not a disease either, it 
is our emotions. In certain situations, they make us lose rational control over our actions 
                                                          
83 Idem, p.17. 
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and sometimes say “it wasn’t me, it was my resentment [or rage, or fear or jealousy] 
speaking”85. 
When instead we manage to do what we intend or decide to do, we act. Just like non-
actional behaviors, actions too are diverse and can be classified according to the degree 
to which the agent contributes to them. The actions in which the agent is less involved 
are spontaneous actions, such as routinely preparing one’s breakfast. These are actions 
that are impelled by the agent’s previously formed intentions but which do not require 
her full attention at the moment when they are made. When we go down the stairs, cross 
the street and enter the car, we are not consciously deciding to do all these things because 
we act out of “a will already formed”86, or according to a “standing intention”87. These 
actions are under our conscious control nonetheless, and we do them for reasons. If these 
reasons change (e.g. if our car is parked somewhere else, or if we realize that we forgot 
something important at home and have to go up the stairs again, etc.), our actions will 
change accordingly. This is called reasons-responsiveness and it is a quality the essential 
core of all the behaviors I analyzed before lacks. Even if a drug addict can choose how 
much heroin he wants to shoot up, he is not deciding to take the drug simpliciter. Even if 
he is given all the reasons in the world for not shooting (all the bad consequences, the 
possibility of dying, of being incarcerated, of losing custody of his children), once he is 
addicted and all the severe circuitry changes have taken place in his brain, he has lost 
control over his decisions and his behavior will very hardly change. If it does, then it is not 
a mere purposive behavior anymore, it has become a proper action. 
Another example of spontaneous decisions are self-regulation habits, such as not saying 
everything that comes to our mind if it is not socially adequate. Since childhood we have 
been taught these habits and any healthy person will train them gradually while growing 
up until they become natural and almost effortless. This does not mean that they are not 
under the agent’s control. They are, and that is why one can decide to give in to one’s 
                                                          
85 A similar example is suggested by Velleman in his (1992), p.465. 
86 Kane, R. (1998), p.78 
87 Mele, A. (2009), pp.3-4. 
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impulses sometimes and feel “childish”. Also, that control is precisely what one loses in 
emotionally charged situations such as a fight, when these inhibitions are removed. 
It is important to note that actions such as these are common to nonhuman animals as 
well. They too act intentionally when they move in space in search for food and they too 
are capable of great self-control, with training and reinforcement.  
“If you want to see control in the wild, watch a predator stalking prey. A fox slowly, 
silently creeps up on the pheasant until she is close enough to spring with a good 
chance of success. Her pups watch and learn. When a pup first tries for himself, he 
is apt to spring too soon. Feeling the disappointment of losing out on food, he learns 
to bide his time. He learns to control his impulse to spring now.”88 
The main new element in these actions, both in human and non-human animals, is the 
agent. Certainly, these actions might seem like an automatic response to stimuli from the 
environment, according to a previously programmed algorithm, just like the utilization 
behavior of a patient who will hammer a nail to the wall once both these objects are put 
in front of him. The similarity derives from the fact that routine actions do not follow 
explicit deliberation, nor are they the outcome of a decision, since there is no uncertainty 
about what to do under the specific circumstances the agent is in. If I prepare my 
breakfast, I can think of a dozen other things at the same time, because the movements 
of my hands cutting slices of bread, taking milk and butter out of the refrigerator, etc, are 
not something I have to actively decide to do at each instant; they are responses to the 
information I receive through my retina about where all those things are in space, 
together with information stored in my memory and the reasons I have for eating this 
specific type of food right now (my preferences and beliefs about nutrition). Those 
reasons do not have to be selected each time I perform this action, they are standing 
reasons that I can act on each time I prepare my breakfast ceteris paribus. Note, however, 
that unlike the patient suffering from UB, a “normal” agent who acts spontaneously will 
not act on the stimuli she receives from the environment unless she has a previously 
acknowledged reason for doing that (e.g. a reason for hammering that nail to the wall). 
                                                          
88 Churchland, P. (2013), p.154. 
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While we are responsive to perceptive signals, we are also responsive to our previously 
formed reasons, and among all the reasons we might have in favor of a certain action, 
only some were selected as our effective reasons for acting at this moment. That selection 
was made by the agent, through her power to form intentions to act. Even in spontaneous 
actions such as these, the exercising of this power is what renders us the authors of what 
we do, not a passive pawn in the game, or a victim of our “temper” or of the craving for a 
certain drug. 
The next level of agency regards what I call actions-on-the-spot. These are actions that 
result from fast decisions: there is still no conscious process of deliberation involved but, 
unlike in the case of spontaneous actions, there is some uncertainty about the outcome 
and so the intervention of the agent involves deciding which action to perform. One 
famous example of this type of actions are the actions performed by subjects in Libet-type 
experiments. In this family of experiments, conceived originally by Benjamin Libet and 
colleagues89 but replicated by numerous other scientists90, subjects are asked to flex their 
wrist or to press one or more buttons, whenever they feel like it. Their decision might 
regard only the timing of the action (in the case of wrist flexing or pressing just one button) 
or both the timing and the action itself (in the case of choosing which of two buttons to 
press). In both cases, however, it is clear that the agent is put before different options (for 
example, at each instant she has to decide whether to press a button or not) and she is 
asked to decide on the spot. Subjects in these types of experiments are asked not to plan 
their actions in advance, and so what they will eventually do depends on a fast decision 
that is not preceded by a process of deliberation. 
This is analogous to what happens when we make immediate decisions in our everyday 
life, such as deciding which pair of socks to put on in the morning or which pack of 
Pampers diapers number 6 to pick at the supermarket. Admitting there is no reason to 
prefer one pack to another, nor to use the blue woolen socks rather than the green ones 
on a cold day in which I will be wearing boots, the decision is preceded by no deliberation, 
                                                          
89 Libet, B. Gleason, C.A., Wright E.W., Pearl D.K. (1983), mentioned in section 1.2. 
90 Most famously Soon C.S., Brass M., Heinze H.-J., Haynes J.-D. (2008) and Fried I., Mukamel R., 
Kreiman G. (2011), mentioned in section 1.2. 
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even though it is made and authored by the agent, who is influenced by previous habits 
and tendencies. Also in the case of actions-on-the-spot, agency is common to human and 
many non-human animals. Superior creatures like dogs, mice, sharks and snakes are 
obviously capable of making fast decisions when they are faced with alternatives. They 
can choose this path or that, they can go fetch some food or sit a little longer in the sun, 
they can chase a difficult prey or procrastinate. Like Helen Steward has pointed out: 
“If one watches a large farm animal, such as a cow or a sheep, engaged in its normal 
activities, it is almost impossible, I suggest, for a normal and unprejudiced human 
being to avoid looking upon it as an agent. One supposes, that is, that though nature 
may have prescribed for it a number of essential activities (grazing, mastication, sex, 
drinking of water, etc.) from which it is certainly not free to forbear, it nevertheless 
determines the details of how, when, and where exactly these activities are to be 
carried out.”91 
Last but not the least, deliberative actions are at the top of the pyramid. They regard 
those processes of choosing (and acting upon one’s choice) on the basis of reasons 
consciously weighed by an agent. When we think about which road to take to avoid traffic 
or whether to accept a new job far away from home, we take (more or less) time to 
consider the different options we have, the reasons for and against each option, and make 
a commitment for one of them based on these reasons. The main difference between the 
aforementioned actions-on-the-spot and deliberative actions is that in the former case 
reasons influence the choice the agent makes without she/it consciously considering them 
in advance, whereas in the latter case the reflective mind of the agent mediates the 
decision by pondering upon those reasons explicitly. This of course can happen very fast, 
maybe in a fraction of a second. 
This last degree of agency is human exclusive, so far as we can tell. It requires abstract 
reflection, something for which a high level of brain complexity is required. However, one 
must not forget that all the elements that distinguish the “lower” forms of agency from 
simpler behaviors are present in deliberative actions as well, namely, the ability to form 
                                                          
91 Steward, H. (2014), p.75. 
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intentions to act, reasons-responsiveness, and the capacity for decision-making. It is 
important to keep this in mind so that one does not make the mistake of inferring that 
the criterion for deliberative agency is simply reasoning. Instead, if we first analyze the 
requirements of agency as such, from its simplest to its most complex variations, it will 
become clear that agency is not possible without an irreducible entity endowed with 
downward causal powers. 
 
2.3. The contribution of the agent 
 
What happens when someone acts? This is the question David Velleman asked in his 
homonymous article of 1992. In that influential paper, Velleman presented an important 
objection to the davidsonian model of action production, according to which, under 
normal circumstances, beliefs and desires jointly cause the intention to perform a certain 
action. Velleman argues: 
“In this story, reasons cause an intention, and an intention causes bodily 
movements, but nobody – that is, no person – does anything. Psychological and 
physiological events take place inside a person, but the person serves merely as the 
arena for these events: he takes no active part.”92 
I follow Velleman’s lead here, even though his analysis is restricted to what he calls “full-
blooded actions” (the equivalent of deliberative actions), whereas I believe it could be 
extended to every form of agency. When an agent acts, her role can be described as: 1) 
forming an intention to act for certain reasons and 2) producing a bodily movement 
according to that intention. It is not the reasons that produce the intention per se, nor the 
intention that produces the movement. If that were the correct story, then we would be 
unable to justify why, under some circumstances (which might be abnormal, like the 
pathologies we analyzed in the previous section, as well as quite regular, as in cases of 
absent-minded or emotionally driven behavior), the agent can fail to participate in the 
                                                          
92 Velleman, D. (1992), p.461. 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 41 
behavior that she is supposed to be the author of. After all, in all these cases reasons and 
intentions would be present just the same. 
Like I said in the previous section, the difference between the behavior of addicts and 
non-addicts, for example, is not that the former is not driven by reasons. Addicted 
behavior is motivated by certain desires (for the drug) and beliefs (that shooting up a 
certain dose in a certain manner will provide the desired effect). The problem is that in 
such cases there is no intermediate agential intervention between the reasons and the 
intention, nor between the intention and the behavior. The drug addict goes about his 
business in autopilot mode, like a kleptomaniac or a manipulated person, and this is why 
his behavior cannot yet be considered to be an action.  
Velleman’s proposed way out of this problem is event-causal and reductionistic.  
“My objection to the standard story is not that it mentions mental occurrences in 
the agent instead of the agent himself; my objection is that the occurrences it 
mentions in the agent are no more than occurrences in him, because their 
involvement in an action does not add up to the agent's being involved.”93 
Velleman’s view is that agency cannot be reduced neither to reasons nor to intentions, 
because the agent intervenes between these elements. However, it would be question-
begging to assume that the agential intervention cannot consist in the occurrence of 
certain mental states. Since a naturalistic explanation, according to his view, must involve 
states and events94, what he suggests one should do, before giving in to a substance-
causal or dualistic alternative, is to look for an extra element that might play the causal 
role of the agent in cases of full-blooded action. He believes to have found such an 
element in a person’s desire to act for reasons: 
“The agent, in his capacity as agent, is that party who is always behind, and never in 
front of, the lens of critical reflection, no matter where in the hierarchy of motives it 
turns.  
                                                          
93 Idem, p.463. 
94 He is not clear about what he means by “events” or “occurrences”, but we can assume that he 
takes an event to be “a particular’s having a property at a time, or standing in a relation to another 
particular at a time” [Clarke, R. (2003), p.155]. 
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What mental event or state might play this role of always directing but never 
undergoing such scrutiny? It can only be a motive that drives practical thought itself. 
(…) What animates practical thought is a concern for acting in accordance with 
reasons. And I suggest that we think of this concern as embodied in a desire that 
drives practical thought.”95 
Can we follow Velleman in this reduction of the causal role of the agent to the desire to 
act for reasons, the desire to do what makes sense and is intelligible to her? I believe there 
are two main problems with this proposal. I have already mentioned the first problem, 
which is that Velleman’s account concerns only “full-blooded” actions, human actions par 
excellence. This is problematic because the element he identified as crucial cannot be 
adopted as definitory of agential intervention per se, from the level of spontaneous 
actions, through actions-on-the-spot, to deliberative actions. This is a drawback of his 
account because the degree of agential control with which I perform a daily routine action 
such as brushing my teeth is both very similar to the control I have when I deliberatively 
choose what to wear at an important meeting, and radically different from the degree of 
control a kleptomaniac has when she steals a certain object from her best friend. These 
similarities and differences are something that has to be accounted for. 
Also related to this first problem is the fact that Velleman chose to restrict his account to 
deliberative actions because he takes for granted that in many other cases (that “lack 
what distinguishes human action from other animal behaviour”96), people might perform 
an action without taking active part in it. This strikes me as incoherent for two reasons: 
On the one hand, because an action in which the agent is not active sounds like an 
oxymoron (even if philosophers can have very different positions concerning what the 
active participation of the agent amounts to). On the other, because if there is no 
difference between certain human actions and other animal behaviors, then either the 
putative human actions are actually behaviors or the so called animal behaviors are 
actually actions. Should the fact that a certain undertaking is performed by a human 
                                                          
95 Idem, pp.477-478. 
96 Idem, p. 462. 
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rather than a non-human animal suffice to define it as an action? I do not think so, and I 
hope to have made my case for this point in the previous section. 
The second problem with Velleman’s reductive account of the agential role as the desire 
to act for reasons is that it is too narrow. An action can be authored by the agent 
regardless of how the agent can herself explain it. It is entirely coherent to conceive the 
experience of doing things that we do not understand but which we fully endorse as 
actions that we performed intentionally: many of us (if not all) have had this experience 
some time or another. Also, we often act akratically, acting from reasons that we do not 
consider to be our best, and this does not prevent us from being accountable, nor others 
from giving us credit or blame for our acts – which reveals how much we are considered 
to have actively contributed to the action’s coming to be.  
Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder97 have made a similar objection to Velleman’s 
account with the help of Mark Twain’s famous character Huckleberry Finn. In what they 
qualify as an act of moral inverse akrasia (a situation in which the agent acts against what 
she considers best but, due to her lack of judgment, the akratic course of action is more 
praiseworthy than the alternative one), Huckleberry fails to return Jim, a runaway slave 
he became friends with, to Miss Watson, his lawful owner. Because of the moral principles 
he was taught in rural Missouri, Huck believes returning Jim is the right thing to do and 
blames himself as a weak and bad boy for not being capable of acting morally, according 
to his convictions: 
“Conscience says to me: ‘What had poor Miss Watson done to you, that you could 
see her nigger go off right under your eyes and never say one single word? What did 
that poor old woman do to you, that you could treat her so mean?...’ I got to feeling 
so mean and so miserable I most wished I was dead”98 
Even though weakness of will and moral weakness are two distinct phenomena99, they 
coincide in this case, given that Huckleberry is in fact failing to do something he believes 
                                                          
97 Arpaly, N., Schroeder, T. (1997). In the use of this example, the authors followed the lead of 
Jonathan Bennett’s (1974). 
98 Twain, M. (1885), quotations taken from the online edition at e-booksdirectory.com. 
99 Cf. Zilhão, A. (2005). 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR AGENT-CAUSATION 
 44 
to be both the right and the best thing to do. He wants to denounce Jim and he plans on 
doing it: 
“My conscience got to stirring me up hotter than ever, until at last I says to it: ‘Let up 
on me—it ain’t too late, yet—I’ll paddle ashore at first light, and tell.’ I felt easy, and 
happy, and light as a feather, right off. All my troubles was gone.” 
However, Jim’s trust in him (his words of goodbye: “Dah you goes, de ole true Huck; de 
on’y white genlman dat ever kep’ his promise to ole Jim”) make his emotions win over his 
rational decision. When the chance comes to tell on the runaway slave, he just cannot 
find the strength to do it: 
“I didn’t answer up prompt. I tried to, but the words wouldn’t come. I tried, for a 
second or two, to brace up and out with it, but I warn’t man enough—hadn’t the 
spunk of a rabbit. I see I was weakening; so I just give up trying.” 
What Arpaly and Schroeder argue is that Velleman’s account fails to justify the common 
intuition that Huckleberry’s action is praiseworthy, despite its akratic nature. In fact, 
according to Velleman, an agent is not accountable for acts contrary to the desire to act 
rationally; Huck’s motivation is not grounded on a desire to act for reasons, it is driven by 
a gut feeling of sympathy for Jim, hence the boy deserves no praise for what he has done. 
Since I am not concerned with moral judgement, I will not pursue this argument. My point 
instead is that Velleman’s view would prevent us from even considering Huck’s act as a 
proper action, and this seems utterly unreasonable to me.  
If Huckleberry is able to find many more reasons in favor of the action of returning Jim 
than in favor of the action of protecting him – which is, in fact, an alternative in favor of 
which he can find no reason at all – then, on Velleman’s account, when he fails to act 
according to his reasons, he quits being an agent. There is no agential intervention in the 
causal sequence that leads to his bodily movements; they constitute a mere animal 
behavior. This is such a counterintuitive conclusion that we just have to give up the view 
that would force us to accept it. When in Huckleberry’s difficult deliberation, sympathy 
ends up weighing more than morality, there is a clear intervention of his self. His desire 
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to act for reasons (a desire which he did have and intended to act on) fails to move him, 
because he is not passive, because he takes sides.  
But is the misjudgment of this case as a sub-actional behavior a problem related to the 
specific attitude that Velleman chose as being functionally identical to the agent (the 
desire to act for reasons), or is it a more general drawback capable of affecting any similar 
type of account? 
I believe that no reductionist account of the agent can appropriately respond to the 
problem that Velleman points out. He claims: 
“What makes us agents rather than mere subjects of behaviour – in our conception 
of ourselves, at least, if not in reality – is our perceived capacity to interpose 
ourselves into the course of events in such a way that the behavioural outcome is 
traceable directly to us.”100 
I agree entirely. But I suspect that, no matter what psychological states and events a 
reductionist might elect as the core elements that can “speak for the agent”101, there will 
always be an available counterexample of an action that lacks that element in its etiology 
but which we are willing to count as an action nonetheless. What is it that grants us the 
“capacity to interpose ourselves into the course of events in such a way that the 
behavioural outcome is traceable directly to us” in all the events that we call actions? 
What is undoubtedly present in all actions is not a state but rather an ability: it is the 
agent’s power to form an intention to act and, through that intention, to be the cause of 
the action – that is, her Will.  
The will is a tricky concept in the philosophy of action. It has recently been associated with 
volitionism, a theory according to which what defines an action as such is that it is either 
identical or it begins with a basic mental action called a volition (which is the agent’s 
willing or trying to move her body in a certain way). What motivates volitionists is the idea 
that it should not be an external element such as the action’s causal history, to determine 
whether it is in fact an action or just an event. What characterizes basic actions should be 
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101 Bratman, M. (2007), p.4. 
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a noncausal element, such as an “actish phenomenal quality”102 or some sort of intrinsic 
intentionality103. However, this view faces many problems, most importantly the idea that 
the agent (as well as her reasons) acts without causing the action. How does the action 
come about, in a physical world? As it has become clear so far, I do endorse a causalist 
view according to which the agent’s reasons (as well as her intention) are among the 
causes of her action. So I will define the will in a way that is independent from volitionist 
theories. 
In my view, the agent’s will is her power to make decisions or to form intentions to act. 
This power is not a human exclusive ability. Like I have said before, spontaneous actions 
and actions-on-the-spot can be performed by any animal whose mental capacities include 
the possession of beliefs and desires, the formation of intentions and, sometimes, the 
making of decisions. I contend that most mammals, for instance, can be said to be able to 
act of their own will.  
This may seem surprising to the philosophical community, a large portion of which tends 
to attribute propositional attitudes to creatures with language only104. However, once we 
engage in common interactions with animals (say dogs, cats, horses), we interpret their 
behavior on the basis of the assumption that they do what they do because of what they 
want, believe and intend. The general assumption in experimental neuroscience, for 
instance, is also that the evolutionary continuity in biological systems allows us to infer 
that animals share with us the ability to act for reasons despite their lack of language. For 
example, neuroscience has been studying the neural basis of decision-making for over a 
decade and the main trend is to assume that “the path from simple decisions to complex 
ones may be more straightforward than it appears”105, since the models that have been 
developed in experiments in non-human primates as well as in rodents can apply 
successfully to humans106. 
                                                          
102 Ginet, C. (1990), p.13. 
103 McCann, H. (1998), p.163. 
104 Cf. Davidson, D. (1982). 
105 Gold, J.I., Shadlen, M.N. (2007), p.562. 
106 I am referring, for example, to the integration-to-bound model according to which the brain 
accumulates inputs (which may come from the environment, in evidence-based decisions, as well 
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However, it is important to note that to say that an animal or human agent acts of her 
own will is different from saying that she acts of her own free will. In fact, the question we 
must ask now is if all actions are equal in what concerns the agent’s degree of control and 
freedom. This is what I will turn to in the next section. 
 
2.4. Free action and free will  
 
We have seen so far that in order for an action to be such, it has to be intentional. This 
implies that it must be the product of the agent’s willful act of forming an intention to act 
in a certain way. This means that every action is a free action, in a certain sense: it is an 
event that is brought about by an agent in such a way that it was not made inevitable by 
any extrinsic cause (it was not coerced), nor by an intrinsic force (it was not compulsory); 
instead, it was appropriately caused by the agent’s intention to act for certain reasons 
(beliefs and desires). The agent did what she did because she so decided or simply 
intended.  
This is not the only way in which one can conceive of freedom, though. In the classical 
debate on the compatibility between determinism and free will, this sense of free action 
is not what is at the center of the controversy. An agent may perfectly well have the ability 
and the possibility to do what she wants, but the question incompatibilist philosophers 
ask is: could she have wanted otherwise? In other words: is her will free? 
The difference between both these meanings of freedom became apparent in the famous 
seventeenth century debate between Thomas Hobbes and Bishop John Bramhall, in which 
the former argued: 
                                                          
as be caused by some inner source of variability, in spontaneous decisions) voting for or against 
an action, but only commits to a definite decision once a certain threshold is crossed. This model, 
which is practically consensual in what concerns animal evidence-based decisions [Roitman, J.D., 
Shadlen, M.N. (2002), Hanes, D.P.,  Schall, J.D. (1996), Krajbich, I. et al. (2010)], has recently been 
argued to provide an adequate explanation for the “readiness potential” (a typical neural pattern 
observed in a EEG) which precedes actions-on-the-spot in the abovementioned Libet experiments 
performed in humans [Murakami, M. et al. (2014), Rigato, J. et al. (2015)].  
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“Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the 
nature and intrinsical quality of the agent. (…) I conceive that nothing takes beginning 
from itself, but from the action of some other immediate agent without itself. (…) So 
that whereas it is out of controversy that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary 
cause, and by this which is said the will is also caused by other things whereof it 
disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes and 
therefore are necessitated.”107 
Determinism is the contemporary term for what Hobbes called “necessity”: it is the causal 
nature of a world in which given a full description of all its elements and laws at t1, only 
one possible state can follow at t2108. In other words, a world in which given a certain 
physical cause, the physical effect becomes inevitable. It is clear, then, how Hobbes’ 
freedom of action is independent from the truth of determinism. According to his 
compatibilist view, what is crucial is that the agent’s intention to act is caused by her will, 
which is identified with her most effective desire. It becomes irrelevant whether her will 
is necessitated or not by previous causes. But Bramhall questioned this view: even if the 
agent may act as she wills, “if the will has no power over itself, the agent is no more than 
a staff on a man’s hand”109:  
“Whosoever have power of election have true liberty, for the proper act of liberty is 
election. A spontaneity may consist with determination to one, as we see in children, 
fools, madmen, brute beasts, whose fancies are determined to those things which 
they act spontaneously, as the bees make honey, the spiders webs. But none of these 
have a liberty of election, which is an act of judgment and understanding, and cannot 
possibly consist with a determination to one.”110 
                                                          
107 Hobbes, T. (1654), Of Liberty and Necessity, in Chappell, V. (1999), p.38. 
108 Robert Bishop (2011) defines physical determinism on the basis of four conditions: differential 
dynamics, unique evolution, value determinateness and absolute prediction. I believe that the 
concept of Unique Evolution [although defined by Bishop in the language of physical science: “A 
model is such that a given state is always followed by the same state transitions” (p.85)] is the one 
that can capture best the feature of determinism that underlies its tension with free will: the 
existence of only one possible future, given the past and laws of nature.    
109 Bramhall, J. (1655), cit. in Chappell, V. (1999), p.44. 
110 From Bramhall’s original “Discourse of liberty and necessity” (written in 1645, but unpublished 
until 1676), in Chappell, V. (1999), p.2. 
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Bramhall’s ideas were actually a reflection of his scholastic inheritance (contrasting with 
Hobbes’ modern materialism) and they are still present today, under different versions, 
in the libertarian theories of free will. One of the most famous ones is Robert Kane’s, 
according to whom free will is “the power of agents to be the ultimate creators (or 
originators) and sustainers of their own ends or purposes”111. 
Under a view such as Hobbes’, that reduces the agent’s will to her “desires and 
inclinations” (or to her most effective one), the possession of these reasons is sufficient 
to cause the production of an intention to act accordingly. The intention is an 
intermediate mental state, caused by other mental states (beliefs and desires), leading to 
the action. The problem is that such an account faces the objection we developed in the 
previous section: it reduces the agent to the locus where the whole causal chain that leads 
from reasons to action takes place, and nothing more. Since the will is a state and not an 
ability, the agent’s role is passive, for what brings about the action are the beliefs and 
desires that she has, not something that she actually does – and this seems to be an 
unsteady basis on which to ground the distinction between actions and behaviors.  
It is in order to avoid this drawback that many contemporary philosophers of action112 as 
well as myself endorse the view according to which the active element of forming an 
intention is crucial for an action to be considered such. As I have already explained, the 
will is the name given to this ability by which the agent intervenes in the causal chain by 
committing herself to a plan and hence actively contributing to the outcome.  
This type of account is noncommittal with regard to the question of determinism, for what 
is crucial is the active forming of an intention, not that that intention-forming act can 
escape causal determinism. And since the agent’s will does not have to be indeterministic 
in nature for an intentional behavior (an action) to be clearly distinguished from an 
unintentional one, there seems to be no reason to think that action cannot take place in 
a deterministic world. The agent can act even if her will could not have been different 
                                                          
111 Kane, R. (1998), p.4. 
112 Cf. Bratman, M. (1987) and Mele, A. (1992). 
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from what it is. So we can conclude that actions are always free (in a compatibilitist sense), 
but need not be free willed (in a libertarian sense). 
However, even if the structure of action as such does not imply that the agent’s will be 
free, the degree of control the agent possesses over her action increases when it is in fact 
free, for she becomes able to settle not only what she will do but also what she wants to 
do. John Martin Fisher established an important distinction between these two types of 
control, which he calls respectively “guidance control” (a reasons-responsive mechanism 
that is the agent's own) and “regulative control” (which involves the ability to choose and 
act differently under the exact same circumstances). 
“[S]uppose you are at the controls of an airplane, a glider, and you are guiding the 
plane to the west. (…) You consider whether to steer the plane to the east, but you 
decide to keep guiding it to the west, in part because the scenery is nicer in the west. 
Unknown to you, the wind currents in the area are such that the plane would 
continue to go to the west, in just the way it actually goes, even if you had tried to 
steer it in some other direction. (…) In this example, you steer the plane to the west 
in the “normal” way. It is not just that you cause it to go to the west (which you 
would equally have done had you steered the plane in the same way as a result of a 
sneeze or an epileptic seizure). Rather, you guide the plane in a distinctive way — 
you exhibit a signature sort of control, which I shall call “guidance control.” Here you 
exhibit guidance control of the plane’s movements, but you do not possess 
regulative control over the plane’s movements.”113 
Regulative control is the type of control that Bramhall aimed at, one that gives the agent 
that “liberty of election” by which she can be in charge of her own will notwithstanding 
the past and present circumstances, her character and reasons. An action that proceeds 
from this level of control is different from an action over which the agent possesses only 
guidance control because in the former case there are open alternative futures and the 
agent has the power to determine which becomes actual, whereas in the latter case there 
are not. However, the possibility of someone acting with a libertarian type of control is 
                                                          
113 Fischer, J.M. (2006), p.8. 
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still under heavy controversy because of its questionable coherence and (according to 
many) scientific implausibility. 
These are topics I will assess only further ahead in this dissertation. For now, I am 
concerned with other important implications of the capacity of forming an intention to 
act per se, which might give us a surprising new perspective on the compatibilism/ 
incompatibilism debate.  
 
2.5. A non-aggregational agent 
 
If the active role of the agent in raising her arm marks out a contrast with what happens 
to her in cases of unwilled behaviors, then the existence of an intention-forming entity 
responsible for the mental act of forming an intention to act must be assumed. And here 
is where agent-causalism, a theory that has been met with much undeserved suspicion, 
enters the picture.  
If the agent were nothing more than the mereological sum of her mental states and events 
and their neural correlates (a "bundle or collection of different perceptions"114, quoting 
Hume) and her intending could be reduced to her intention being brought about by some 
of those, then there would be nothing, besides them, which might influence the 
behavioral outcome. On such an account, the agent would in fact be just a name given to 
a collective entity, which would be constituted and controlled by its parts (her reasons 
and other intentional states), without in turn being able to control them, whether they 
were necessitated or not by past events.  
A “humean” agent is a composite entity with structural properties115, just like rocks or 
plants are, and thus her bringing it about that she will do A instead of B is actually the 
                                                          
114 Hume, D. (1738), A Treatise of Human Nature, 1.4.6.4 (the Norton edition, the last number 
indicating the paragraph). 
115 Cf. O’Connor’s definition of structural properties: "A property, S, is structural if and only if 
proper parts of particulars having S have some property or properties not identical with S, and this 
state of affairs is constitutive of the state of affairs of the particular's having S." [O’Connor, T. 
(2000), p.109]. 
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result of each of her parts’ causing a certain complex collection of events at the mental as 
well as the neural level. Thus for an action to be brought about by the agent, as opposed 
to her being passive relative to the occurrences taking place within her, the agent as such 
must be the cause of the action, by willing. This means that at the psychological level as 
well as at the neurophysiological one, the agent whose will determines the outcome must 
be something more than some of, or all, her mental states.  
Let us go back to some of the examples we used in previous sections in order to 
understand this better. When one compares the compelled behavior of a kleptomaniac, 
a drug addict or a manipulated person, on the one hand, with the willful acts of a person 
under normal conditions, on the other, one realizes that the main difference between 
them lies in the degree of control that connects the agent with her action. What the first 
three cases have in common is that they describe people that are not in charge of their 
behavior, even if it flows out from their inner mental states. On the contrary, the regular 
agent is someone whose autonomous will can supersede the blindness of event causality 
which would otherwise make her an automaton. Both compatibilists and incompatibilists 
agree that self-determined action entails physical and moral responsibility insofar as it 
involves control, and control is another word for authorship. If the agent were not the 
author of the action, her behavior would be something that happens to her and not 
something she does. The agent’s power lies in the fact that she herself (and not the 
psychological and neural events that happen within her) is the action’s author.  
Therefore, any view that recognizes the importance of the intention-forming act requires 
the postulation of a “non-aggregational”116 self, who is endowed with the ability to 
commit to a plan based on (but not necessitated by) the reasons it has, and whose causal 
power to so intend is not merely derivative. Such a view is clearly an agent-causal view: 
one that considers the agent as a fundamental cause of the action, a necessary cause that 
cannot be described in event-causal terms117. 
                                                          
state of affairs of the particular's having S. 
116 I am borrowing this term from Clarke, R. (n.d.). 
117 Whether the agent-causalist will endorse an account of the agent that defines the human 
person as an animal, a brain, a soul or something else, is something that I believe can be left 
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Many event-causalists counter this view by arguing that there is a way to avoid passivity 
without having to postulate the agent’s ability to intervene via some sort of emergent and 
downwardly effective causal power. Like Velleman’s “desire to act for reasons” that I have 
already presented here, other solutions proposed by Frankfurt118, Watson119 or 
Bratman120 purport to show that if the agent (as a complex psychophysical system) 
functionally identifies with some of her states and these states play the self-determining 
causal role in bringing about the action, then, thanks to that identification, it is as though 
the action was directly caused by the agent as such. What is needed, these authors say, is 
that the agent’s effective reasons are recognized by the agent’s evaluative system as valid 
and thus fully endorsed. 
I do not deem this suggestion to be capable of adequately distinguishing a free agent from 
someone who is a victim of addiction, for instance. The identification of the agent with 
the desire that caused her to act could have happened merely by chance! Imagine the 
case of a kleptomaniac who defends the righteousness of theft and conscientiously wishes 
to steal: when he falls prey to his compulsive behavior, he is no more in control of it than 
some other kleptomaniac who does not want to steal. It does not matter if he might agree 
or identify with his action: what does matter is what eventually caused it121.  
To conclude, agents whose free actions are internally caused by their psychophysical 
states in the same manner as their compulsory or unconscious actions are, cannot be 
considered agents at all. This implies a non-aggregational account of their authoring self, 
which must be irreducible to any mental states and events that might have the power to 
                                                          
unsettled for now. Unlike what is sometimes thought, an agent-causal view does not need to 
presuppose some spiritual being in order to have theoretical coherence, it only needs an 
irreducible substance (which can be something as concrete as a living and thinking brain) whose 
power to act amounts to more than the sum of the powers of its parts. Timothy O’Connor (2000), 
Randolph Clarke (2003), Jonathan Lowe (2008) and, more recently, Helen Steward (2014) are all 
examples of authors who tried to put forward accounts of agent-causation that are compatible 
with a naturalistic stance. 
118 Frankfurt, H. (1971). 
119 Watson, G. (1975). 
120 Bratman, M. (2000, 2005, 2007). 
121 This case is very similar to that of Frankfurt’s willing addict, that I have already mentioned here 
(Frankfurt, H. (1971). 
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bring about their bodily movements in cases of sub-actional behavior, while at the same 
time being present and active in all those cases that we are willing to consider proper 
actions.  
 
2.6. Agent-causal libertarianism 
 
There is a peculiarity in my analysis so far that might have caught the attention of some 
of my readers: I am not following the standard approach according to which compatibilist 
accounts of agency always reduce the agent’s causing the action to events involving her 
causing it, while libertarian accounts might either do that or not. In the usual taxonomy, 
in fact, only libertarians are given the option between event-causal incompatibilist 
accounts or the less popular agent-causal accounts, which have been heavily criticized as 
ontologically obscure and scientifically implausible. 
As I have pointed out, any reductionist view about agency falls short of endowing the 
agent with enough authorship over what she is doing. If an account of action does not 
leave room for the agent’s intervention, it will be unable to tell apart sub-actional 
behavior from proper actions and to justify the intuitive belief according to which these 
are different sorts of things. This entails that agent-causalism, i.e. the view that includes 
the agent as a causal element apart from her mental states and events (or their neural 
correlates), can and should be defended by both compatibilists and incompatibilists122. 
Libertarian agent-causalists, however, have an extra argument against event-causal 
versions of their contention that free action implies an indeterministic type of free will. In 
order to understand this argument, let me first present briefly how their position is 
framed in the contemporary debate about free will. 
According to any incompatibilist view, the agent can be said to act freely only if she has 
the ability to make different choices under the exact same circumstances, given the past 
and laws of nature. This means that, if the film of the universe were to be replayed all 
                                                          
122 Helen Steward (2014) is one of the few who has defended such an account. Other authors have 
discussed it, such as Randolph Clarke (2003, pp.163-3) and Christopher Franklin (forthcoming c). 
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over again, from the Big Bang up until now, and every single detail were to happen exactly 
the same way, the agent might still act otherwise here and now and thus give rise to 
alternative futures. 
Libertarianism is the name given to all forms of non-skeptical incompatibilism and event-
causalism is its most popular version. It relies on the idea that all causes are events and 
on a causal theory of action according to which “an event is taken to be an action in virtue 
of being caused in a certain way by mental events of certain sorts”123. It differs from 
compatibilism only in the requirement that the causal relation between those mental 
events and the agent’s action be undetermined, i.e., that there be genuine open 
alternatives up to the moment when an intention is formed. As in any other cases of 
indeterministic causation, the effect is underdetermined by its causes and so it is not 
empirically necessary but only probable. In the specific case of free decision, all the 
reasons the agent acted on, and were thus effective in producing that particular action, 
did cause it; they made it possible, but not inexorable.  
In contrast, according to agent-causal libertarianism, there is an extra crucial element that 
must enter the etiology of action: the agent, who is the one who “tips the balance”124 in 
cases of torn decisions and the one up to whom the ultimate choice is, even in cases of 
unbalanced options. One of the main objections that agent-causal libertarians (as well as 
some nihilists) make to their event-causal counterpart is the so called “disappearing agent 
argument”125 (which is similar to Velleman’s objection to the davidsonian picture of action 
production, but with a further element regarding chance). The argument can be stated as 
follows:  
                                                          
123 Clarke, R. (2003), p.25. 
124 This image is used by Carl Ginet, criticizing Clarke’s view on the collaborative causation of free 
action by reasons and the agent as a substance, in Kane, R., ed. (2002), p. 398. 
125 Cf. Pereboom, D. (2001, 2004, 2007, 2012); Griffith, M. (2010). The “No-Choice argument” by 
Peter Van Inwagen argues in a similar manner for the agent’s insufficient control over his own 
decision: “If an agent’s act was caused but not determined by his prior inner state, and if nothing 
besides that inner state was causally relevant to the agent’s act, then that agent had no choice 
about whether that inner state was followed by that act” [van Inwagen, P. (1983), p.149, cit. in 
Clarke, R. (2003), p.98].   
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DISAPPEARING AGENT - If the decision remains genuinely undetermined up to the 
very last moment, and if the agent can be reduced to her psychophysical 
states and events, which ultimately bring about that decision, then she has an 
insufficient control over which decision is eventually made.  
This is a very strong consequence of both the first presupposition of any incompatibilist 
account (that the decision is indeterministically caused) and event-causalism (the idea 
that everything that happens in the world is caused by occurrences rather than by 
objects). As Derk Pereboom framed it: 
“With the causal role of the antecedent events already given, whether the decision 
occurs is not settled by any causal factor involving the agent. In fact, given the causal 
role of all causally relevant antecedent events, nothing settles whether the decision 
occurs.”126 
The final decision happens merely by chance, and the agent ‘disappears’ from the causal 
etiology of action. This is hardly something a libertarian should feel comfortable with. 
However, according to agent-causalists and other critics of event-causalism, the 
disappearing agent problem arises only if the libertarian should assume a reductionist 
account of the agent127 together with an event-causal view. As Timothy O’Connor, one of 
the few contemporary agent-causalists, illuminatingly put it:  
“Even though the [event-causal libertarian] account allows for the real possibility of 
different courses of action, any of which would be ‘controlled’ by the agent in the minimal 
sense of being an ‘outflowing’ of the agent, it’s not ‘up to the agent,’ something he ‘has a 
choice about,’ just which potential cause will be efficacious in any given instance and so 
which action will actually occur. It is, rather, a matter of its falling under a statistical or 
quasi-statistical tendency that governs the general pattern of behavior in types of 
                                                          
126 Pereboom, D. (2014b), p.61. 
127 Even though they usually do, it is important to note that neither compatibilists nor event-causal 
libertarians have to commit to a reductionist account of the agent. One thing is the answer to this 
metaphysical question: “which kinds of things are causes?”; another is the answer to this question 
of basic ontology: “what fundamental things are there?”; another still is the answer to questions 
related to action theory: “What is an action and what sort of thing is an agent?”. While the event-
causal libertarian gives, of course, an event-causal answer to the first question, she could 
nevertheless consider the agent to be an irreducible substance. Just not a substance-cause. 
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circumstance over time, and this probabilistic tendency clearly is not something the agent 
has any choice about”. 128 
For an action to be freely brought about by the agent, she must have the capacity to settle 
which of the possible alternatives becomes actual, and this depends both on the 
metaphysics of causation that is true of our world (or at least of action production), and 
on the ontology that defines what an agent is. On the one hand, it must be the agent, as 
the bearer of certain properties, that causes an action to occur, as opposed to it being the 
event of her having, coming-to-have or ceasing-to-have a certain property or causal power 
at a certain time. On the other, this agent must be conceived in a non-humean way. In 
fact, under an aggregationist or humean ontology, the causing that is experienced by the 
agent as a whole is actually the result of many tiny causal processes and that, as we have 
seen above, would prevent us from adequately distinguishing actions from non-actional 
behaviors. A substance-causal metaphysics is not sufficient for agent-causation, since the 
irreducibility of the agent’s causal powers to events involving her does not entail the 
irreducibility of herself as a substance-cause. 
To sum up, a libertarian theory that wishes to enhance the agent’s control over her action 
must make two major modifications to its underlying metaphysics: 
1) It will have to abandon the idea that all causes are states or events, for an 
alternative view that recognizes that causes of (at least129) actions are substances. 
This will allow it to accept that the agent herself, as an irreducible substance, is the 
ultimate cause of her actions.  
2) For that second clause to be true, the agent-causalist will also have to substitute 
robust accounts of the self (emergentist or dualist), for the bundle approaches that 
reduce the agent to the sum of her parts. 
                                                          
128 O’Connor, T. (2000), p.29. 
129 E.J. Lowe, for example, endorses the view according to which all causes are substances: 
“Events, in my view, may be said to be causes at best only in a loose and derivative sense, as a 
convenient façon de parler.” [Lowe, E. J. (2008), p.5]. 
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These are the same two modifications that I have contended any realist account of action 
(even a compatibilist one) must make. The second of these (the need for an irreducible 
self) appears to be in contrast with the reductionist research program that has allowed 
for the extremely detailed knowledge we have today about the mechanisms underlying 
behavior in biological systems. This knowledge is improving at a very fast pace and any 
philosophical account of action or free will must beware of assuming empirical 
commitments that may easily be refuted. Nevertheless, I am willing to embrace the 
challenge of understanding how agency might be possible in the physical world, as it is 
presented to us by the natural sciences.  
As we have seen in the beginning of this chapter, scientific accounts too assume actions 
to be distinct from mere reflexes in that they manifest some sort of freedom from 
immediacy and presuppose a self that is in control. I believe what I have argued so far 
shows that these assumptions are incompatible with a reductionist account of action 
production. But is reductionism not an assumption as well? 
My point is that, in order to avoid this apparent contradiction between a non-deflationist 
account of agency and the truth of reductionist physicalism, we must analyze better the 
assumptions upon which science stands and see how solid and indispensable they are. 
The problems of action, the mind-body relation, causation and the ontology of 
hierarchical levels in the organization of physical reality are all intertwined. As Helen 
Steward pointed out: 
“An answer to [the question how agency is possible] will require also an 
understanding of what could lead us to want to say that an organism rather than 
merely some part of one, or some process within one, has brought something about, 
and of how the causality thereby effected (the causality that is agency) relates to the 
causality involved in the sub-personal processes that make it possible.”130 
Ultimately, for both philosophers and scientists, it is worth asking these questions: How 
can a macro substance have downward causal effects over the undertakings of the parts 
                                                          
130 Steward, H. (2014), p.11. 
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that constitute her? In the concrete case of human action, how can we say that the agent 
as such is the non-derivative cause of her bodily movements?  





3. IRREDUCIBILITY IN NATURE 
 
 
“Given the advent of quantum mechanics and these other scientific 
theories, there seems not a scintilla of evidence that there are emergent 
causal powers or laws in the sense in question…  and there seems not a 
scintilla of evidence that there is downward causation from the 
psychological, biological and chemical levels.”  
(Brian McLaughlin, 1992) 
 
 
3.1. Definition and History of Emergence 
 
Emergentism, in its various forms, is the view according to which there are features of 
reality that are irreducible to the lower-level basis from which they emerge, in the sense 
that they are more than just the result of the combination of the system’s parts and their 
interactions. These features are paradoxically (or so it seems) both dependent on and 
autonomous from their emergence base, i.e. from the lower-level that brings them about. 
This type of theory has been developed in very many areas, from different scientific 
branches to philosophy. In the latter field, its study stems from metaphysics and the 
philosophy of mind (in which the focus has been mainly on the relationship between 
mental/conscious entities and their physiological substrate), to philosophy of science in 
general (where the focus is on whether certain theories are reducible to others or not), to 
philosophy of physics (where emergence seems to be a good conceptual tool for 
explaining nonlinear phenomena) and philosophy of biology in particular (where the main 
interest is top-down causation in self-organizing systems). Needless to say, there is no 
uniformity in the way the concept of emergence is used and in the candidates that are 
accepted as good examples of emergent phenomena. 
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I will now present briefly the history of this concept in philosophy and frame the account 
I believe is useful and relevant for the discussion that concerns me in this dissertation. 
“British emergentism”131 was very popular in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and the first quarter of the twentieth century. Authors like Samuel Alexander132, C. D. 
Broad133 and Lloyd Morgan134, among many others, endeavored to develop an account of 
phenomena like life or the mind that could be somehow intermediate between 
Mechanism and Vitalism. The former position seemed insufficient to explain the 
surprisingly novel properties that arise in nature at certain levels of complexity, whereas 
the latter was a dualist alternative which gave up on the goal of explaining how those 
properties could fit the natural order. The so called classical emergentists chose a third 
path instead, in which monism was rendered compatible with the irreducibility of special 
features like life or consciousness to the microphysical: 
“Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain wholes, 
composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each other; that all 
wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B, and C in relations of the 
same kind as R have certain characteristic properties; that A, B, and C are capable of 
occurring in other kinds of complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R; 
and that the characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory, 
be deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in 
isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C).”135 
This means that the relations the primary constituents are involved in are what 
determines the systemic properties of the whole they will compose. Each different case 
of emergence manifests a “unique and irreducible law”136, which can be learnt only 
empirically, not deductively, and which is what renders the systemic properties novel, 
despite their dependence on the substrate from which they arise. They are produced by 
                                                          
131 Cf. McLaughlin, B.P. (1992). 
132 Alexander, S. (1920). 
133 Broad, C.D. (1925). 
134 Morgan, C.L. (1923). 
135 Broad, C. D. (1925), p.61. 
136 Idem, p.68. 
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the underlying elements and their arrangements, as they could not exist without them, 
but they are qualitatively new and unpredictable a priori. Whenever they appear, the 
general “principle of composition of causes”137, according to which the effects are 
proportional to the causes, fails, which means that systemic properties are no longer 
resultant (additive).  
Ingenious as this proposal might be, its classical versions were very problematic. When 
faced with the need to explain how this new type of relation worked, classical 
emergentists had no positive account to offer, and considered emergent entities as just a 
brute fact, a fundamental and irreducible expression of the laws of nature: 
“The higher quality emerges from the lower level of existence and has its roots 
therein, but it emerges therefrom, and it does not belong to that level, but 
constitutes its possessor a new order of existent with its special laws of behaviour. 
The existence of emergent qualities thus described is something to be noted, as some 
would say, under the compulsion of brute empirical fact, or, as I should prefer to say 
in less harsh terms, to be accepted with the ‘natural piety’ of the investigator. It 
admits no explanation.”138 
However, stating the unexplainability of certain facts does not illuminate the very problem 
that unexplainability represents and this has led many to consider that emergence was 
just another way of casting spooky phenomena out of the realm of natural science. Also, 
scientific improvements like the discovery of the DNA and the quantum mechanical 
explanation of chemical bonding dictated the fall of British emergentism, as it was too 
much based on the contingent lack of knowledge of nineteenth century science for it to 
be able to survive the incredible explanatory power of new reductive theories139. 
Recently, the concept of emergence has regained attention and the merits of its 
applicability to various fields have been defended with more sophisticated examples and 
arguments, both among scientists as well as philosophers of science, philosophers of mind 
                                                          
137 Cf. John Stuart Mill (1868). 
138 Alexander, S. (1920), vol.II, pp.46-7. 
139 Cf. McLaughlin, B.P. (1992). 
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and metaphysicians140. The interest grew back due to various reasons, among which the 
developments in condensed matter physics which unveiled the impossibility of deducing 
the phenomena observed at the level of many-body physics by extrapolation from the 
properties of single particles (as in examples of spontaneous symmetry breaking). The 
implications of this problem for the myth of reductionism were famously explicated in a 
very influential article by Nobel laureate Philip Anderson entitled “More is different”. 
“The ability to reduce everything to simple fundamental laws does not imply the 
ability to start from those laws and reconstruct the universe. (…) Instead, at each level 
of complexity entirely new properties appear, and the understanding of the new 
behaviors requires research which I think is as fundamental in its nature as any 
other.”141 
Progresses keep being made in condensed matter physics, in the sense of exploring the 
philosophical consequences of some formal techniques aimed at explaining phenomena 
such as phase transitions, universality, and changes of scale142. But other fields in physical 
science have also contributed to the revival of emergentism, such as the physics of 
complex systems143 and quantum mechanics (which has sometimes been considered 
almost a paradigmatic case of irreducibility because of the holistic nature of quantum 
entanglement144). Also in some areas of philosophy, advances were favorable to the 
reclamation of the emergence hypothesis, such as in philosophy of science (with the 
putative failure of Nagelian forms of reduction145), philosophy of mind (because of the 
persistent dissatisfaction of many with reductive solutions to the mind-body problem146) 
                                                          
140 Cf. the interdisciplinary research developed presently at the University of Durham, founded by 
the Templeton Foundation (Durham Emergence Project). 
141 Anderson, P.W. (1972), p.222. 
142 Cf. Batterman, R. (2002). 
143 Cf. Hooker, C. (2011). 
144 Cf. Hütterman, A. (2005).  
145 Ernest Nagel (1961) provided a formal model of the explanatory unification of the different 
sciences, according to which the laws of the reducing theory would deductively entail the laws of 
the reduced theory, but no examples of such inter-theoretic reduction were ever accepted 
universally. 
146 Cf. Nagel, T. (1974), Jackson, F. (1982, 1986), Levine, J. (1983), Chalmers, D. (1996).  
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and metaphysics (in which recent dispositional147 and substance-causal theories of 
causation148 have given new motivation to the search for a coherent and plausible theory 
of emergence).  
For all these reasons, emergence is now considered a hot topic in philosophy and certainly 
not an outdated hypothesis in many scientific fields.  
Before I move on to section 3.2. in which I explore putative cases of emergence in physics, 
it is useful to distinguish between epistemological and ontological types of emergence. 
The former type is uncontroversial and regards the relation between theories and the 
impossibility to deduce higher-level laws or properties from our knowledge of the lower-
level elements and of the laws that govern their behavior and their relations. This might 
be only a practical impossibility that derives from the imperfections of our epistemic 
access to reality.  
In turn, ontological emergence regards the relation between entities themselves (beyond 
the theories that describe them). It is an in-principle insufficiency of the lower-level 
domain (for example, the neurobiological states, events and laws) to provide a 
satisfactory explanation for the novel entities and features that appear at the upper-level 
domain (for example, consciousness). These entities emerge from the lower-level but are 
autonomous in the sense that their behavior is not reducible to the underlying properties 
and laws (i.e. it is not derivable from nor identical to them). 
How can this in-principle irreducibility be established? We will get to that point in the next 
chapter, where I will attempt to show that we have independent reasons for considering 
that there are some phenomena in the world that can never be reduced to particle 
physics. However, regardless of those independent reasons, we must first put forward a 
more detailed account of what we mean by ontological emergence.   
What is most important about the possibility of ontologically emergent entities 
(properties or substances) is that they carry with them new causal powers that are not 
derivative, i.e. that are basic (despite belonging to composite individuals). O’Connor and 
                                                          
147 Cf. Mumford, S., Anjum, R.L. (2011), Jacobs, J.D., O’Connor, T. (2012). 
148 Cf. Lowe, E.J. (2008). 
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Wong have defined basic properties as “those properties whose instantiation does not 
even partly consist in the instantiation of distinct properties by the entity or its parts”. 
And they add:  
“It is the thesis of emergentism that some basic properties are had by composite 
individuals.”149 
Unlike structural properties150, the causal powers of which just amount to the collective 
entity’s parts having certain properties and relating to each other in a certain way, 
emergent causal powers are not reducible to the causal powers of their emergence base. 
This means that the causal effects the upper-level entity can have are distinct from the 
effects its emergence base can have, even if we take into account all its parts and their 
relations.  
For something to be correctly labeled as an emergent, it has to be both novel and real. 
The criterion most emergentists (myself included) assume to determine whether 
something is real (rather than just a collective entity that can be identified at a certain 
level of description but which has no ontological status of its own) is the so-called 
Alexander’s dictum: To be is to have causal powers. Therefore, an emergent entity cannot 
be epiphenomenal – it has to be able to have causal effects in the world –, and it has to 
be novel – which means that its causal efficacy as a whole has to amount to more than 
the sum of the causings of its parts. So emergence entails upper-level causation: which 
can be same-level causation (e.g. mental-to-mental) or downward causation (e.g. mental 
to-neural).    
Not all philosophers agree with this statement, though. John Searle, for instance, 
distinguishes between “emergent 1” features and “emergent 2” features: The former are 
not explainable only on the basis of the system’s components and their arrangements, 
and rather require the causal interactions between the elements to be part of their 
explanation (that is why they are emergent 1). The latter, however, have the added merit 
of possessing causal powers that cannot be explained by the causal interaction of the 
                                                          
149 O’Connor and Wong (2005), p.664. 
150 I am borrowing this term and this distinction from O’Connor and Wong (2005, p.663). 
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system’s components, which Searle recognizes is a necessary condition for there to be 
downward causation. But alas, there are no cases of emergence 2, according to him. Even 
consciousness is an emergent 1 feature, says Searle, and thereby causally reducible to its 
neurological substrate. 
Like I said in the beginning, this is one of the problems with the current literature on 
emergence: there is an enormous heterogeneity among concepts, with cases that some 
consider to be paradigmatic of emergence being rejected as clear examples of reducibility 
by others. Therefore, we must be clear from the start about what we believe emergence 
is and what instead are to be considered mere situations of structural complexity. 
I will then conclude this section with my definition of ontological emergence (the type of 
emergence I am concerned about): 
Ontological emergence is a relation between entities (substances or 
properties) belonging to different levels of organization of reality (different 
lengths and time scales), in which the lower-level structure gives rise to the 
higher-level entity without the novel causal properties manifested at the 
emergent level being reducible to the ones below.  
What does it mean to say that the emergent causal properties are irreducible?  
For the causal properties of the emergent entity to be irreducible is for them to 
be both distinct from and causally unexplainable in terms of the properties of 
the constituent or subvenient151 elements that originate them, nor in terms of 
the laws that govern their behavior and interactions.  
Several clarifications are in order. First, I refer to lower-level elements as “constituent or 
subvenient” because it is important that the entities that form the emergence base be 
                                                          
151 Subvenient entities (intended here as naturally subvenient rather than logically subvenient – I 
will develop this distinction in section 3.6.2) are lower-level properties, events, substances or laws 
that are in a natural supervenience relation with upper-level entities. The natural supervenience 
of non-fundamental entities on the bottom-most metaphysical domain is the philosophical term 
for the asymmetric covariance relation by which all macro changes that those entities undergo 
depend on corresponding micro changes, but not vice-versa. Many authors believe that 
emergence implies the break of natural supervenience. I do not believe so and will argue against 
those who do in sections 3.6 to 3.8. 
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allowed to consist in mereological parts as well as not. The relationship between the brain 
and the conscious mind, for instance, is not a part-whole relation (thus failing to count as 
a constitution relation) but it is a very good candidate for an emergence relation 
nonetheless. Second, note that in the definition of ontological irreducibility there is an 
epistemological element that I failed to eliminate: explanation. In fact, it is not sufficient 
to claim that the causal powers of an emergent entity are distinct from those of its 
emergence base. The causal powers of a composite whole are very often distinct from 
those of its parts but if they derive from them, they cannot be considered emergent. The 
properties of common table salt, for example, are totally different from the properties of 
its components (sodium and chlorine) taken separately, but they are derivable from their 
bottom-level features plus the laws that govern their interactions. This means that the 
physical and chemical properties of the bottom-level structure are sufficient to explain 
the properties we can find in the compound. On the contrary, in cases of emergence, “it 
is not possible to trace the determinative chain that goes from the emergence basis to the 
emergent”152. 
The fact that we have to use the epistemological concept of explanation in the definition 
of ontological emergence is revealing of our limitations as subjects, of course. We cannot 
assess the degree to which a certain portion of reality (the emergence base) is a sufficient 
condition for the coming to be of another portion of reality (the emergent entity), 
independently from our epistemic access to both of them. Because of this, as we will see 
in next few sections, it is very hard to establish whether a certain entity is only 
epistemically or also ontologically emergent. 
 
3.2. Emergence in Physics 
 
A commendable tendency in the past years in philosophy of science has been to develop 
accounts of emergence that move away from armchair metaphysics and anchor 
philosophical analyzes in scientific theory and practice. Two important examples are 
                                                          
152 Sartanaer, O. (2005), p.5. 
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Robert Bishop, a physicist and philosopher who has been working in questions of 
Emergence and Complex systems for many years, and Robert Batterman, a leading figure 
in Philosophy of Physics.  
Alone153 or together with Harald Atmanspacher (theoretical physicist)154, and more 
recently with Michael Silberstein155, Bishop developed an account of what he calls 
“contextual emergence”, which is a relation between different levels of description (in its 
epistemological form) or between domains of reality (in its ontological form), whereby 
the description, properties or behaviors156 of the lower domain provide some necessary 
but no sufficient conditions for the novelty existing at the upper-level. The remaining 
sufficient conditions must be provided by the context, which includes the emergent states 
and observables’ stability conditions (that guarantee their existence and persistence), 
which are not given by lower-level descriptions. Bishop and his co-authors use several 
examples as evidence for the ubiquity of contextual emergence, from the domain of 
quantum chemistry to that of human society. All of them have to do with scale 
transformations: how the laws of microphysics give rise to the laws and properties of the 
macro world. 
It is common knowledge that the transition from quantum to classical mechanics is a 
mysterious one. Mathematically, these two realms are separated by singular limits 
(mathematical expansions in which some quantities are assumed to tend either to zero or 
to infinity), which means that the transition between the formalism that describes the 
behavior of particles at the quantum level (the Hamiltonian dynamics) and the equations 
                                                          
153 Cf. Bishop, R.C. (2005, 2009). 
154 Cf. Bishop, R.C., Atmanspacher, H. (2006) 
155 Cf. Bishop, R.C., Silberstein, M. (n.d.). 
156 The word “behavior” in the context of physics refers to the changes in the properties and laws 
that we can use to describe the system under study: “With respect to the behavior of a physical 
system, we can distinguish the state of the system, its constants, and the laws that pertain to it. 
Some quantities of a physical system are constant; others vary with time. In the case of a single 
classical particle, we can distinguish position and momentum as changing quantities, whereas 
mass remains constant. The values of the varying quantities at a particular time are called the 
state of the physical system at this time. However, the constants and the state of a system do not 
determine the complete system’s behavior. Furthermore, we have laws that describe the 
connections between the various quantities involved, and in particular, they describe how the 
state of the system develops in time (the dynamics of the system).” [Hütterman, A. (2005), p.115]. 
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used in the field of many-body physics is discontinuous. The behavior before and after 
that transition is qualitatively different and has to be described by a totally distinct 
equation. And in order to move from one equation to the other, one has to expand the 
former about a singular limit, assuming Planck’s constant to tend to zero – which is a 
mathematical trick that departs from reality (in reality, Planck’s constant is non-zero). 
Hence, between the classical and the quantum domains there is a cliff that no bridge 
laws157 can cross.  
Many other phenomena share this feature of being brought about, in the models, by 
singular limits. The appearance of molecular shape, the passage from statistical mechanics 
to thermodynamics and criticality are three such examples that I will now turn to 
explaining briefly.   
The first case has to do with isomers, molecules that share identical chemical formulas 
but have different spatial arrangements which gives them very different properties (one 
isomer might be lethal for humans while the other is a useful medicine, as in the case of 
thalidomide). According to Bishop, these are good candidates as examples of contextual 
emergence since the specific structure into which a certain Hamiltonian will evolve at the 
chemical level cannot be deduced from quantum mechanical data alone.  
“Even though QM contains necessary conditions in terms of nucleons, electrons and 
their properties, fundamental force laws and so forth, observables relevant for 
molecular structure do not exist in the domain of QM. For such observables to obtain, 
an additional context not given by QM must be specified.”158 
Only with the help of heuristic formal procedures, like assuming the nucleus of the atom 
to be stationary and infinitely larger than the electron mass159, can one derive the 
                                                          
157 Ernest Nagel (see footnote 143) famously introduced the idea that, in cases of heterogeneous 
reduction (when the terms of the upper-level theory are not a subset of the lower-level theory), 
bridge laws are required to connect the two levels. 
158 Bishop, R.C. (2009), p.177. 
159 This “clamped-nucleus” assumption is part of the so called Born-Oppenheimer “aproximation”. 
Mathematically, it corresponds to an asymptotic series expansion in which the parameter ε (= 
electron mass/ nuclear mass) diverges to zero, that is, the nuclear mass is assumed to be infinitely 
large with respect to the electron mass. 
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equation encoding molecular shape. This means that the chemical context (the stability 
conditions of a “clamped nucleus” together with the ratio of the electron mass over the 
nucleus mass tending to zero) must be fed into the mathematical treatment of the 
quantum mechanical information. It is thanks to these constraints that come from 
“outside” the quantum realm that the quantum correlations between nuclei and electrons 
are broken and classical position and momentum observables, as well as molecular shape, 
can arise. 
The second case has to do with temperature. Even though in the philosophical literature 
temperature is still cited as a good example of reduction (it is taken to be nothing but the 
mean translational kinetic energy of molecules in a system), according to Bishop, it is 
actually a good example of an emergent feature. Temperature arises out of two 
mathematical transitions (from particle mechanics to statistical mechanics, and from 
there to thermodynamics), the calculation of which depends upon mathematical limits 
(e.g. the thermodynamic limit, which assumes the container of a gas to be infinitely large) 
as well as on stability conditions which are not available in the underlying domain, such 
as thermodynamic equilibrium. So again we are before a case in which the appearance of 
the macro property is not a mere quantitative derivation from a smaller scale to a larger 
scale, but rather a qualitative transformation which can be explained and predicted (at 
least on the basis of the models and theories presently available to us) only through the 
artificial normalization of singular limits. This can be interpreted as an indicator of the 
inadequacy of our theories and models, or instead as a “source of information”160. Robert 
Batterman has been arguing for the latter attitude for several years now: 
“If it were not for the singularities that appear in our theories and models we would 
have no understanding of the emergence at different scales of distinct and 
apparently “protected” states of matter.”161 
                                                          
160 Batterman, R.W. (2011), p.1038. 
161 Idem, p.1040. The “protected” states of matter that Batterman is referring to are what Laughlin 
and Pines call “protectorates” [Laughlin, R. B., Pines, D. (2000)], which are stable states of matter 
that are insensitive to changes at the micro-level, such as in cases of thermodynamic criticality. 
These protectorates are the units of the phenomenon physicists call “universality”, which is what 
philosophers name “multiple realizability”. 
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According to Batterman, emergence happens precisely there where singular limits cause 
our lower-level theories to break down. And as a matter of fact, our most important 
physical theories are asymptotically related in pairs: 
Lim1/c → 0 (special relativity) → Newtonian mechanics  
Limλ → 0 (wave optics) → ray optics 
Limh → 0 (quantum mechanics) → classical mechanics 
One example that Batterman uses in order to show how Nagelian forms of reduction are 
explanatorily inadequate in cases of singular transitions is thermodynamic criticality (the 
third case listed above). The critical point of a fluid is a state in which liquid and vapor can 
coexist, and it is determined by a specific temperature and pressure (which is different 
from fluid to fluid)162. Surprisingly, once they reach their specific critical point, all fluids 
(as well as magnets) behave in an identical manner, even if their properties are radically 
different in other phases and even if the values of their critical point are as diverse as 
1,040.85oC/270 atm for sulfur and -239.95oC/12.8 atm for hydrogen. This macroscopic 
similarity beyond microscopic differences is what physicists call universality and it has 
been mathematically accounted for by the renormalization group theory163. This 
mathematical technique (for which Kenneth Wilson won the Nobel Prize) shows how the 
molecular details that are specific to each fluid are irrelevant for the macroscopic behavior 
that it shares with all other fluids. The process is based on an iterated transformation of 
the Hamiltonian of each system, by which as one gradually changes scale, more and more 
fine-grained information is lost and the resulting function ends up being the same for all 
the elements of the universality class in question (a value that is called a “fixed point”). 
Batterman’s argument is that “this kind of strategy can provide an explanation for 
universal/multiply realized behavior without satisfying the criterion of derivability that is 
essential for Nagelian reduction”164, and this means that renormalization group theory 
                                                          
162 As with the previous cases, this phenomenon too is described as the result of assuming a 
variable to be infinite: viz. the number of particles or the correlation lengths between them (the 
distance over which one particle can influence another). 
163 Developed by Kadanoff, Fisher, and Wilson [Cf. Batterman, R. (2002)].  
164 Batterman, R.W. (2014), p.15. 
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challenges the reductionist pretense of providing all the explanatorily relevant 
information we might need.  
Batterman is in good company, as voices have been raising in the attempt to tell 
philosophers and unexamined reductionists that real-world science does not actually have 
any models that drill down from many-body physics to some mythic “microphysical state” 
and that, in fact, productive scientific models largely ignore such thinking altogether. The 
idea that one might in principle deduce the goings-on in the domains of chemistry, biology 
and other special sciences from a complete knowledge of particle physics is proven absurd 
already at the level of condensed-matter physics. As Nobel laureate Robert Laughlin has 
been defending in the past years, nature is filled with emergent phenomena, regulated by 
“higher organization principles” and insensitive to microphysics165. According to Laughlin 
and Pines, that the behavior of these phenomena is determined by higher organizing 
principles is something obvious for solid-state physicists and chemists as well as biologists, 
even though for other scientists, namely many physicists, this is a dangerous idea that 
conflicts with reductionism – a belief that is central to much of physical research. 
However, they say, “the safety that comes from acknowledging only the facts one likes is 
fundamentally incompatible with science. Sooner or later it must be swept away by the 
forces of history”166. What Batterman adds to this argument is a concrete positive way of 
explicating these higher principles and how they arise. 
 
3.3. Physics’ case against reductionism 
 
What the aforementioned examples show is that the reductionist ideal of macro 
properties being explainable in terms of microscopic features and laws is not grounded in 
                                                          
165 Two examples: “The Josephson quantum is exact because of the principle of continuous 
symmetry breaking. The quantum Hall effect is exact because of localization. Neither of these 
things can be deduced from microscopics and both are transcendent, in that they would continue 
to be true and to lead to exact results even if the Theory of Everything were changed” [Laughlin, 
R.B., Pines, D. (2000), p.261]. 
166 Laughlin, R.B., Pines, D. (2000), p.264. 
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scientific practice. Scale transformations are highly problematic and many aspects of 
reality seem to simply pop up when a certain threshold of complexity is crossed, which 
mathematically corresponds to unphysical singular limits. Therefore: 
“Predicting protein functionality or the behavior of the human brain from these 
equations is patently absurd.”167 
But isn’t this a merely epistemic matter? Even if we cannot predict upper-level 
phenomena on the basis of our lower-level knowledge, this does not imply that we are 
dealing with ontologically irreducible features.   
We face a problem once we start trying to use the epistemological/ontological distinction 
in physics. Physics does not ever pretend to know the reality underlying its models. All 
physics does is design theories that are quantitative, predictive and falsifiable. Whether 
those theories correspond to the actual objective truth is something physics cannot tell 
us. Such an instrumentalist approach can make it hard on the philosopher to extract useful 
information from physical theory and practice for her metaphysical speculations. 
But philosophers do not give up on what might be a fruitful dialogue and try to bridge the 
two fields in order to inform their theories with scientific information. For example: the 
philosopher’s most typical way of reasoning about the nature of reality in and of itself, 
independently from our epistemic access to it, is to imagine a universal and omniscient 
calculator (a laplacean demon), whose complete knowledge of a certain system might be 
sufficiently explanatory of all its macro properties. Could such a calculator predict the 
formation of Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells168 in a fluid with such and such initial and 
boundary conditions, might the philosopher ask a physicist?  
Unfortunately, the physicist will likely find the idea of a laplacean demon to be 
inapplicable to physical science for several reasons.  
                                                          
167 Idem, p.260. 
168 Rayleigh-Bénard convection is a macro phenomenon that is easily observed in liquids that are 
submitted to a non-uniform temperature distribution (by putting them in a horizontal plane and 
heating it from bellow), which causes the formation of a regular pattern of geometric cells of 
moving fluid. Robert Bishop often uses these cells as an example of contextually emergent 
entities. 
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First, because if we are dealing with open systems, then the information the demon would 
have to compute would be the whole universe, and this makes no sense in physics. The 
models physics works with must be applied to a defined and limited system, which means 
that this demon would have to work with a different science and different conceptual 
tools, so to speak; hence, our present physics cannot evaluate its metaphysical possibility 
any more than can our common logic.  
Second, because the in practice impossibility of calculating all the information contained 
in any macro system, not to mention the whole universe, is considered by physicists to be 
an in principle impossibility. It is presently established that no computer can ever 
accurately solve the quantum Hamiltonian of a system with more than ten particles169, 
because the complexity of the equations to be solved grows with the factorial of N 
(number of particles), which means that the interactions between particles are 
intractable. So to imagine a universal calculation of the evolution of an ideal “system of 
the world” just sounds plainly absurd. A philosopher may tend to react to such an 
argument with dismay and call attention again to the hypothetical nature of the laplacean 
demon that need not suffer from the physical limitations of actual computers (which store 
information in space and take time to calculate), but the dialogue with the physicist will 
likely have come to a halt. 
Third, because even if our hypothetical physicist interlocutor decides to take this 
calculating impossibility as only a practical problem, he will probably present us with one 
more argument for discharging the laplacean demon from the debate: the theories we 
have that describe and explain macro properties on the basis of molecular properties are 
statistical in nature. That is to say they do not express the sort of one-to-one causality 
relations we would like a laplacean demon to have access to. So a really carefully imagined 
omniscient being would have to have a theory set that is fully coherent across scales, 
which is something we are nowhere near to achieving and cannot even know is possible. 
All in all, reductionism seems more like a leap of faith than a sound basis for which science 
has produced any evidence. Every microphysical law, which is an abstract construct 
                                                          
169 Cf. Laughlin, R.B., Pines, D. (2000), p.160. 
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formulated by theoreticians in as simple and context-free a way as possible, is tacitly 
implying that its application depends on the absence of outside influences (influences 
from upper-levels of organizations). What happens in a laboratory, then, is the testing of 
such abstract physical laws in equally aseptic environments, carefully designed to exclude 
any disturbing factor. Like John Dupré says:  
“Very specialized phenomena in extremely carefully controlled conditions do exhibit some 
impressive regularities (…) produced in extremely elaborate machines – machines 
painstakingly designed for the very purpose of producing these regularities.”170 
However, outside these controlled setups, things get very messy. Even though the results 
of the experiments often corroborate the laws we wish to test, they cannot confirm their 
applicability to real-case scenarios where the boundaries between organization levels are 
loose and causal interactions between them much more likely. 
Hence, it would be fallacious to infer from the results of experimental scientific research 
such strong metaphysical assumptions as reductionism or the causal closure of physics 
(which I will address in section 3.6), since that would require us to be able to ascertain 
with profound detail what happens in increasingly complex and ever changing contexts. 
Evidence for reductionism should consist in the verification that the behavior of complex 
systems (from chemical, to biological, to neurological, to psychological, to social), in real-
case situations, can be fully explained by microphysical laws, which is something that 
cannot even be done at a molecular level. 
In principle reductionism is impossible to prove and so is non-derivability. We can only use 
as arguments what science is able to verify right now, not what it might be able to reveal 
in the future. So what both alternatives must do is try to make the case for the higher 
implausibility of their rival position. In this sense, the epistemological emergence of many-
body properties and the radical mathematical discontinuity between theories at different 
levels does come in handy as evidence in favor of the ontological non-reducibility of the 
macro to the micro.  
                                                          
170 Dupré, J. (2001), pp.164-165. 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 77 
3.4. From anti-reductionism to emergence 
 
But even if phenomena such as molecular shape can reveal the problems facing 
reductionism, does that amount to what we call ontological emergence? Recall my 
definition: 
Ontological emergence is a relation between entities (substances or 
properties) belonging to different levels of organization of reality (different 
lengths and time scales), in which the lower-level structure gives rise to the 
higher-level entity without the novel causal properties manifested at the 
emergent level being derivable from or causally explainable in terms of the 
properties of the constituent or subvenient elements that originate them, nor 
in terms of the laws that govern their behavior and interactions.  
Emergence relies mostly on the irreducibility of the causal powers manifested at the 
higher level. It is not merely a matter of there being novel properties (like chirality) and 
laws (such as the second law of thermodynamics) that were absent at lower levels of 
organization and which are not derivable from first principles as Nagel and others 
supposed they should. It is mainly a matter of the emergent entitiy’s new causal power to 
produce effects in the world not being identical to, nor explainable only on the basis of, 
the properties of the lower-level entity that brings them about. Upper-level causation 
(both same-level and downward) is inherent to emergent phenomena, otherwise they are 
not “emergent” but merely collective phenomena171.  
Liquidity, for example, is a very familiar property (or cluster of properties) which I find it 
hard to consider emergent, despite its unpredictability and novelty with respect to the 
properties of the components of the liquid taken in isolation. The macroscopic properties 
of liquids (like viscosity or surface tension) and their causal powers are entirely explainable 
in terms of chemical bonds and other microscopic states and events. What we see at the 
                                                          
171 Even though physicists use “collective” and “emergent” as synonyms, I am taking “collective” 
to mean systemic (i.e. a property that can exist only at the level of the whole) but explanatorily 
reducible. 
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level of the liquid is not something over and above the goings-on at the level of the 
molecules and their interactions. So reducibility seems possible, almost unavoidable. 
However, condensed matter physicists will tell me, it is not that simple. Note what Victor 
Weisskopf, one of the founding fathers of quantum mechanics, said about the 
unpredictability of liquids: 
“Assume that a group of intelligent theoretical physicists had lived in closed buildings 
from birth such that they never had occasion to see any natural structures. (…) What 
would they be able to predict from a fundamental knowledge of quantum 
mechanics? They probably would predict the existence of atoms, of molecules, of 
solid crystals, both metals and insulators, of gases, but most likely not the existence 
of liquids.”172 
The stability of liquids depends on temperature, which cannot be derived from the 
particle’s interactions. The calculation of the macro properties of liquids cannot be made 
without first establishing the stability conditions upon which the liquid depends, that is, 
one cannot derive their macro properties from their micro state without taking into 
account the macro conditions that make it so that some laws of interaction rather than 
others apply. So, why should I consider liquidity, solidity and other ordinary bulk 
properties any different from the more unusual and paradigmatic properties that Bishop, 
Batterman and others use as examples of emergence? 
Molecular shape, temperature and criticality are considered to be good candidates for 
emergence because of the irreducibility of their formal description to the underlying 
Hamiltonian. If this epistemic irreducibility were to express a deeper ontological 
irreducibility, that would mean that there is a spontaneous and unexplained symmetry 
breaking at a certain point in the evolution of the system, whereby new properties with 
new causal powers come about. Isomers with different boiling points and densities, 
temperature with different effects on macroscopic bodies (such as melting), critical points 
in which new visible phenomena such as opalescence take place (the fluid becomes 
opaque and colored). If our epistemic limits express true ontological irreducibility, these 
                                                          
172 Weisskopf, V.F. (1977), p.202. 
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examples, as well as many others, which might be more or less familiar and more or less 
complex173, all seem to be cases of causally new and irreducible, hence emergent, macro 
features.  
However, the new properties we find here are all derivable from the microscopic 
properties, given stability or other constraints. Molecular shape, temperature and 
criticality are not unexplainable, it we take into account these constraints, and thus are 
not different from liquidity, which too can be calculated afterwards but cannot exist 
unless there is a certain sort of symmetry breaking induced by temperature. So either all 
of these phenomena can be considered to be emergent, or none of them can. 
Let us sum up. These are all systemic properties that are qualitatively different from the 
properties of the parts. They can be calculated once we know the stability conditions that 
allow them to persist, but the singular limits that separate the theories that describe them 
render it impossible to explain the whole only on the basis of the parts.  
Hence, when authors like John Searle cite properties as ordinary as solidity, liquidity and 
transparency as cases of emergence, which we would be suspicious of on a first 
impression, they might actually be right. Not so much because these are “system features 
[that] cannot be figured out just from the composition of the elements and environmental 
relations [and rather] have to be explained in terms of the causal interactions among the 
elements”174, which is trivial (a clock would fit into this description), but given the 
fundamental discontinuity between the models that describe the constituents and those 
that describe the wholes. 
Nevertheless, the fact that we cannot know whether this epistemic irreducibility 
corresponds to ontological irreducibility rather than to mere limitations of our models 
prevents us from being able to assert whether these are cases of ontological emergence 
or not. In the end, the move from the epistemic to the ontological level of analysis is a 
matter of personal preference and intuition. Physics is silent about what is really there 
                                                          
173 Among the more familiar ones we find ferromagnetism; among the less familiar, there is the 
Bose-Einstein condensate or the quantum Hall effect, which are often used as examples of 
emergence in the literature. 
174 Cf. Searle, J.R. (1992), p.111. 
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and so all it can do to help the emergentist’s case is tell her that ontological emergence is 
not an absurd anti-scientific hypothesis. It is actually plausible, if our theories are true, 
since the way our models relate to each other is exactly what one should expect if 
ontological emergence were true. 
To conclude this reflection on emergent phenomena in physics: Brian MacLauglin, whom 
I’ve quoted in the beginning of this chapter, is plainly wrong. Despite the advent of 
quantum mechanics and other scientific theories, there is much more than a few 
“scintillas of evidence” that there are emergent causal powers and laws, as well as 
downward causation, in the world. And they might be much more common than usually 
supposed, even though reductionism cannot be disproven.   
 
3.5. How is ontological emergence possible? 
 
We cannot be sure on the basis of the examples we collected from condensed matter 
physics, that there is more than plain epistemological emergence. But there are examples 
from other fields that might convince us more, especially when we move from the world 
of material objects located in space-time to the elusive world of conscious mental entities. 
I will address the possibility of emergence in the transition from the body to the mind in 
the fourth chapter. Before, however, I need to explore a bit further the conundrums of 
ontological emergence, should it be true of some of the phenomena we discussed so far, 
as well as others. The crux of the matter is how the coming about of these irreducible 
causal powers can possibly take place in the natural world. The appeal to emergent ad 
hoc laws whereby the new feature appears “as a brute fact” makes this all sound too 
mysterious. Could we give ontological emergence a more detailed explanation? 
This is what has led Gil Santos, for example, to argue that for ontological emergence to be 
conceivable, we have to abandon the atomistic heritage that still makes most of us 
(classical and contemporary emergentists included) take for granted that the parts are not 
intrinsically transformed when combined in a whole. In fact, putative emergent 
properties, in the usual accounts, are properties of the whole, not of the parts; the parts 
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are considered to undergo only quantitative changes, and to give rise, by mere 
combinatorial organization and new emergent laws, to different wholes with different 
properties. That different combinations produce different results is trivial; any 
reductionist will accept this kind of transformation, which is what allows for complexity 
and plurality to originate from a few simple principles and a collection of elementary 
particles. What emergentists add to this upward production of variety is in principle 
unpredictability, that is, the fact that in cases of emergence the structural building up of 
new systemic features breaks the laws of superposition that otherwise prescribe the 
outcome of any combinatorial arrangement.  
According to Santos, this is something an atomistic framework prevents us from giving a 
naturalistic explanation to, as Diderot had already noted in 1751, while addressing the 
quality of living organisms:  
“Life cannot be the result of organization. Take three molecules A, B, C; if they are 
not alive in the combination A, B, C, then why should they begin to live in the 
combination B, C, A, or C, A, B? This is inconceivable.”175   
The example of Life can be generalized: mere differences in combination cannot justify 
the appearance of properties that are simultaneously new (qualitatively novel) and real 
(not epiphenomenal). That emergence cannot be explained did not seem to disturb its 
first proponents. However, it should worry those who wish to give this type of account 
more credibility among naturalistically inclined philosophers and scientists. Santos 
believes the problem can be solved, for it is grounded in those atomistic assumptions that 
make the emergence of life become just another word for vitalism: since the components 
do not change in themselves, the unpredictable novelty we find in the systemic properties 
of the whole is entirely due to the “new kind of relatedness”176 that magically transforms 
the system. This sui generis law is not a force (like Bergson’s élan vital) or a substance (like 
                                                          
175 “La vie ne peut être le résultat de l’organisation; imaginez les trois molécules, A, B, C; si elles 
sont sans vie dans la combinaison A, B, C, pourquoi commenceraient-elles à vivre dans la 
combinaison B, C, A, ou C, A, B? Cela ne se conçoit pas.” [Diderot in the Encyclopédie, translated 
by Santos, G.C. (2015b), p.8]. 
176 Morgan, C.L. (1923), p.6. 
IRREDUCIBILITY IN NATURE 
 82 
a soul) coming from outside the material realm but it is an ad hoc element nonetheless. 
And this reasoning applies to all sorts of emergent phenomena, not just life, of course. 
Instead, Santos suggests that the atomistic model of inalterable fundamental elements 
arranged in different combinations should be replaced with a relational ontology 
“according to which all entities’ type identities and behaviors are constructed by their 
intrinsic and extrinsic relations”177. For an emergence relation to be possible there must 
be some qualitative transformation of the intrinsic178 properties of the constituents of the 
whole.  
Santos’ solution is reminiscent of Paul Humphreys’ “fusion”, by which “when emergence 
occurs, the lower level property instances go out of existence in producing the higher level 
emergent instances”179. However, while fusion may be an adequate description of what 
happens in some cases (as in the case of quantum entanglement, which Humphreys uses 
as an example), it does not apply to many other cases in which the components’ parts are 
still present and identifiable, despite the transformation of their properties. For example, 
Santos uses the case of symbiogenesis, an evolutionary theory according to which 
eukaryotes originated from prokaryotes180 by a process of endosymbiosis181. In this 
process, a host cell (a heterotrophic protist182) ingests a cyanobacterium that, through 
evolution (in which both exchange genes), eventually becomes an organelle, part of a new 
                                                          
177 Santos, G.C. (2015b), p.18. 
178 By intrinsic properties, Santos means “the properties that an entity has of itself, despite its 
relations with other entities in its environment – that is, the possession of those properties 
depends entirely upon what an entity is like in itself – and relational properties are properties that 
an entity has and acquires solely due to its extrinsic relations with other entities” [Santos, G.C. 
(2015b), p.5, nota 4]. 
179 Humphreys, P. (1997), p.8. 
180 Eukaryote: an organism whose cells contain a nucleus and other organelles enclosed within 
membranes. Procaryote: a single-celled organism that lacks a membrane-bound nucleus and 
other organelles. 
181 Cf. Santos, G.C, Santos, R. (2012), “Symbiosis as a case of Emergent Evolution”. Conference at 
the seminar “Evolution of Cellular Complexity: Philosophy, Cell Biology and Symbiosis” (November 
22nd, 2012. Faculty of Sciences of the University of Lisbon). 
182 Heterotroph: an organism that cannot fix carbon and uses organic carbon for growth. Protist: 
a unicellular eukaryote organism. 
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autotrophic organism183. The two components are transformed (both the protist and the 
cyanobacterium have changed properties: the former by becoming autotrophic, the latter 
by losing its autonomy) and through this transformation a new entity is born: a proto-alga. 
It does seem too radical to say that there is “fusion” in this case, as the remainder of the 
two initial components is still there, in the form of the parts of the new whole. 
A relational ontology could in fact “solve the mystery” of emergence by revealing that 
there was no part-whole micro-physicalism184 to begin with. Things do not exist in 
isolation and the properties by which we define the objects that exist are always given in 
a relation. When objects change their relations, their properties change accordingly (I can 
be a mother only in relation to my children). According to Santos, if that change is 
qualitative (and not merely quantitative), in that some previously manifested properties 
disappear and new properties arise, then we are before a case of emergence.  
Is this scientifically plausible? It does not seem implausible to me. There are many 
examples at the level of microphysics that fit a relational model. Elementary particles, for 
instance, are actually a system of interrelated quarks which can undergo substantial 
qualitative changes in virtue of the structures they are part of185. And quantum 
entanglement, which I have mentioned before, is usually taken as the quintessential 
example of a system in which the parts’ properties are correlated and dependent on the 
compound system as a whole.  
However, if one takes emergence to be a relation by which an entity acquires independent 
causal powers that are not derivable from its emergence base (and what relevance could 
this concept have if we endowed it with any less autonomy?), I cannot see that Santos’ 
solution is helpful. The causal properties of the emergent whole (e.g. the eukaryote) are 
directly derived from the properties of its transformed parts (e.g. the protist and the 
cyanobacterium). And that transformation seems quite linear to me: the gene exchange 
                                                          
183 Autotroph: an organism capable of producing complex organic compounds from simple 
substances using energy from light (photosynthesis) or inorganic chemical reactions 
(chemosynthesis). 
184 Cf. the definition of micro-physicalism by Andreas Hütterman (2005). 
185 Cf. Cordovil, J.L. (2015). 
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and other mechanistic processes perfectly explain how the protist became an organelle 
and how the original heterotroph became an autotroph. There is no more novelty here 
than in cases where classical reductionism applies, i.e. when the components, their 
properties and the laws that describe them, plus the laws of composition that govern their 
addictive relations, are sufficient to determine the outcome. In contrast with those cases, 
the concept of emergence implies the possession of basic causal powers by the upper-
level entity, despite the apparent contradiction of an emergent feature being basic. So 
the case of the new autotroph organism is not a case of ontological emergence at all, 
according to this definition.  
Santos might counter that I am begging the question. I am adopting a much too strong 
concept of emergence, which will naturally exclude the cases he is concerned with. He 
could suggest that I might instead accept that there are weaker and stronger versions of 
ontological emergence186: the former would regard cases like endosymbiosis in which the 
properties of the whole are brought about by a process of qualitative transformation of 
the parts, without that implying that the causal powers those systemic properties carry 
with them are unexplainable in terms of the new transformed properties of the parts; the 
latter would concern cases where the emergent features would have new basic causal 
powers. Even if the former cases would fail to meet the criteria for strong ontological 
emergence, they would be emergent nonetheless, if we define emergence against the 
background of part-whole micro-physicalism. 
True, one could define emergence in such terms, but that would be a much less familiar 
definition and one that renders secondary the feature that in my opinion (and in that of 
many authors) is the crucial element for drawing the line between emergent and non- 
emergent entities: novel causal powers. 
Let us consult the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, for instance, to see how emergent 
properties are most commonly defined: 
                                                          
186 Note that the distinction between epistemological and ontological emergence is very often 
made in terms of “weak” and “strong” emergence. What I am supposing might be objected to me 
in terms of a useful distinction between strong and weak versions of emergence would instead 
regard only cases of ontological emergence. 
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“It is a novel, fundamental type of property altogether. We might say that it is 
‘nonstructural,’ in that the occurrence of the property is not in any sense constituted 
by the occurrence of more fundamental properties and relations of the object's parts. 
Further, newness of property, in this sense, entails new primitive causal powers, 
reflected in laws which connect complex physical structures to the emergent 
features.”187 
And what are new causal powers usually taken to be in the literature? Let us see how 
Jaegwon Kim defines them: 
“[E]mergent properties (…) are supposed to represent novel additions to the 
ontology of the world, and this could be so only if they bring with them genuinely 
new causal powers; that is, they must be capable of making novel causal 
contributions that go beyond the causal powers of the lower-level basal conditions 
from which they emerge.”188 
What Santos classifies as emergent are systemic properties which arise through a process 
of transformation of the properties of that system’s parts. This makes it so that between 
the macro level of the system and the micro level of the parts as taken in isolation, a new 
intermediate meso level of the transformative relations between the parts must be taken 
into consideration. I find this type of process trivial. The occurrence of properties which 
arise out of these transformative relations is “constituted by the occurrence of more 
fundamental properties and relations of the object's parts” and it is not “capable of 
making novel causal contributions” that go beyond them.  
In the case of endosymbiosis, used as an example above, despite the natural evolution 
whereby these two entities lost some of their properties and became a new type of entity 
with novel causal powers (such as the ability to produce its own food through 
photosynthesis), one can describe what happens whenever this entity exercises its new 
powers in micro chemical terms, with no loss of information. So even if diachronically, in 
                                                          
187 O'Connor, Timothy and Wong, Hong Yu, "Emergent Properties", The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Spring 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2012/entries/properties-emergent/>. 
188 Kim, J. (1999), p.25. 
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the long evolutionary time, there was a qualitative macro transformation, synchronically, 
reduction is still the best explanation of the fine-grained mechanisms of a proto-alga’s 
photosynthesis.  
This is not to say that diachronic emergence is not important. The point is just that one 
cannot claim that the original coming to be of a new entity at a certain point of evolution 
is a case of ontological emergence if, synchronically, the subvenient parts of the 
composite system, together with the laws that govern their relations, are sufficient to 
derive the upper-level properties in question.  
Let me be clearer: I take diachronic emergence to be a causal relation between entities, 
which involves a time lapse between an instant t when the emergent entity was still 
absent from reality and the moment t1 when it first appears. It may concern entities 
belonging to different domains (e.g. physical vs. chemical) or same-level entities. In turn, 
synchronic emergence is a realization relation189 between simultaneous entities at 
different domains. Both these versions of emergence can be epistemological or 
ontological and both involve the crucial discontinuity that founds the irreducibility of the 
emergent to its basis.  
On my view, there can be no diachronic emergence without synchronic emergence, nor 
vice-versa190. If the putative diachronically emergent entity is constituted by its parts or 
realization base in such a way that one can identify all the steps that lead from the lower-
levels to the upper-level phenomenon, then the diachronic process that causally produces 
this entity over time is similarly explainable. How can we say there was the intervention 
of a sui generis law by which new causal powers (irreducible to the causal powers of its 
diachronic causes) appeared, if the lower-level elements are sufficiently explanatory of 
upper-level phenomena? If they are sufficient now, they would have been sufficient in the 
past as well. 
                                                          
189 I take realization to be an umbrella term for inter-level compositional relations (between parts 
and wholes) as well as relations between entities of different nature belonging to the same level 
of organization (such as neurobiological and psychological entities).  
190 Olivier Sartanaer argues for this same thesis in his (2015). 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 87 
To sum up, I think the symbiogenesis example is not a case of emergence. Also, it seems 
to me that to assume a relational rather than an atomistic ontology is not what makes the 
greater difference to the question whether ontological emergence exists and can fit the 
natural world. Even if one adopts a relational ontology according to which the 
components of a system can undergo qualitative changes in their intrinsic properties, the 
new features that appear as a consequence of such transformations should be considered 
emergent only if their causal properties are basic, which entails that they are underivable 
from the initial properties of the components (both intrinsic and relational) and the laws 
that govern their interactions. There is no reason why a relational ontology should be 
more favorable to this type of irreducibility than the traditional atomistic ontology. 
In my view, what does make a difference to the plausibility of emergence is whether our 
world view allows for the influence non-fundamental entities have on fundamental events 
to be irreducible to the influence bottom-level events have on each other. This 
presupposes that the entities we find at the most fundamental level of reality are not the 
only type of entities that have effects in the world, which is what I will discuss in the next 
section. 
 
3.6. Is the physical causally closed? 
 
The main reason why the emergentist hypothesis is met with suspicion in scientifically 
inclined circles is the idea that the physical world is closed to causal influences from 
outside its frontiers. The principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical (CoP), that many 
mistake for an unquestionable axiom of physical theory191, asserts roughly that for every 
physical event (or its chances192) there is a sufficient physical cause, insofar as there is any 
                                                          
191 Cf.: “Physics does not admit that physical effects have non-physical causes” [Sturgeon, S. 
(1998), “Physicalism and Overdetermination”, Mind 107: p. 413; cit. in Lowe, E.J. (2008)]. 
192 It is worth noting that contemporary authors tend to substitute the nondeterministic version 
of CoP in terms of every physical event having its chances fixed by sufficient physical causes, for 
the simpler to state but questionably deterministic formulation in terms of the physical events 
themselves having sufficient physical causes [Cf. Lowe, E.J. (2008), p.44]. 
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cause at all. At face value, this seems to entail one of two consequences: either non-
physical properties and objects are actually physical after all, or they are epiphenomenal. 
In other words, either the chemical, the biological, the psychological and the social 
domains are only different levels of description of one same reality that can in principle 
be understood in terms of the laws of a complete physical science, or the putative 
emergent levels are distinct from the physical reality but there is nothing left for them to 
cause, since all effective causes are physical causes. 
CoP can be read in two different ways: as stating the completeness of the microphysical 
(as opposed to the chemical, biological, etc.) or affirming the completeness of the 
physical, intended as the material reality that exists in space-time and can be described 
or explained in quantitative terms (as opposed to the subjective nature of conscious 
thoughts, say). The former reading is with no doubt the most common in the philosophy 
of science literature. The latter is mostly discussed in philosophy of mind, where CoP 
appears as particularly threatening, since people cherish the causal autonomy of mental 
properties more than that of any other property. If the solidity, mass and speed of a 
cannonball are nothing but the global effect of the properties of its tiny parts, that does 
not disturb us much. But if our conscious states (intentions, desires, decisions) are 
epiphenomenal, then our vision of who we are and how we act in this world is in need of 
a major revision.  
 
3.6.1. The Causal Closure of the Microphysical as a typicality 
condition 
 
Robert Bishop has devoted much of his work to assessing the Causal Closure (or Causal 
Completeness) principle in the first sense (the “physical” intended as the “microphysical”) 
He notes that CoP is presented usually as a premise in arguments in favor of physicalism 
– the thesis that everything is physical or supervenes on the physical. In such arguments, 
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as for example Papineau’s Causal Argument for Physicalism193, Causal Closure is 
formulated as the claim that “all physical effects are fully determined by fundamental laws 
and prior physical events”194 and it is illegitimately assumed as a well-founded scientific 
decree of some sort. That, however, is false:  
“Physics itself does not imply its own causal closure nor is there any proof within physics 
of its own completeness.”195 
Indeed, Bishop argues that evidence from physics supports only a qualified reading of CoP 
as a typicality condition (stating what happens in scientific labs, under controlled 
circumstances that prevent non-physical interferences). According to this reading, what 
CoP tells us is that in the absence of non-physical influences, physical causes (events and 
laws) will produce physical effects. In order for CoP to entail the ineffectiveness of non-
physical causes in the etiology of physical effects, one would have to endorse the extra 
clause “that the only efficacious states and causes are physical ones”196 – which is clearly 
a question-begging assumption197. 
Hence, the reductionist physicalist is left with two unattractive alternatives: on the one 
hand, she can endorse a strong but unjustified interpretation of CoP, which would prevent 
any emergent entities from having autonomous downward causal powers (preventing 
                                                          
193 Papineau’s argument is the following: 1) All physical effects are fully determined by 
fundamental laws and prior physical events (CoP); 2) Some mental events are causes of physical 
events; 3) Physical effects of mental causes are not, in general, causally overdetermined (Causal 
Exclusion); 4) Mental causes are identical to physical causes (Physicalism). [Cf. Papineau, D. 
(2002)]. 
194 Bishop, R.C. (2006), p.45.  
195 Ibidem. 
196 Idem, p.47.  
197 E.J.Lowe, who discusses CoP mostly in the second sense (of physical vs. mental reality) presents 
a similar thesis in (2008, part I) and he too argues that the stronger version of physicalism is 
actually an “unwarranted dogma” based on the faith in the empirically unfounded claim that “no 
physical event has a non-physical cause” (p.40). He also says that the weaker versions of CoP are 
much more plausible than the stronger ones (which either render the physicalist argument 
question-begging or lack empirical support), and they allow for non-physical causes to enter the 
causal chain, either by directly causing a physical event (along with its physical causes, which are 
physically sufficient but would have been coincidental, were it not for the interference of the 
mental element) or by causing it to be the case that certain physical events have a certain physical 
effect.  
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also any intentional action from taking place, according to the argument developed in the 
previous chapter), but which cannot be confirmed nor disproven by empirical means. On 
the other, she can adopt the weaker typicality version, supported by physical science, but 
which is insufficient to ensure that only physical causes are effective. Either way seems to 
get reductionism into more trouble than anticipated. 
In order to defend the plausibility of his weak interpretation of CoP, Bishop uses several 
examples that show how scientific laws and forces in physics are ceteris paribus clauses, 
by which he means that they are never context-free: for example, the gravitational law 
can predict the movement of a certain body only if no other forces (e.g. electromagnetic) 
are affecting its behavior; the half-life of neutrons is dependent on whether they are 
bound in a nucleus rather that isolated; and the expression of genes depends on the 
presence of other genes and environmental influences.  
“The upshot of these examples is that all of the forces and laws we take to be 
important in our sciences always carry tacit clauses of the form ‘If nothing outside 
affects the object, then ...’ where ‘outside’ can be understood as outside the relevant 
body of theory (other senses of ‘outside’ more relevant to our concerns here would 
turn on the construals of ‘physical’ and ‘non-physical’). In other words, context 
matters at least as much as laws.”198 
Bishop then concludes that “the question of overdetermination is a contextual affair”199, 
because the structure of reality is such that entities are simultaneously influenced by 
many forces and other bodies, and causation is mainly a cooperative process. Whether a 
certain cause is sufficient or not for its effect, then, is a matter of context. Even if a force 
would have been sufficient to produce a certain effect in an isolated context, when other 
entities enter the arena, the game changes and the ceteris paribus character of the 
physical laws describing that force and its correlations is revealed.  
The unjustified tendency to accept Causal Closure as a proven natural truth is what mainly 
feeds the accusation of scientific implausibility that faces emergentism and agent-
                                                          
198 Bishop, R.C. (2006), pp.49-50. 
199 Idem, p.48. 
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causalism. However, once we realize that the dispute is clearly a philosophical one, since 
we have no grounds for taking CoP as anything more than a typicality condition, 
emergence becomes a plausible explanation for many natural phenomena in which 
control seems clearly to be exercised in a top-down manner. 
 
3.6.2. Causal Closure of the “Material” world and two types of 
supervenience 
 
It is important to note that one can challenge the causal argument for physicalism by 
questioning only the second interpretation of the Causal Closure Principle (which intends 
the physical in a broader sense – let us call it “material”), and leaving the first untouched. 
By this I mean that one can consider that the whole material world can be understood in 
reductionistic terms, i.e., that all the hierarchical levels, from the physical to the biological, 
are connected by some sort of “building relation”200 and that any material event has its 
chances determined by a sufficient material cause. Still the mental world can be seen as 
something new, distinct and genuinely emergent, something that is ontologically 
irreducible to the material levels and that has new non-derivative causal powers.  
John Dupré is one of the authors that questions CoP in the material-to-mental sense201, 
based on the argument that accepting the postulate of causal closure would render 
mental causation impossible. He uses the example of a person wanting to drink a glass of 
water (mental domain) and moving her arm accordingly (physical domain): if one assumes 
CoP to be true, the extraordinary coincidence of the co-occurrence of appropriate events 
at the two levels (the level of the mental intention to drink and the level of the physical 
causes than produce the physical movement) remains a mystery:  
“All the physical movements of the agent would have happened even if the mental 
occurrences had not, if, that is to say, there had been no principles or laws requiring 
mental processes or events to come along for the ride with the physical ones. (…) Causal 
                                                          
200 I am borrowing this phrase from Bennett, K. (2011). 
201 Even though he is an anti-reductionist is the first sense as well. 
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completeness at the microlevel must entail reductionism, at the very least in the sense of 
the supervenience of everything else on the microphysical. And even supervenience, I 
claim, is sufficient to deny any real causal autonomy to higher structural levels.”202 
At face value, in fact, supervenience seems not to leave room for downward causation, as 
this relation entails that mental properties depend on neurobiological properties, and not 
the opposite. When a certain brain state at t1 causes another brain state at t2, there seems 
not to be anything left for the related mental state to cause, since all the changes taking 
place at that mental level (thus, the changes from the mental state at t1 to the mental 
state at t2) are taken to depend on the underlying physical changes203.  
Dupré is not alone in considering that supervenience is an unfounded assumption that 
conflicts with the causal efficacy of entities at upper levels of organization, most notably 
at the mental level. Paul Humphreys204, for example, opposes emergence and 
supervenience as two incompatible forms of inter-level relation: you cannot have one 
without giving up the other.  
I agree with Dupré that Causal Closure entails the epiphenomenality of any state or event 
which is distinct from the physical states and events on which it supervenes, and that this 
is extremely implausible, as will become clear in the next chapter. But unlike him, 
Humphreys and many others, I believe supervenience is not the problem. At least not 
natural supervenience. 
In his famous 1996 book The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers presents a very useful 
distinction between logical and natural supervenience. Logical supervenience is a relation 
that holds between properties A and B such that there cannot be a world in which A (the 
subvenient property) is present without B (the supervenient property) being present as 
well. This is the type of relation that holds between the aesthetic properties of a painting 
                                                          
202 Dupré, J. (2001), pp.161, 162. 
203 The alternative, of course, would be to assume an identity theory according to which mental 
events are actually physical events, but that is something Dupré is not willing to do. I will address 
the reasons why I believe that conscious mental states and events cannot be identical to physical 
states in the next chapter. For now, I wish only to analyze Dupré’s argument as to why Causal 
Closure entails the causal redundancy of the non-physical.   
204 Humphreys, P. (1997). 
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and the physical substrate that realizes it. If one wanted to reproduce a certain painting, 
one would only have to duplicate every single physical particle that constitutes it, in its 
proper place and entertaining the same relations to all the others as in the original 
painting, and the aesthetic properties of the painting would come along as a bonus. To 
use Saul Kripke’s205 famous image, if everything there is logically supervenes on the 
physical, then when God created the world, he needed only one day to do it. After having 
created the physical, God could rest, because every single aspect of the world as we know 
it (all the esthetic properties of every painting, the biological properties of living systems, 
every thought or phenomenal feel people experience) was in place.  
This is the type of supervenience that Chalmers’ zombie hypothesis stands against and I 
will address it in the next chapter. What interests me now is natural supervenience, the 
type of covariance relation that science assumes to hold between physical and non-
physical properties (i.e. chemical, biological, psychological properties) in this world. This 
is the type of supervenience that I contend does not have to be called into question even 
if emergence is true of some phenomena or levels of organization.  
Assuming that ontological emergence is possible and that at a certain point in the scale of 
complexity some emergent entities appear, one does not have to imagine that those 
entities’ autonomy is such that some of the changes they undergo at the upper level might 
happen regardless of corresponding changes at the bottom level. Even if supervenience 
holds between the emergent level and its emergence base, such that there is always 
covariance with a bottom-up entailment, the upper-level entities which are realized at t1 
by the subvenient entities can affect the world at t2 in ways that are not merely the 
consequence of how some subvenient material elements affect each other. There is 
nothing a priori incoherent about this, and in the next two sections I will show why. 
The crucial step in the argument is that the break of Causal Completeness is not sufficient 
for emergence to be possible: there is another condition that must be in place, namely 
fundamental indeterminism. 
                                                          
205 Kripke, S. (1972), pp.153-154. 
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3.7. Indeterminism at the bottom 
 
According to Kim’s famous Supervenience Argument206 (often called the Causal Exclusion 
argument), if mental properties are supervenient on physical properties and yet 
irreducible to them (in the sense of not being identical to any physical item), then they 
are bound to be causally impotent207. Kim’s argument for the inconsistency of the three 
theses of non-reductive physicalism – supervenience, irreducibility and causal efficacy – 
is based on what he call’s Edwards’ dictum208, according to which vertical determination 
excludes horizontal causation. He cites the following passage by Jonathan Edwards: 
“The images of things in a glass, as we keep our eyes upon them, seem to remain 
precisely the same, with a continuing, perfect identity. But it is known to be 
otherwise. Philosophers well know that these images are constantly renewed, by the 
impression and reflection of new rays of light; so that the image impressed by the 
former rays is constantly vanishing, and a new image is impressed by new rays every 
moment, both on the glass and on the eye… And the new images put on immediately 
or instantly do not make them the same, any more than if it were done with the 
intermission of an hour or a day. The image that exists at this moment is not at all 
derived from the image which existed at the last predicting moment.”209 
It is easy to see the analogy between this case and the mind-body relationship. If mental 
occurrences are synchronically dependent on physical occurrences (as mirror images on 
                                                          
206 A request to my readers is in order: the fact that I am citing Kim’s Supervenience Argument 
should not be misinterpreted. I am concerned with the possibility of downward causation, 
independently from where in nature it might take place (between the chemical and the physical, 
the biological and the chemical, the psychological and the biological), so my aim is not to address 
the mind-brain relation nor any of its conundrums at this point. However, I will use one the most 
famous arguments in Philosophy of Mind against non-reductive physicalism in order to prove my 
point. Therefore, I ask my readers to keep in mind that the context in which that argument was 
first presented by Kim is very different from the context in which I am using it now. For instance, 
I am assuming by hypothesis that there is no type nor token identity between the emergent 
entities and their substrate, because I am addressing the question of the conditions of possibility 
for any emergence relation which, by definition, can hold only between distinct entities. 
207 Cf. Kim, J. (1993). 
208 Named after the 18th century philosopher Jonathan Edwards. 
209 Edwards, J. (1758) cit. In Kim, J. (2003), p.154. 
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rays of light), their diachronic dependence on putative causal antecedents breaks down. 
Counterfactually, what happened at t1 is irrelevant for the persistence of an image (or a 
mental state) at t2, in case the supervenience base, which is indispensable, fails. 
Kim’s way of developing Edward’s insight comes in two stages. First, he shows how, given 
supervenience, mental-to-mental causation entails mental-to-physical causation: the 
mental event M1 at t1 can cause another mental event M2 at t2 only by causing the 
subvenient physical event P2 on which M2 depends. And this can be generalized to any 
causal relation between upper-level properties bound by supervenience to a more 
fundamental level. Second, he argues that, upon analysis, mental-to-mental and mental-
to-physical causation (or any other kind of causal relation involving an upper-level cause) 
are explained away by the presence of two more theses that physicalists will mostly likely 
be willing to embrace: causal closure, which I addressed in the previous section, and 
causal exclusion, according to which “no single event can have more than one sufficient 
cause occurring at any given time – unless it is a genuine case of causal 
overdetermination”210.  
If M2 has to have a physical cause P (causal closure) and it is usually not overdetermined 
(causal exclusion), and if M1 is not identical to any physical event at t1 (irreducibility), then 
M1 cannot be the cause of P2; P1 most probably is. This entails the epiphenomenality of 
the mental: 
“In this picture, there is but one causal relation, from physical property P to another 
physical property [P2], and the initially posited causal relation from [M1] to [M2] has 
vanished altogether. An apparent causal relation between the two mental properties 
is explained away by their respective supervenience on two physical properties that 
are connected by a genuine causal process.”211 
So “either reduction or causal impotence”, Kim says. And I would follow him on this, if I 
accepted all of his premises. But I do not. I question causal closure (which Kim, instead, 
                                                          
210 Kim, J. (2003), p.157. This is basically thesis 3 of the Papineau’s Causal Argument for 
Physicalism, which I addressed in the previous section. 
211 Idem, p.159. 
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considers to be “virtually an analytic truth”212), for the reasons stated above, and I 
question also one hidden premise that I think is crucial for his argument: the assumption 
the world works deterministically.  
“No single event can have more than one sufficient cause occurring at any given time”, 
Kim says. So bottom-level causes render upper-level causes redundant because they are 
sufficient to ensure the effect. In fact, it seems logical to me too that, if every detail of the 
lower-level is already defined, there is nothing left for the upper level to cause, neither in 
a top-down way, nor as a same-level causal event. However, if one questions Causal 
Closure and assumes there is quantum indeterminacy at the bottom-most level (as 
mainstream interpretations of quantum formalism do), then there is room for causal 
collaboration between different-level causes. I will now argue for this thesis, and it might 
be useful to start with the help of the following diagrams: 
 
                                                          
212 Idem, p.162. 
C1 (e.g. cellular level)
B1 (e.g. molecular level)









Fig.1: In a world in 
which the upper levels 
of complexity 
supervene on the 
lower ones, if 
determinism connects 
the most fundamental 
state of a system at t1 
with its following state 
at t2, then there is 
nothing left for any 
other level to cause. 
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C1 (e.g. cellular level)
B1 (e.g. molecular level)











Now imagine a dust particle suspended in a fluid, undergoing Brownian motion. Its space 
of physical possibilities would obviously be much broader if it were outside this context. 
However, given its location and its relation with all the other particles around it, that 
possibility space is limited to what the laws allow in the concrete situation it is in. Do 
Newtonian laws allow for diverse alternatives in the particle’s next move given this 
situation? Of course not, since they are deterministic! Now picture an elementary particle 
inside your brain, instead. How can neurons and molecules that are made up of billions of 
particles like this have a downward influence over the particles’ movement? How can 
mental states exercise their causal power over it? Only by means of the interactions each 
particle has with its neighbors, which constrain its motion just like a dust particle in a fluid, 
but that happens at the physical (not the chemical) level. The downward constraint 
exerted by the molecules and neurons that particle is embedded in is only apparent and 
derivative, for all the determination happens at the level of the parts.  
This determination goes back all the way to the Big Bang, as strange as that may seem. If 
fundamental laws, which describe the rules of interaction among fundamental particles 
and fields, were universally deterministic (in the sense of allowing for a “unique 
evolution”213 of each system and of the world), the initial conditions of the universe as a 
                                                          
213 Bishop, R.C. (2011), p. 86. The also note 108 in the presente dissertation. 
Fig.2: As in Fig.1, there 
is no room for causal 
difference-making at t2 
if A2 is the only 
possible state of the 
system at the most 
fundamental level, and 
B2 supervenes on A2.   
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whole (which would include the details of the environment of every given system) would 
be sufficient to determine its multilevel evolution in time. The causal powers of all the 
complex macro-structures we find in our 21st century world and their epistemically 
emergent features and criteria for downward constraint – such as the evolutionary fitness 
of a cell or the effectiveness of desires in cases of human agency – would not only be 
derivative and drain down to the elementary basis of the world here and now, but they 
would have been determined to be what they are and to cause what they cause from the 
very beginning of the universe.   
Let us use John Conway’s “Life” game214  as a model of a deterministic universe. In this 
model, from very simple two-type individuals and three rules of necessitation, upper level 
configurations and regularities arise in such a way that we consider them to be 
epistemically emergent. By this, I mean that the behavior of the macro aggregates and 
patterns that appear at a certain point in evolution seems unexpected given only the three 
micro-level rules with which the game begins and, after a certain degree of complexity, it 
is better described and understood by coarse-grained laws. However, this does not mean 
that the three “fundamental laws” are insufficient for the existence of those higher level 
entities. On the contrary, what surprises us in Conway’s “Life” is precisely that nothing 
further had to be added for this new epistemic level to arise, that the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for such a complex evolution are so simple and were given from the 
beginning.  
Authors who consider that the break of Causal Closure is all that is needed for emergence 
to be possible, would certainly object that the game of “Life” is not a good example, for it 
describes a causally closed world, a world in which the fundamental level is complete, 
                                                          
214 Cf. Gardner, M. (1970): “The basic idea is to start with a simple configuration of counters 
(organisms), one to a cell, then observe how it changes as you apply Conway's "genetic laws" for 
births, deaths, and survivals. (…) First note that each cell of the checkerboard (assumed to be an 
infinite plane) has eight neighboring cells, four adjacent orthogonally, four adjacent diagonally. 
The rules are: 1. Survivals. Every counter with two or three neighboring counters survives for the 
next generation. 2. Deaths. Each counter with four or more neighbors dies (is removed) from 
overpopulation. Every counter with one neighbor or none dies from isolation. 3. Births. Each 
empty cell adjacent to exactly three neighbors - no more, no fewer - is a birth cell. A counter is 
placed on it at the next move.”  
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which begs the question. On the contrary, our world is such that the physical domain 
provides only necessary but insufficient conditions for the other levels to unfold. This is 
why Robert Bishop, for example, believes emergent phenomena can happen even in 
deterministic contexts. If the principle of the Causal Closure of the Physical (intended as 
the Microphysical) is qualifies as a mere typicality condition, determinism becomes 
irrelevant215, he says. Once we understand that there is no reason to assume that only 
microphysical causes can be effective, we can perfectly accept that chemical or biological 
constraints can influence the unfolding of the causal history of reality.  
In contrast, and to use Bishop’s own terms, I believe that the break of Causal Closure is a 
necessary but insufficient condition for there to be non-derivative upper-level causation 
in the natural world, and thus for ontological emergence to be effective. Even if we accept 
the interference of non-fundamental (or non-material) entities in the lower-level 
sequences of events as nomologically possible, there will not be any logical space for them 
to be difference-makers if causal interactions at the lower-level are deterministic. 
George Ellis, a leading cosmologist who has recently been working on the philosophical 
problem of emergence, talks about top-down causation in the human brain as a 
consequence of the break of Causal Closure: 
“Physics provides necessary conditions (but not the sufficient conditions) for what 
happens; it provides the possibility space for what happens, but does not determine the 
outcome. Top-down causation allows higher-level causes to be what they appear to be: 
real effective causes. Context is the key to physical outcomes: multiple causation is always 
at work.”216 
In other words: when the biological system which we call an agent decides to make a 
bodily movement such as waving at a friend, she is influenced by reasons, motives and 
traits of character, just as she is causally conditioned by deterministic and probabilistic 
laws, as well as physical impossibilities. The complex interaction among all these elements 
                                                          
215 Cf. Bishop, R.C. (2010). 
216 Ellis, G.F.R. (2009), p.78. It is interesting that Ellis cites Bishop and Atmanspacher’s 2006 article 
explicitly, when referring to the importance of contexts. 
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is what ultimately structures her possibility space. Also, since Ellis assumes a nonreductive 
physicalist stance, according to which the upper-level influences are real and distinct from 
lower-level ones – in short, that those reasons, motives and traits of character are neither 
identical to their neural correlates nor epiphenomenal.  
However, if all the abstract degrees of freedom of each particle in the agent’s waving hand 
are limited by the specific circumstance in which it is embedded (the quantitative values 
of its mass, charge, location and momentum as well as the values of all the other elements 
in its physical context), then whatever may be the psychophysical interactions that might 
take place, there are no more open alternatives than the ones already given, like in the 
case of the particle in a fluid that we mentioned before. If fundamental physics is 
deterministic, the trajectory of the particle cannot change, for example, neither can the 
timing of a neural spike.  
If the waving example were a case of emergence, the agent’s conscious states would have 
to be taken as distinct from her neural states as well as endowed with some downward 
causal power over them. This entails that, when the agent purposefully waves at a friend, 
for her intention to effectively cause her behavior, it must be the case that some particles 
in her motor cortex have different possibilities of movement at the instant immediately 
following her decision to move, even given all the specifications of their circumstance at 
the instant of her decision (the precise values of their mass, charge, location, etc. as well 
as the complete state of each of their neighbor particles); only if this is so, can they initiate 
a causal chain that will lead all the other particles correlated with them, namely the ones 
which constitute the agent’s hand, to move according to her will. There must be diverse 
possibilia that may or may not become actualia by downward constraint.  
Ellis is one of the very few authors who explicitly affirm that indeterminism is a necessary 
condition for this interaction between levels to take place – even though he does not 
develop this issue much. Right after the above citation, he adds:  
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“Random fluctuations along with quantum uncertainty provide the freedom at the 
bottom needed to allow this to happen. It enables the causal power of abstract entities – 
mathematics, theories, ethics, social constructs (…).”217  
According to Ellis, then, the very possibility of downward causation depends on the 
existence of genuinely probabilistic laws at the most fundamental microphysical domain 
- what he calls a “causal slack”218. But surprisingly, this demand of indeterminism at the 
bottom-most level is something that authors seldom mention as a precondition for 
emergence219. 
Arguing for the effectiveness of mental causation, John Sperry220 has famously coined the 
example of a wheel rolling downhill in which each molecule’s movement is determined in 
space and time by the overall properties and dynamics of the wheel as a whole. Even 
though Sperry’s interpretation of such a case as an example of emergence and its use for 
an analogy with the mutual interdependence between consciousness (the rolling wheel) 
and the brain (whose individual neurons are “carried along” just like the molecules in the 
wheel) have both been generally criticized in the literature, I believe this example is useful 
for the point I wish to make.  
Sperry was one of the first authors in contemporary philosophy of mind and, especially, 
in the world of neuroscience, to defend the idea that conscious mental states were not 
                                                          
217 Ibidem. 
218 Idem, p.74. One must be aware, though, that indeterminism does not imply the lack of 
causation. Ellis’ phrase is quite imprecise. 
219 Helen Steward is one exception: according to her, if determinism were true, there would be 
“no gap into which a phenomenon like top–down causation might be fitted” (2014, p. 240). 
However, my view departs from hers in that she considers universal probabilistic laws also to be 
a problem for downward causation.  
Another exception is Peter Ulrich Tse, a neuroscientist who was part of the four million dollar 
project “Big Questions in Free Will”, sponsored by the Templeton Foundation and directed by 
Alfred Mele. This project aimed at putting philosophers, scientists and theologians working 
together on the problem of free will. Tse wrote a book called The Neural Basis of Free Will (MIT 
Press, 2003), where he put forward an empirical model of how downward causation might happen 
in the brain, allowing for free will. One of the conceptual steps in his argument is that Kim’s 
Exclusion Argument can be overcome if ontological indeterminism is true of neural processes 
(pp.123-127). 
220 Sperry, R.W. (1969). 
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only causally efficacious, but were actually so in their own right, and not merely insofar as 
they were identical to their neural correlates. 
“Conscious phenomena as emergent functional properties of brain processing exert an 
active control role as causal determinants in shaping the flow patterns of cerebral 
excitation. Once generated from neural events, the higher order mental patterns and 
programs have their own subjective qualities and progress, operate and interact by their 
own causal laws and principles which are different from and cannot be reduced to those 
of neurophysiology.”221 
However, Sperry defended micro and macro determinism in the neural substrate and 
functioning of the brain, and also argued that, in exerting their “supervenient downward 
control”, the emergent mental properties could not intervene nor disrupt the causal 
activity at the lower-level222. Consequently, the analogy he used for the reciprocal 
interaction and determination between mental and neural levels had to be that of the 
trivial but only apparent mutual influences between the micromolecular level of the 
atoms in the rolling wheel (which are obviously causally efficacious at their own level), 
and the determination of their space-time trajectories by the entity as a whole (which is 
actually just a macro level of description that does not correspond to any real superior 
and novel causal influence over the wheel’s components).  
I believe Sperry’s use of the example of the wheel is particularly significant in the context 
of his explicit defense of the compatibility of emergence and universal determinism, 
insofar as it shows precisely how the Newtonian laws that govern or describe the behavior 
of physical entities do not leave any room for downward causation. What does it mean 
for atoms and molecules to be “carried along” as the wheel rolls downhill? The rolling of 
the wheel itself is nothing but the sum of the movements of its atoms and molecules, 
which lower level laws manage perfectly to describe within the framework of a 
reductionist physics.  
                                                          
221 Sperry, R.W. (1980), p.201. 
222 These two theses, so I argue, are interdependent, thus I believe Sperry’s contention of the 
latter (that emergent laws do not contradict the lower-level ones) was actually a coherent 
consequence of his adopting the former (determinism). 
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It is interesting to see how Sperry felt the need to explicitly state the differences between 
his thesis and Popper and Eccles’ dualistic theory of the mind-brain relation in his 1980 
commentary “Mind-brain interaction: mentalism, yes; dualism, no”223, of which a specific 
section is dedicated to the debate of “determinism versus indeterminism”. In it, Sperry 
defends the deterministic functioning of the brain throughout all layers, fundamental and 
emergent, as well as the causal determination of the synchronic emergence process 
itself224, while Popper and Eccles, in their influential book, had defended precisely what I 
believe to be true:  
“The emergence of hierarchical levels or layers, and of an interaction between them, 
depends upon a fundamental indeterminism of the physical universe.”225 
But maybe the example of the wheel was just unfortunate. Could a better instance of 
deterministic emergence help? Bishop often uses Rayleigh-Bénard convection cells as a 
paradigmatic example of complex systems in which sensitive dependence allows for the 
emergence of higher level structures with downward causal power - in other words, a 
“control hierarchy”. However, even though an analogy between this type of system and 
the human brain would be more accurate than the preceding example because of its 
increased complexity, still the movement of each molecule in a fluid convection cell is 
constrained by the movement of all the other elements of the fluid (in a horizontal all-to-
one sort of constraint). The whole of the system as such is more than the mere sum of its 
parts in the sense that the dynamics itself must also be accounted for by any faithful 
model of the system, but its causal power cannot be manifested over and above the causal 
power of each one of its parts if the trajectories in space-time that they follow are 
deterministic. Unless the behavior of the components obeys probabilistic laws that endow 
it with alternative futures, the dynamics of the system as a whole is only an emergent 
epiphenomenon and the interaction among particles is what really calls the shots. 
                                                          
223 Sperry, R.W. (1980). 
224 “I hold that every time the elements of creation, whether atoms or concepts, are put together 
in the same way under the same conditions, that the same new properties would emerge and that 
the emergent process is, therefore, causal and deterministic” (Idem, p.200). The deterministic 
nature of the process of synchronic emergence is something that I am not questioning here. 
225 Popper, K., Eccles, J.C. (1977), p.35. 
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Let us look at a different diagram now: 
 
D D1 D2 (e.g. mental  domain)
C    (e.g. cellular level)
B (e.g. molecular level)












In this diagram, the dotted arrows represent indeterministic causation, that is, a causal 
path that can either become actual or not. A1 and A2 are two alternative possible futures, 
caused by both same-level and top-down causes, each of which would have been 
insufficient to determine the outcome in isolation.  Likewise, D1 and D2 are jointly caused 
by the hierarchical structure that synchronically leads from A1 and A2 all the way up to the 
highest level, and also, indirectly, by the D-level antecedents that made it so that the 
particular structure in question (either 1 or 2) was selected. So, even though 
supervenience holds, diachronic causal influences by the emergent entity described by 
state D have an effective power over which of the two alternatives (hierarchy 1 or 
hierarchy 2) will become actual. Edwards’ dictum thus fails. 
 
3.8. The break of supervenience and emergent indeterminism 
 
The problem with my view, some might say, is that I am postulating a structural kind of 
relation between levels which presupposes natural supervenience (cf. 3.6.2). But if we 
Fig.3: The upper-level 
states have downward 
causal power over the 
subvenient reality which 
is insufficiently 
determined by the 
previous physical states, 
given fundamental 
indeterminism. 
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hypothesize that changes might happen at the chemical or biological level that are not 
matched by corresponding changes at the lower-levels, then there could be same-level 
causation at the chemical level, for instance, without the need for fundamental 
indeterminism. Actually, indeterminism would become an emergent feature in this 
scenario. 
 
C    (e.g. celular level)
B (e.g. molecular level)
A (e.g. quantum level) 
t1 t2
SAME-LEVEL CAUSATION
WITH THE BREAK OF SUPERVENIENCE
deterministic causation
composition
BA       V BB




A problem with the above schema is that it lacks information in what concerns the relation 
between levels at t2. The mereological relation that we could picture between A (e.g. 
physical particles and forces) and B (e.g. molecules at the chemical level, say) at t1, is 
somehow broken at t2, for it is hard to understand how A* can constitute both BA (in the 
first alternative scenario) and BB (in the second alternative scenario). It seems logical that 
a mereological sum cannot be identical both to X and to Y, if X and Y are different things. 
So the relation that could link A* to BA or BB would have to be an indeterministic relation, 
which leads us to the postulation of a causal relation (the only indeterministic relation we 
usually find in our metaphysics), as many emergentists today argue holds between an 
emergent and its emergent base226. Naturally, at t1 the composition relation would have 
to be replaced with a causal relation as well, in our schema, for a matter of ontological 
                                                          
226 Cf. O’Connor, T. and Wong, H.Y. (2005). 
Fig.4: If supervenience 
breaks, then there can 
be a sort of “emergent 
indeterminism”, for B 
would give rise to two 
alternative scenarios at 
t2, even though there is a 
unique evolution at the 
fundamental level. 
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coherence. After these adjustments, this is how figure 4 could be completed and 
corrected: 
 
C    (e.g. celular level) 
B (e.g. molecular level)
A (e.g. quantum level)
t1 t2
SAME-LEVEL CAUSATION
WITH THE BREAK OF SUPERVENIENCE
deterministic causation
BA     V BB
A*   
indeterministic causation
CA1   V CA2 CB1 V CB2
 
 
Given the nature of indeterministic causation, at t2 B could act as a partial cause of either 
BA or BB (in two alternative worlds), in collaboration with A*, which is also a partial cause 
of both. And the same could be thought to happen at the following levels in the hierarchy.  
But is this a plausible picture of reality? Could indeterminism be emergent? Could there 
be some sort of “realizable multiplicity” – the opposite of “multiple realizability”? 
A surprising aspect about this question is that many authors who deal with problems 
related to free will, indeterminism or emergence, do not really commit to either one of 
these two theses: a) that indeterminism can originate only from the bottom-most level, 
or b) that there can be some sort of “emergent indeterminism” in the world. This is very 
surprising, especially since this question is of the utmost importance for the free will 
problem – for if (b) is true, one could hypothesize the existence of alternative possibilities 
only at the mental level, with no need for any postulation about the nature of the physical 
substrate227.  
                                                          
227 This what Helen Steward argues should be done in her (2008). 
Fig.5: In a world were 
supervenience does not 
hold between levels, 
relations can be thought 
of as indeterministic 
causal relations, with 
branching possibilities 
from the bottom up. 
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In this hypothetical scenario of “realizable multiplicity”, even if physics (in all its domains, 
classical or quantum) were strictly deterministic, the higher and more complex levels of 
reality that were disjunctively related to physical states could be diverse and the causal 
same-level sequences they would engage in could be described (if not governed) by 
probabilistic laws. Of course, these laws and the sequences of events at the upper 
domains that they would describe could not contradict the physical lower level laws. But 
if the latter were general enough and physics provided only necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for what happened in other domains, then unique evolution could be broken 
at a non-fundamental level.  
Intuitively, one might tend to think this is something that we encounter on a daily basis, 
like in a soccer game where, apart from a small number of deterministic rules, there are 
many ways to play and score. And it is also what prima facie happens in the biological 
world, where the unfolding of events seems to have immense – if not infinite – 
possibilities, though constrained by a relatively small number of strict deterministic 
physical laws. In her influential 1971 essay on indeterministic causation, Elizabeth 
Anscombe also described this hypothesis elegantly, using the example of a game of chess: 
“the play is seldom determined, though nobody breaks the rules”228.  
However, if we try to build an analogy between these cases and the concrete and detailed 
examples we might find when analyzing a certain multilayered system like a cell or a 
molecule, we immediately see that we are comparing incommensurable things: coarse-
grained descriptions of soccer or chess games and fine-grained descriptions of a 
physicochemical organic system such as a cell. The apparent looseness or generality of 
physical laws in the latter case is just a misunderstanding. When we move from the 
coarse-grained description of the macro-system to a more detailed fine-grained 
description that gradually includes all the relative values of all the material elements 
involved, then the “space of possibilities” gets increasingly reduced for the specific instant 
that we are considering, up to a point of full determination – unless we postulate 
                                                          
228 Anscombe, G.E.M. (1971), p.99. Anscombe acknowledges that this comparison was first 
suggested by Gilbert Ryle [in The Concept of Mind (London, 1949), p.77], though his use of the 
example was different than hers. 
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probabilistic laws from the beginning. Certainly, such an inclusion of the micro values into 
the description of the system would make it cease to be the description of a macro-
system. However, my point is precisely that if we want to assess if “the play” is 
“determined”, we must go beyond the macro-descriptions and dig into the fine-grained 
laws that underlie the behavior of the players at each instant. The rules of chess or soccer 
are not the only set of laws at play in the field, just as the biological laws are not the only 
laws constraining the behavior of a cell.  
As the reductionist research program pursued by most special sciences today is still in 
progress, we cannot yet be sure that only one macro-state can correspond to any micro-
state of a system. However, that is the most plausible view, all things considered. 
Scientists, as well as ordinary educated people do not typically deal with reality as 
synchronically branching. If we put two glasses of milk in the refrigerator at the same time 
and one of them gets spoiled sooner than the other, we will first look for a visible 
difference between them: distinct packs with different expiring dates or some dirt in one 
of the glasses, for example. If we cannot find it, we will likely think there is an invisible 
reason that can explain what happened and explain also why it happened in only one of 
the glasses rather than in both. We will intuitively postulate a microscopic difference 
which will surely have caused the macro phenomenon that we can detect with our senses. 
In the same way, when scientists encounter differences between two samples of a similar 
substance at the biological level that they cannot easily explain, they will look for 
corresponding differences at the chemical level that might justify the phenomenon. 
Likewise, if a Rayleigh-Bénard cell shows a small local perturbation in the macroscopic 
expected pattern, that will be due to a small (maybe even microscopic) difference in the 
bottom surface of the container.  












This is how science reasons and how it has progressed. Differences at one level lead 
researchers to look for differences at the next smaller one where explanations might be 
found, and along that trail they discover the patterns of the microscopic structure of 
reality, like the periodic table or the standard model of particle physics, and find out the 
genetic or viral origin of certain diseases.  
To postulate that cases of emergence would break this principle and allow for upper-level 
changes to take place independently from micro-level changes would certainly fuel the 
case against the plausibility of emergence. And to appeal for the heterogeneity between 
physical causation and psychophysical causation in order to defend the break of 
supervenience in the latter cases only229 seems too fragile a solution as well. That the 
mind depends on the brain and has a covariance relation with it has been the guiding 
assumption of neuroscientific research, a field in which extraordinary progresses have 
been made in the past decades. Today it is possible to infer from behavior and subjective 
reports the existence of chemical imbalances in the brain that can be treated 
pharmacologically, physical lesions that can be confirmed later via brain imaging 
                                                          
229 Cf. O’Connor, T., Wong, H.Y. (2005). 
Fig. 6. Imperfection in a 
hexagonal convection cell 
pattern caused by a tiny dent 
in the plate. 
[Van Dyke, M. (1982), p.83] 
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techniques, etc. All this must be taken seriously into account when dealing with the 
associated philosophical problems. 
Therefore, as a matter of prudence, I would avoid giving up supervenience. It would carry 
too heavy a cost, especially since I believe we do not have to do it in order to make sense 
of emergence. Assuming the truth of ontological indeterminism at the most fundamental 
level of reality is much more coherent with the current scientific picture of the world and 
thus comes surprisingly inexpensive as a solution for the dilemma introduced by Edward’s 
dictum. 
 
3.9. The irreducibility of the relation itself 
 
One last thing is missing before we can move on to the next chapter. I have written several 
times that, in an emergence relation, the subvenient level “generates” or “produces” the 
supervenient one. But what does that production relation amount to? Is it a special sort 
of mereological relation, in which novel causal powers emerge but the bottom-level 
entities are parts of the upper-level one? Is it instead a dynamic, rather than static and 
formal, relation, in which the immediately preceding emergence base causally brings 
about the subsequent upper-level entities? 
The first alternative would imply the assimilation of the emergence relation to the 
composition relations we find everywhere in nature. There is nothing fallacious in that, I 
believe, but it misses the point. To say that the emergent entity is composed by the 
elements that form its emergence base does not allow us to identify that which renders 
this relation different from cases where the systemic properties are simply resultant. In 
my opinion, a composite whole can be emergent as well as not, depending on whether its 
causal properties are explainable or not only on the basis of the causal properties of its 
parts. Likewise, as we said before, an emergent entity can be in a part-whole relation with 
its base, as well as not. In the cases where it is, the question of its “production” is given 
an easy answer: the emergent entity is brought about by the aggregation of the elements 
that compose it in a whole, together with a previously unmanifested and basic emergent 
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law. This seems to me to be logically possible – the question whether it is empirically 
plausible will be dealt with in the next chapter.  
However, in cases such as the mind-body relationship, where mereology does not apply, 
how can the production or generation of the emergent entities out of the emergence base 
be understood? O’Connor and Wong230 suggest that the emergence relation holding 
between the mental and the physical (which they assume to be fundamentally distinct) is 
a causal relation, albeit one that is not homogeneous to the physical-to-physical causal 
relation. They assume a dispositional account of causation according to which the 
appearance of a systemic emergent property is to be understood as the joint effect of the 
tendency of each of the basic entities to generate a collective effect that could never 
manifest below a certain threshold of organized complexity. It is thus unpredictable, but 
entirely natural. 
The problem with this account is that, unless we wish to question the usual assumption 
that causes must precede their effects (which I do not want to do), it implies considering 
emergence as a diachronic dependency of the upper-level entity on its preceding lower-
level cause. Emergent mental states, for example, would not be simultaneous with the 
neural states they depend on, but rather subsequent to them (even though the time lapse 
between them is supposed to be minimal). For example, the neural substrate of my 
mental state at t (say, a certain intention to act) would not be my brain state at t but 
rather my brain state at t-1, while my brain state at t would be the neural substrate of my 
following mental state at t+1.  
This strikes me as odd. In a hypothetical snapshot of my complete self at t, there would 
be mismatch between my thoughts and feelings and my brain states. Imagine a temporal 
sequence in which my mental state MA leads to mental state MB , which leads to MC; by 
hypothesis, at the neural level we would find NB, then NC, and finally ND. In an alternative 
sequence (not necessarily an alternative world, but merely another moment in time in 
which, given different stimuli, say, a different mental sequence occurs), we can imagine 
                                                          
230 Cf. O’Connor, T., Wong, H.Y. (2005). 
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MX, rather than MB, to follow MA. At the neural level, in the first instant of the sequence, 
we would have NX (the neural substrate of MX) rather than NB (the neural substrate of MB). 
Now imagine MA represents a question in someone’s mind (e.g. “What am I to do?”) and 
that MB and MX are two different answers to this question (“Do B” or “Do X”). In a 
hypothetical snapshot of my whole person in the instant when I am posing myself the 
question, I would find, in one circumstance, the neural substrate of the answer B, and on 
the other, the neural substrate of the answer X. But at the mental level, in both 
circumstances, I would still be undecided about the outcome.   
My view instead is that non-mereological emergence is irreducible to other types of 
relation. It is a “building relation”231 of its own, whereby a certain system belonging to 
one domain is necessarily linked to upper-level properties (or even substances) belonging 
to another domain. 
A useful analogy can be that of color: at the strictly physical level no object possesses 
color, but once an object enters a relation with visible light and with an appropriate 
detector, such as the human eye (hence, given a certain context), it will necessarily 
manifest this secondary property. Color is not a new event or property caused by the 
primary properties of the object; it is realized by and supervenient on them, once the right 
trigger is in place. Thus, when I look at a red tomato, the tomato possesses both a certain 
superficial structure and the spectral reflectance that we call color, with the latter 
supervening on the former. Likewise, once the necessary and sufficient conditions are in 
place in a certain system (say, a mammal’s developing brain), an emergent property 
appears (say, phenomenal consciousness), endowed with novel causal powers but 
nevertheless dependent on the lower-level structure in order to subsist. 
The limits of this analogy are obvious: color is not an observer-independent instance of 
the ontology of the world. It depends on the interaction with a detector in order to 
manifest as something other than the primary properties of the object’s superficial 
structure. Many even argue that, in fact, it is nothing but those primary properties232. This 
                                                          
231 Again, I am borrowing this phrase from Bennett, K. (2011). 
232 Some of the discussion between physicalists, dispositionalists and subjectivists about color can 
be found here: Ross, P.W. (2000), Byrne, A. and Hilbert, D.R. (2004).  
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is not the place to get into that discussion. However, I believe the analogy can help us 
understand how different properties can be related by asymmetric dependency and 
simultaneous manifestation. When the relata at stake are truly distinct entities, we add 
to these modes of relation the underivability of the upper-level entity’s causal powers and 
we are faced with ontological emergence. 
In this chapter I have tried to show that the concept of ontological emergence is useful, 
compatible with our current science and that it can be given a coherent account. However, 
we still need to see if it corresponds to any actual features in the world. In the next chapter 
I will turn to this problem. Even though this is mainly an empirical question, I believe the 
appeal of the emergence hypothesis is greater in some fields rather than in others and 






4. THE CONSCIOUS SELF 
 
“How is it that anything so remarkable as a state of consciousness comes 
about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as 
the appearance of the Djin, when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.” 
(T.H. Huxley, 1866) 
 
4.1. Emergence only at the conscious level 
 
We have seen in the previous chapter that much evidence has been gathered that in 
nature, apparently, “more is different”233: as we go up the scale of complexity, our models 
have to include, at each level of organization, laws of a different type establishing relations 
between surprising new properties carrying causal powers that we cannot deduce nor 
explain only in lower level terms. Examples (though seldom uncontroversial) range from 
the liquidity and transparency of water, to physical phase transitions, to life and 
consciousness. Opinions differ a lot, however: some say emergence is ubiquitous, others 
consider it rare, others still inexistent. 
For an emergentist like Robert Bishop, for instance, complex systems are permeated by 
constant inter-level relations by which upward determination is combined with 
downward constraint. Whenever a certain domain (say quantum physics) provides 
necessary but insufficient conditions for the description and, most importantly, the 
existence of phenomena at another domain (say, chemistry), contextual emergence is at 
work. These emergent domains or levels of organization, in which new constraints are 
superimposed over the broader and under-defined physical space of possibilities of the 
underlying levels are the subject matter of the special sciences.  
                                                          
233 Cf. the above mentioned article by P. W. Anderson (1972). 
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“In the absence of any other causes, physics supplies conditions defining the space of 
possibilities for matter’s behavior and interactions. However, biological, 
psychological, and social realities further constrain this space of possibilities. These 
additional realities do not violate the space of physical possibility (i.e. never produce 
possibilities outside the physical space of possibilities). (…) For instance, the physical 
space of possibilities places relatively mild constraints on the motion of my arms, but 
my intentions in a voting context dictate when and how I will raise my arm in support 
of my favored candidate.”234 
According to Bishop, an example such as this one (the intentional motion of my arm in a 
voting situation) is no different from the example of clownfish, a hermaphroditic species 
in which the male located highest in the social hierarchy (the largest one) turns into a 
female when the dominant female of the group dies. The removal of the female from the 
social unit initiates a certain chemical mechanism (probably induced by the lack of 
pheromones) which is the triggering necessary condition for the next dominant male to 
undergo sex change; however, the size-based dominance hierarchy channels that trigger, 
providing one of the jointly sufficient conditions for which particular fish makes the 
switch235. In Bishop’s view, this example from biology, along with examples from physics 
(temperature), chemistry (molecular shape) or the social sciences (how policies influence 
traffic, say), allows us to realize how the ubiquity of elementary physical laws does not 
imply the principle of the causal closure of the physical in its strong version, according to 
which such laws are sufficient to determine all behaviors.  
I am skeptical about most of these examples, however. The contextual elements that 
seem to make all the difference can be interpreted in reductionistic terms, despite the 
greater simplicity of an upper-level explanation. In the clownfish example, the ecological 
reason why this specific male, rather than that one, changed into a female can most 
probably be translated into biochemical terms concerning certain reproduction-regulating 
hormones (even though the specific mechanisms that induce sex change in this species 
                                                          
234 Bishop, R.C. (2010), p.607. 
235 Robert Bishop presented this example in the talk “Free Will and the Causal Closure of Physics” 
he gave in Lisbon (May 20, 2014), and discussed it with me in private correspondence. 
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are still under study). And what about all those examples of irreducibility in condensed 
matter physics that we analyzed in the preceding chapter? As I said, the singular limits 
that have prevented us so far from unifying physics under one universal theory of 
everything are indicative of the limitations of our models, but remain silent about the 
degree to which nature contains true cases of emergence or not. The only thing we know 
is that physical science (as well as the so called special sciences) is compatible with the 
conditions I presented as necessary for emergence to be possible: 
- Physics cannot (and does not) prove that the microphysical world is causally closed 
- Despite some controversy, the most common interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, our best theory about the most fundamental level of reality we know, 
is indeterministic, which means that in the quantum world, given a certain state 
of a system, different possible outcomes might follow.   
So we certainly cannot exclude the possibility of emergence from the material realm; 
however, if we miss an independent reason to grant an emergentist explanation more 
credit than a reductionist one, we should probably bet on the latter. The success of 
science’s reductionist research program in the last century justifies the confidence of most 
in the assumption that the full explanation of every fact in chemical-then-physical terms 
is just a matter of time. Every time we explore parts of the material world using the 
scientific method we find very complex and structured systems in which mereological 
pieces, like physical particles (and their properties), are combined into mereological 
wholes, like molecules and cells (and their properties). The living dynamics of a cell, for 
example, cannot take place at lower levels and it certainly appears as something new and 
unexpected, but it is explainable derivatively on the basis of the properties of the lower 
level components of the cell and their relations. Hence, even though our epistemic 
limitations and the discontinuity between our theories do not allow us to confirm nor 
refute reductionism, it is plausible that all material levels are resultant, as they stand in 
some kind of reductive relation to the fundamental domain. And for the sake of 
metaphysical simplicity, this seems to be the most reasonable position to assume 
whenever possible. 
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This reductionism-by-default position is very useful as it does not let us rest on the 
mystery. Instead of labeling the gaps in our knowledge as emergent phenomena, it rather 
forces into seeking deeply into the unknown, as in the famous Sidney Harris cartoon used 
by Dennett to taunt dualism: 
 
Fig. 7. ©1975 Sidney Harris – American Scientist magazine.236 
 
But are there any cases in which we have an independent reason to consider that 
emergence is the only adequate concept we can use to characterize the relation between 
two levels of reality?  
Phenomenal experiences are simultaneously linked to our bodies and radically distinct 
from them: they are dependent on the brain (if we drink too much alcohol, we 
immediately feel its typical effect on our conscious experience, for example), they are 
effective enough as to cause our body to move, but they appear to us by introspection as 
intrinsically qualitative and not amenable to a third-person description. Therefore, the 
relation between the body and phenomenal consciousness seems prima facie to be a 
promising terrain where to look for ontological irreducibility. Might we say that, in this 
case, one has more reasons to consider that there is a radical discontinuity in the very 
fabric of reality and not only in the eyes of the beholder? 
                                                          
236 Cited in Dennett, D.C. (1993), p.38. 
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Even if the agent’s physical body (including her brain) works as a machine the functioning 
of which can be exhausted by a reductive explanation, the agent’s conscious states might 
be emergent. There is no reason to assume that if we “let emergence in” at a certain level 
of complexity, this should make us accept that there is emergence all the way down. Also, 
as action and free will are what most concerns us in this dissertation, what we need to 
assess is the possibility of a causally powerful entity that might choose and originate her 
actions without being determined to do so. And that does not require the falsifying of a 
reductionist account of material reality. What it does require is that the agent exerts her 
downward causal power over her physical body, and that her decisions might be caused 
by her, as an emergent substance, rather than by her parts. This relies only on the 
emergence of the conscious self.  
However, one might ask why is it that the prudential reasons that led me to deny that 
epistemically emergent phenomena like living cells are ontologically emergent do not 
force me to embrace a reductionist view about consciousness as well. Indeed, a world in 
which a whole new type of reality (phenomenality) emerges at a certain point in evolution 
(and, synchronically, when a certain type and degree of complexity is reached) is certainly 
less parsimonious than a world in which everything, including our representations and 
feelings, is ultimately reducible to the most fundamental level. Defying Ockham’s razor 
never comes in cheap. Nevertheless, conscious phenomena do seem to be of a totally 
different nature with respect to the physical world in spite of the fact that the latter 
provides the substrate from which they arise: they are subjective, qualitative and have a 
phenomenal feel to them that can only be directly experienced by the subject himself. In 
my view, arguments in favor of the emergence of phenomenality are much more powerful 
than arguments in favor of emergence in the non-mental realm.  I will now turn to 
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4.2. The irreducibility of consciousness 
 
All the putative emergent phenomena that we considered in the preceding chapter 
appear in space, are quantifiable and can be detected by a third party, namely by 
machines. Conscious experience shares none of these properties.  
Consciousness is the property of experiencing reality from a first-person perspective. It is 
the property we humans and, so we suppose, other complex animals are endowed with 
when we are awake and aware. There is something it is like to be this concrete conscious 
subject in this particular situation, and the what-it-is-likeness of this experience is radically 
subjective – I can know it only by having it. In the inner life we experience as conscious 
beings there is an epistemic asymmetry by which our conscious experiences are directly 
known to us and only indirectly translated into language and shared with others. There is 
no objective access to subjective phenomenal experience. As David Chalmers noted: 
“Even if we knew every last detail about the physics of the universe — the 
configuration, causation, and evolution among all the fields and particles in the 
spatiotemporal manifold — that information would not lead us to postulate the 
existence of conscious experience. My knowledge of consciousness, in the first 
instance, comes from my own case, not from any external observation. (…) 
Eliminativism about conscious experience is an unreasonable position only because of 
our own acquaintance with it. If it were not for this direct knowledge, consciousness 
could go the way of the vital spirit.”237 
None of the other properties we come in contact with in the world share this inherent 
subjectivity. We can know them by perceiving them, by measuring them, by calculating 
and deducing them, by learning about them from a third-person description. I do not need 
to experience being a dog in order to know how much my dog weighs, nor how his 
immune system works. And surely I can even infer from his behavior how he feels when I 
pet him. However, a future robot dog might look and behave exactly like my dog and miss 
                                                          
237 Chalmers, D. (1996), pp.101-102. 
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consciousness altogether. Its behavior can never give us a complete (not to mention 
infallible) knowledge about its inner experience: I would need to be my dog in order to 
know what it is like to be my dog being petted. That aspect of my dog’s reality is 
inaccessible to anyone besides himself. 
Many arguments have been given in favor of this idea and of its implications. A very 
famous one is the one given by Thomas Nagel in his influential 1974 article “What is it like 
to be a bat?”. Nagel argues that the phenomenal experience of being a bat, like the 
phenomenal experience of being human, is intrinsically subjective. It is impossible for 
humans to know how the experience of perceiving the world through a sonar system feels 
like, even if we know every bit of objective information there is to know about the 
mechanisms that make this type of perception work. The experience of echolocation is 
grounded on a particular point of view that only a bat or a very similar specimen can adopt 
and which is missing from any objective description. This is different from any other 
phenomena, even those of which we have qualitative experiences such as heat or color238, 
because their objective character is independent from any particular point of view, and 
can be captured under a scientific description. Like Nagel says, “lightning has an objective 
character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance, and this can be investigated by a 
Martian without vision”239. On the contrary, phenomenal experience is, by its very nature, 
subjective. 
The epistemic asymmetry by which conscious experience is directly accessible to the 
subject that experiences it and not to others led Nagel to infer the failure of the 
physicalistic ambition to reduce conscious experience to physical facts. The inherent 
subjectivity of conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical reality, which is 
objective by excellence. The gap is unsurmountable, for the translation of a subjective 
phenomenon into objective terms would annihilate the phenomenon in question. 
                                                          
238 Of course, the experience of color is very often considered to be irreducible to its description 
in physicalistic terms [Cf. Jackson, F. (1986)], but we can easily distinguish the subjective 
experience from its objective source (the interaction of a certain receptor with the reflection of 
light with a certain frequency by the molecular structure of the surface of a certain material). 
239 Nagel, T (1974), p.443. 
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“It is difficult to understand what could be meant by the objective character of an 
experience, apart from the particular point of view from which its subject apprehends 
it. After all, what would be left of what it is like to be a bat if one removed the 
viewpoint of the bat?”240 
Nagel concludes that our inner experience of the world can never be satisfactorily 
accounted for via a third-person description.  
However, some disagree and have endeavored to “explain” consciousness in purely 
physicalistic terms. Daniel Dennett, for example, in his book Consciousness Explained, 
purports to provide a functionalist model of conscious experience without adding any 
“mind stuff” to the objective reality that science can study – the brain. He acknowledges 
that “human consciousness is just about the last surviving mystery”241, but believes that 
considering it to be something else besides the brain is to adopt dualism, and that this 
amounts to “just accepting defeat without admitting it”242. So Dennett undertakes a long 
journey through the mechanisms that lead to the construction of experience in which he 
tries to show that “there is no observer inside the brain”243. When we see and interact 
with the world, multiple drafts of information coming from our senses are registered in 
our memory and analyzed algorithmically (allowing us to identify edges, corners, faces, 
words), in the same manner as a small primitive robot like 1960’s Shakey244 can “perceive” 
reality, interpret it and react to it, without there being any conscious self inside it that 
“observes” some sort of “mental images” and has a first-person perspective about them. 
There is no projection of the items of phenomenology in a “Cartesian theater” somewhere 
in the brain. There is no audience for that theater, there is no appearance-reality 
distinction in human subjectivity, all there is are iterated discrimination processes that 
produce content that becomes available for eliciting behavior or for later memory 
retrieval.  
                                                          
240 Ibidem. 
241 Dennett, D.C. (1993), p.21. 
242 Idem, p.41. 
243 Idem, p.110. 
244 Shakey was a robot developed at Stanford Research Institute by Nils Nilsson, Bertram Raphael 
and colleagues, whose mechanisms Dennett analyzes in (Idem, pp.85-95).  
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Dennett’s reason for attempting to reduce phenomenality to objective reality is that he 
believes there is no other way of explaining it: 
“Only a theory that explained conscious events in terms of unconscious events could 
explain consciousness at all. If our model of how pain is a product of brain activity still 
has a box in it labeled ‘pain’, you haven’t yet begun to explain what pain is.”245 
This would be a valuable project if it were possible; but I am afraid that, in the case of 
consciousness, to reduce the conscious explanandum to the unconscious explanans is 
actually just “a quagmire of evasion” and “petty word-jugglery”246. The result of our 
reduction would miss what is essential of the original concept, even if one uses the same 
word to name it. The reason is that phenomenality, the subjective and qualitative inner 
experience that a conscious person has of the world around her and within her, is 
something other than the functional aspects of our cognitive activity that can be somehow 
translated into the third-person quantitative and objective world of neurons and 
synapses, located in space and time and defined by structure and function. The 
phenomenal aspect of conscious experience may be produced by its neural substrate and 
be dependent on it to exist, but its causal reduction does not amount to an ontological 
reduction, because it is incommensurable with structural and functional concepts. This is 
why Chalmers distinguishes the easy problems from the hard problem of consciousness: 
the former can be given a functional explanation, the latter cannot. 
“It is an uncontested truth that we have the various functional capacities of access, 
control, report, and the like, and these phenomena pose uncontested explananda 
(phenomena in need of explanation) for a science of consciousness. But in addition, 
it seems to be a further truth that we are conscious, and this phenomenon seems to 
pose a further explanandum. It is this explanandum that raises the interesting 
problems of consciousness. To flatly deny the further truth, or to deny without 
argument that there is a hard problem of consciousness over and above the easy 
                                                          
245 Idem, pp.454-455. 
246 These are two famous phrases that were used, respectively, by William James and Immanuel 
Kant, to describe compatibilism about free will. 
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problems, would be to make a highly counterintuitive claim that begs the important 
questions.”247 
John Searle put forward an argument that can help us see this clearly. He starts by 
describing processes of successful reduction that have been made throughout history, 
regarding perceptual properties like heat, sound, color, solidity or liquidity. 
“In every case the ontological reduction was based on a prior causal reduction. We 
discovered that a surface feature of a phenomenon was caused by the behavior of 
the elements of an underlying microstructure. (…) In each case, for both the primary 
and secondary qualities, the point of the reduction was to carve off the surface 
features and redefine the original notion in terms of the causes that produce those 
surface features. (…) ‘‘Real’’ heat is now defined in terms of the kinetic energy of the 
molecular movements, and the subjective feel of heat that we get when we touch a 
hot object is now treated as just a subjective appearance caused by heat, as an effect 
of heat. It is no longer part of real heat. (…) If all subjective experiences disappeared 
from the world, real heat would still remain. (…) Part of the point of the reduction in 
the case of heat was to distinguish between the subjective appearance on the one 
hand and the underlying physical reality on the other.”248 
However, says Searle, the subjective appearances are the very essence of conscious 
experience. We cannot simply redefine it in terms only of the underlying physical causes, 
as in other cases, for the subjective and qualitative aspect of experience (qualia) is exactly 
what we are supposed to give a definition of, so it is not something that we can simply 
“carve off”.  
“We can’t make that sort of appearance-reality distinction for consciousness because 
consciousness consists in the appearances themselves. Where appearance is 
concerned, we cannot make the appearance-reality distinction because the 
appearance is the reality.”249 
                                                          
247 Chalmers, D. (2003), pp.109-110. 
248 Searle, J.R. (1992), pp.118-121.  
249 Idem, pp.121-122. My reader might have noticed that both Searle and Dennett argue for the 
abandonment of the appearance-reality distinction when it comes to consciousness, but they go 
down opposite paths therefrom. Searle’s recognition of the inadequacy of an appearance-reality 
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I have alluded before to Nagel’s claim that there can be no “objective character” of a 
phenomenal experience:  
“It is impossible to exclude the phenomenological features of experience from a 
reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary 
substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it – namely, by explaining them 
as effects on the minds of human observers. (…) The reason is that every subjective 
phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view, and it seems 
inevitable that an objective, physical theory will abandon that point of view.”250 
How can there be an observer-independent version of my mother’s grief when her father 
died? Or of my feeling of overwhelming joy when my children were born? Of course, given 
our human ability for compassion and empathy, we can relate to other people’s feelings 
and have an idea of what they are like, based on our personal experiences in similar 
situations. But our approximations to the feelings of others will never be their feelings. 
The qualitative and subjective aspect of their mental life cannot be reduced to the 
objective aspects that we can eventually reproduce and thus have a partial knowledge of. 
There can be an objective character of the content of a thought but not of the phenomenal 
representation of that thought in the mind of the one who has it. And certainly not of a 
sensation or a feeling. And since the first-person perspective is essential to phenomenal 
experience (it is my mother’s grief, my joy, the bat’s sensation of perceiving objects in the 
dark), such an experience cannot be identical to any portion of physical reality, which is 
by definition independent of anyone’s point of view.  
Pain is a good example of this impossibility. The definition of pain that is used both in 
medical and neuroscientific contexts around the world is the one provided by the 
International Association for the Study of Pain: 
                                                          
distinction leads him to acknowledging that the reality of consciousness is its appearance. In turn, 
Dennett’s way of dropping that distinction is to reduce consciousness to objective “reality”, 
eliminating the subject’s inner life (the “appearance”) from the model.  
250 Nagel, T. (1974), p.437. 
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“An unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential 
tissue damage, or described in terms of such damage.”251 
In a subsequent note, the authors of this definition state clearly, “Pain is always 
subjective”. Thus, pain is defined in subjective and qualitative terms (“unpleasant 
experience”), even by scientists who strive to delimit it in an as objective and quantitative 
a way as possible. A functional definition of pain that would leave out its “what-it-is-
likeness” could not possibly exhaust what pain is. It could account for the physical causes 
of the experience of pain, the behavioral consequences of it and the neural correlates 
without which pain is not possible. But it would miss the crucial element of how pain feels. 
What happens in the case of pain, happens with any phenomenal experience: to analyze 
consciousness exclusively in functional terms is to collapse it with other concepts, such as, 
for instance, that of “awareness” – the functional notion of “a state wherein we have 
access to some information, and can use that information in the control of behavior”252. 
The concept of consciousness and that of awareness, however, are not logically 
coextensive. Even though they usually go hand in hand, there is nothing in the concept of 
awareness that implies the phenomenal aspect of there being something it feels like to 
be aware and thus I can conceive the possibility of being aware of a fact without having 
an associated phenomenal experience of it. Therefore, functionalizing consciousness 
would be merely “changing the subject”253, not to mention assuming a highly 
counterintuitive position that brings with it the burden of proof. 
That is why Dennett’s Consciousness Explained can be easily nicknamed “Consciousness 
explained away” as the author himself, in the last chapter of the book, suggested could 
happen254. In the words of one of his many critics, his confessed enemy Searle: 
“To put it as clearly as I can: in his book, Consciousness Explained, Dennett denies the 
existence of consciousness. He continues to use the word, but he means something 
                                                          
251 Merskey, H., Bogduk, N. (eds.) and IASP Task Force on Taxonomy (1994), p.209. 
252 Chalmers, D. (1996), p.28. What he calls awareness is what Ned Block labelled “access 
consciousness” (1995). 
253 Chalmers, D. (1996), p.106. 
254 Dennett, D. (1993), p.454. 
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different by it. For him, it refers only to third-person phenomena, not to the first-
person conscious feelings and experiences we all have. For Dennett there is no 
difference between us humans and complex zombies who lack any inner feelings, 
because we are all just complex zombies.”255 
Dennett is not troubled by this type of criticism. His view is that to explain things is to 
explain them away. We necessarily have to leave something of the explanandum out of 
the explanans if we are to explain it. “Leaving something out is not a feature of failed 
explanations, but of successful explanations”256, he says.  
However, deflationist positions such as his clash against what I believe to be an undeniable 
intuition expressed in Descartes’ cogito. Even if I may be totally wrong about how the 
contents of my conscious experience relate to the external world (e.g. I am mistaken when 
I believe that the pain I feel is located in the my hurting limb rather than in my head), I 
cannot be wrong about the fact that I feel something. It is self-refuting to assert that one 
feels like a zombie. Thus, pretending to explain consciousness in physicalistic terms is 
actually denying the reality of the phenomenological experience one is supposedly trying 
to explain.  
Reductive analyses of consciousness which leave out its subjective what-it-is-likeness fail 
to capture what consciousness is, also because they are “logically compatible with its 
absence”257. For instance, how can consciousness be identical with some neural state, if 
that neural state could logically be had by a zombie, a pseudo-person capable of objective 
reasoning, like a computer, but with no subjective experiences whatsoever? Thomas 
Nagel uses this argument in his 1974 article. Despite acknowledging that it is possible that, 
by nomological necessity, any device which is complex enough to create consciousness 
will in fact create it258, he argues that this is not a logical necessity, hence it is perfectly 
conceivable that systems of functional states or intentional states “could be ascribed to 
                                                          
255 John Searle, in his reply to Dennett’s reply to his review of Consciousness Explained [New York 
Review of Books, “The Mystery of Consciousness: An Exchange” (December 21, 1995)]. 
256 Dennett, D. (1993), p.454. 
257 Nagel, T. (1974), p.436. 
258 Cf. Ibidem, note 2. 
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robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing”259. This 
shows how functional or intentional states are compatible with the absence of 
consciousness and are thus not something it can be identified with or reduced to.  
David Chalmers made a very systematic use of zombies in his case against physicalism260. 
The core structure of his argument is similar to Nagel’s: according to Chalmers, we can 
conceive a being that is molecule-by-molecule identical to him and that behaves like him, 
but which misses phenomenal consciousness entirely. Even though he acknowledges that 
his zombie twin is most probably not physically possible in our world, its conceivability 
leads to the conclusion that it is metaphysically possible, which means that consciousness 
does not supervene logically on the physical: there could be a world that is physically 
identical to ours but in which there are no conscious beings. Or to return to Kripke’s 
metaphor261, after God created the physical world, he needed to work some more in order 
to add consciousness to it262.  
Last but not least, there is one more argument in favor of the irreducibility of 
consciousness to its physical substrate that deserves to be taken into account: Frank 
Jackson’s “knowledge argument”263. Here, we are presented with Mary, a scientist 
confined from the day of her birth to a black-and-white room, where she learns all the 
physical (and chemical and neurophysiological) information there is to know about the 
world. One day, she leaves the black-and-white room and sees color for the first time. 
Jackson argues that her experience of seeing a red apple, for instance, is something new, 
something she had been missing, something which her complete knowledge of the 
physical facts about the world could not have given her before. Therefore, Jackson 
concludes, physicalism is false because qualia are not and cannot be included in a 
                                                          
259 Ibidem. 
260 Cf. Chalmers, D. (1996, 2010). 
261 Kripke, S. (1972), pp.153-154. I mentioned Kripke’s metaphor regarding logical supervenience 
in section 3.6.2. 
262 The zombie argument has been criticized both on the grounds that zombies are not conceivable 
[Dennett, D. (1995)], and that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility [Hill, C. S., 
and B. P. McLaughlin (1999)]. Chalmers has answered thoroughly to most of these objections, 
namely in his (1996) and his (2010).  
263 Jackson, F. (1982). 
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complete description of the world in entirely physical terms. Hence, if Mary’s previous 
knowledge about vision and color (which, by hypothesis, was all the physical information 
to be had) was incomplete, then the conscious experiences that provided her with new 
knowledge cannot be satisfactorily accounted for by a neurophysiological description. 
They must be something over and above the causal interactions that take place inside our 
skull264. 
Dennett is much aware of this type of argument which argues for the ontological gap 
between the physical structure of the brain and conscious experience, based on the 
epistemic gap that relies on the radical heterogeneity between these two types of reality. 
And so he counters: 
“Why should consciousness be the only thing that can’t be explained? Solids and 
liquids and gases can be explained in terms of things that aren’t themselves solids or 
liquids or gases. Surely life can be explained in terms of things that aren’t themselves 
alive – and the explanation doesn’t leave living things lifeless.”265 
The analogy fails, however. Solids, liquids and living things can be explained in terms of 
things that lack their definitional properties because the explananda in such cases are 
phenomena that we wish to explain in terms of structure and function. Consider life, for 
example. Today, as well as in the heyday of vitalism, what we are looking for is the causal 
etiology of complex phenomena like adaptation, growth and reproduction, which may 
seem extraordinary with respect to our explanatory tools, but are not of a radically 
different nature. For instance, we can understand life as the name given to the 
homeostatic dynamics of an organism, and once we understand that dynamics in terms 
of structures, functions and laws of interaction, we might easily accept that there is 
nothing left to explain266. It is like explaining the whole in terms of its parts – a type of 
explanation that seems adequate and satisfactory because it exhausts the relevant 
                                                          
264 As is well known, Jackson’s argument led him to the conclusion that conscious states are 
epiphenomenal. However, since I do not assume the Causal Closure of the Physical to be true, I 
use the Knowledge Argument in favor of an anti-physicalistic thesis. 
265 Dennett, D.C. (1993), p.455. 
266 Many would disagree, of course. See for instance, Robert Arp’s “Emergence in Biology” (2008). 
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features of the explanandum. As we have seen, with consciousness, things are very 
different. My feeling a certain experience is part of the essence of that experience, it is 
not dispensable as in the case of heat, say, which would remain present in the world had 
all the subjective experiences of heat disappeared. 
Let us sum up. Any possible causal reduction whereby future science might describe the 
coming to be of conscious mental states may explain exhaustively the mechanisms of their 
production but will always fail to reduce them ontologically, for nothing else besides the 
conscious experience itself can contain what is essential about it.  
Therefore, if to explain A is to restate it in terms of B, then we may as well admit that 
consciousness is unexplainable. As far as what our current conceptual framework allows 
us to see, no neuroscientific model, no matter how exhaustive, will ever be able to show 
us that conscious states are nothing over and above their neural correlates. Even if we 
identify their physical causes and understand in detail the conditions that have to be in 
place for them to emerge, conscious states can never be identical nor reducible to their 
non-conscious substrate.  
This is why I believe that consciousness is the emergent property by excellence. The 
subjective, private and qualitative nature of conscious mental states cannot possibly be 
translated into third-person universal quantitative terms, such as the ones used to 
describe non-mental reality. So even if the self-explanatory character of emergent 
phenomena, with their mysterious novelty somehow transcending the causal processes 
underlying them, might seem too spooky to be included in any serious metaphysics, truth 
is that the reality of consciousness, which we are all intimately familiar with and cannot 
deny, possesses this exact same character: radical irreducibility. 
  
4.3. The conscious self 
 
But conscious states and events are not yet what we were looking for when we started 
investigating the emergence hypothesis. Consciousness is a property, not a substance, 
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and agent-causalism requires that the agent as a substance be irreducible to her parts, 
both at the neural as well as the mental level. But we can make a further step if we ask: 
who is it that possesses the property of being conscious? Common sense, as well as all the 
scientific evidence we have gathered so far, lead us into thinking that inanimate objects 
are not conscious267. Only living complex systems have this property. So what can the 
property of being conscious tell us about its peculiar bearers?  
Some authors have argued that consciousness is a unified state that cannot be possessed 
by aggregates. Only the self268 as an emergent unified substance can be endowed with it. 
I will now present this unity-of-consciousness argument in the words of William Hasker, 
one of its proponents, quoting him at length for the sake of clarity: 
“As an example of the unity of consciousness, I cite my awareness of my present 
visual field. This field includes the impressions from a set of shelves in the living 
room of my apartment, with books on the lower shelves and a number of plants 
(…). All this I observe without scanning or refocusing my eyes: momentarily, as it 
were. The visual field is not unified in any interesting aesthetic sense, but it is a fact 
that I experience it as a unity, all at once and not as a succession of discrete 
experiences. (…) 
Now, my procedure is to take a specific conscious state – the state I am in when I 
am aware of my visual field, as described above – and ask what physical entity it is 
that is in that state. (…) Let us say that it is my brain that is aware of my visual field, 
and I am aware of it in virtue of my brain’s being aware of it. But not all of my brain 
need be involved. (…) Let V be the smallest part of my brain which contains the 
modeling of all the information from my visual field. (…) 
Should we say, then, that it is V which is aware of the visual field? (…) But if V is a 
whole composed of parts each of which is not aware of the visual field, how can V 
itself be aware of it? If we assume that each item of information is modeled in a 
                                                          
267 Panpsychists, of course, would disagree. 
268 The self is a concept that is very hard to define, especially given the very diverse contexts in 
which the term is used (philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, neuroscience). I am taking it here as 
the self-reflexive subject of conscious states, the psychological core that is present in all the 
conscious states of a healthy person, who perceives the world from a certain perspective and 
refers to the owner of that perspective as “I”. 
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discrete subunit of the brain, we might suppose that each subunit is aware of the 
information it contains (…). [But] this does not enable us to explain the awareness 
of the entire field; this would be like saying that each student in a class knows the 
answer to one question on an examination, and that in virtue of this the entire class 
knows the material perfectly! 
(…) A person’s being aware of a complex fact cannot consist of parts of the person 
being aware of parts of the fact. A conjunction of partial awarenesses does not add 
up to a total awareness.”269 
What Hasker is trying to show is that there is a property of the mind (conscious awareness 
of a visual field) which does not follow from the properties of the brain’s parts (and their 
relations) which are thought to produce it. No sum of partial awarenesses can add up to 
total awareness. Analyzing the characteristics of a phenomenal experience such as the 
one quoted above reveals to us that there need be some entity that feels the 
simultaneous and unified “what-it-is-likeness” of the visual field. That entity is the self – 
whom I call the “agent” in the context of action production. 
To say that there is a substance that we can call a self is not to say that the self is a concrete 
object or some supra-natural thing. What is crucial to the conscious self is unity. It can be 
a dynamical system that emerges from the interaction between its parts. Here is the 
difference between an aggregate and a system, according to Alicia Juarrero: 
“In an aggregate, the properties of the parts do not change depending on whether or 
not they are part of the aggregate. In a system, on the other hand, the properties of 
the components depend on the systemic context within which the components are 
located. (…) Correlation and coordination among the parts confer a peculiar unity on 
the overall system.”270 
Systems are not mere epistemic entities, they are present in our everyday reality, from 
cells and multicellular organisms whose identity is dynamically grounded on the 
interactions that keep them together and integrated, to the weather or the food we eat. 
                                                          
269 Hasker, W. (1999), pp.125-128. Compare with a similar claim by Timothy O’Connor (2000, 
p.116). 
270 Juarrero, A. (1999), p.109. 
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These are all systems in which all the parts are correlated and depend on the relation they 
are embedded in, in order to be what they are. If we pick a flower from a tree, it will soon 
die; the flapping of the wings of a butterfly might influence a tornado thousands of miles 
away. 
This is all familiar to us. The difference between these common non-emergent systems 
and possible emergent ones is the reducibility of the causal properties of the former, in 
contrast with the genuine novelty of those of the latter. So an emergent self does not have 
to be a hard core with no structure. It might as well be a dynamic system like many others 
in our body, whose unity derives from it being a system, but which is emergent because 
it can downwardly cause events in the material substrate that produces it in such a 
manner that one cannot take those causings as mere macro effects of many micro 
causings. Given the subjective and qualitative nature of conscious experience, the whole 
that emerges from the system’s intrinsic and extrinsic relations is uniquely endowed with 
a first-person unified perspective on the world and with the ability to voluntarily control 
its own movements.  
This happens with human as well as with non-human complex animals. Unlike the 
paramecium, which moves reactively only, animal agents are capable of controlling and 
directing their bodily movements and interactions with the world purposefully. And this 
faculty is based on the unified and subjective point of view with which their active self 
relates to the world and authors these actions. In the words of Helen Steward, who 
grounds agency in this body/owner distinction: 
“Something that can make its body do various things must be a thing of which it at 
least makes sense to say it ‘has a body’ – something that can reasonably be regarded 
as an ‘owner’ of its body. And it is only of some sorts of entity that it makes sense to 
say that they ‘have’ bodies, thereby separating what is moved (a body or a body part) 
from what is doing the moving (an animal). It is these entities that are potentially 
sufficiently complex to sustain an owner/body distinction which I call ‘agents’ (…). 
Which sorts of entity may be said to ‘have’ bodies (…)? Entities with a mind.”271 
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Or I would rather say: entities with consciousness.  
 
4.4. Is this dualism? 
 
My naturalist readers will regard this thesis with dismay. To say that there are properties 
that are of a totally different nature from material properties is to adopt property dualism, 
which is suspicious enough; adding to this the idea that the self is an irreducible individual 
means to give in to full-blown dualism, today a largely discredited position among both 
philosophers and scientists. 
True enough, I believe that the material and the phenomenal are two radically distinct 
pieces of reality, and so I embrace dualism in this sense. However, in contrast with 
Cartesian forms of substance dualism, I consider that the mind depends on the body, as it 
is produced by (rather than added to) it, and that it naturally supervenes on the brain in 
that there can be no mental change without a corresponding neural change. Therefore, 
on my account, the mind’s autonomy is very limited.  
One could name my form of dualism “non-cartesian substance dualism” after Jonathan 
Lowe, who defined this view as that according to which “persons or selves are distinct 
from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as 
‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily 
separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence”272. 
Lowe argues that the self cannot be identical with its body as the identity-conditions of 
both are radically different. By this, he means that the logically necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the truth of any statement about the identity of a certain self are not the 
same as the logically necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of any statement 
about the identity of the body it is associated with. 
“As evidence of this, it is very plausible to suppose, for example, that I could survive 
the gradual replacement of every cell in my body by inorganic parts of appropriate 
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Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 135 
kinds, so that I would end up possessing a wholly ‘bionic’ body, distinct in all of its 
parts from my existing biological body.”273 
He adds another consideration still: while it is clear that each one of my conscious mental 
states depends for its existence on some part of my brain (for if I were left headless for 
sure I would stop experiencing any sort of mental life altogether), it will become clear 
upon analysis that I am not identical with my brain nor with some part of it. In fact: 
a) my brain as a whole is not the subject of all of my thoughts and other conscious 
mental states (if we remove some parts of my brain, there will be some conscious 
mental states that I can experience with the remaining parts) 
b) there is no part of my brain on which all of my conscious mental states depend (as 
neuroscientific research has shown, brain/mental functions are specialized and 
localized)  
On the contrary, I myself am the subject of all my thoughts and feelings, otherwise they 
would not be mine; I am what unifies them all in a continuum of personal experience. 
According to Lowe, this argument can be used as a reduction ad absurdum of physicalism, 
for the only way an exclusively materialistic account of the human person can answer it is 
by denying that there is such a thing as a subject of experience (like Hume did).  
I agree with Lowe that the identification of the self with the animal body will always bump 
into this problem of personal identity and persistence over time. The most popular 
response to it is the criterion of psychological continuity, the idea that “you are, 
necessarily, that future being that in some sense inherits its mental features – personality, 
beliefs, memories, and so on—from you; and you are that past being whose mental 
features you have thus inherited”274. This is almost consensual. The controversy regards 
what these psychological features amount to and what they require. Could memory, 
intended as some sort of transplantable database, be sufficient to ensure identity? Not if 
that is the way we define memory. I believe that to treat the mental as something that 
zombies could have is to devoid it of one of its essential parts – phenomenality. I would 
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not be myself if my memory were transplanted into a computer with no feelings. All the 
data in my head might be there, all my past experiences, but not the what-it-is-likeness 
that accompanied them and which is what made them my experiences and not those of a 
hypothetical twin sister of mine who could have lived all these events along with me275. 
Therefore, the mental features which ground our psychological continuity and thus our 
identity are entangled with consciousness, a vision that goes back to John Locke:  
"Since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes 
everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other 
thinking things, in this alone consists personal Identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational 
Being: and as far as this consciousness can be extended backwards to any past Action 
or Thought, so far reaches the Identity of that Person; it is the same self now it was 
then; and it is by the same self with this present one that now reflects on it, that that 
Action was done."276  
A whole dissertation would be needed in order to address this problem properly, so I 
cannot develop it any further. My intention in mentioning it is just to show how monistic 
accounts of the human person are more problematic than the physicalist orthodoxy would 
like to admit. Thus I certainly side with Lowe in considering that the phenomenal subject 
with whom I identify through introspection is distinct from the body that I own. 
There is one aspect of Lowe’s view, however, with which I disagree. The non-cartesian 
side of his account led him to considering that the relation between the self and its body 
is like that between a statue and the lump of clay out of which it is made (a very common 
example in discussions about building relations such as realization or constitution). The 
self is spatially extended:  
                                                          
275 The possibility of transplanting not only the intentional aspects of my memory but also its 
phenomenal ones into a hypothetical computer endowed with the ability to feel is less clear. Could 
its new feelings be my transplanted feelings? This would imply that it could assume my point of 
view. But can a personal perspective be transplanted? I suspect this to be a contradiction in terms, 
but I can leave this question unanswered for now as it has no consequences for the point I am 
making about personal identity.  
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“We ourselves, not just our bodies, occupy space and have properties of shape, size, 
mass and spatial location.”277  
According to Lowe, this is a common intuition that it would be important for any account 
of personal identity to preserve. I do not share this intuition, though. I do not feel that the 
body shape that my self is not identical to (according to Lowe’s aforementioned argument 
concerning their distinct identity-conditions) should be definitory of my spatial features. 
Why should being six feet tall define me, if those characteristics are not part of my identity 
conditions? Sure enough, our current use of language makes us say that “I am six feet 
tall”, not that “my body is six feet tall”, but that does not mean that, upon reflection, one 
will not agree that the usual sentence is misguided. I also say that I am blonde, even 
though I know perfectly well that this feature is only accidental and that I might say 
tomorrow, after dyeing my hair, that I am now a brunette. The use of the verb “to be” in 
these sentences is very different from its use when we say, for instance “He is a mean 
man”. In the former cases, it is actually referring to properties of our bodies, whereas in 
the latter it is referring to properties of ourselves. Thus being one’s body features of 
shape, size, mass and spatial location is usually interpreted as merely possessing some 
accidental characteristics, whereas being some sort of person amounts to identifying 
oneself as the bearer of a certain psychological property which is enduring and not 
spatially extended. 
In order to dissociate my view from Lowe’s, I would rather choose another name for my 
account. The one that seems most adequate to me is “emergent dualism”, the position 
defended also by William Hasker, whom I have cited above. 
Hasker uses a suggestive analogy when he claims that the unified subject of conscious 
experiences is the emergent self: 
“A magnetic field, for example, is a real, existing, concrete entity, distinct from the 
magnet which produces it. (This is shown by the fact that the field normally occupies 
– and is detectable in – a region of space considerably larger than that occupied by 
the magnet.) The field is ‘generated’ by the magnet in virtue of the fact that the 
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magnet’s material constituents are arranged in a certain way (…). But once 
generated, the field exerts a causality of its own, on the magnet itself as well as on 
other objects in the vicinity (…). As a magnet generates its magnetic field, so the brain 
generates its field of consciousness.”278  
This analogy should not be taken too far, of course. A magnetic field does not exhibit 
irreducible causal powers nor does it possess the kind of unity that the conscious self must 
have. However, the analogy helps us see how material entities of a certain kind can 
produce by some sort of emission279 another type of entity, distinct from them despite its 
dependency.   
Hasker tends to consider that, like a magnetic field, the field of consciousness too exists 
within a certain volume of space. He does not define it spatially on the basis of the 
properties of the body it is associated with, like Lowe did, but he suggests that the close 
natural connection between mind and brain makes it plausible that “consciousness is itself 
a spatial entity”. Put in these terms, I have to disagree with him, on the basis of the 
reasons stated above. However, the dependency of the emergent self on the brain does 
put contingent physical constraints on the spatial area wherefrom it can exert its causal 
powers. In this sense, then, it is true that our emergent self is spatially confined and 
cannot exist as a supra-natural being. 
To sum up, my account of the irreducible self who is the subject of our conscious mental 
states and the agent to whom actions can be attributed, has the form of a qualified 
dualism. It claims that the conscious self is distinct from its body, even though it is 
produced by it and depends on it for its persistence in time. The conscious self is an 
emergent individual whose activity supervenes on the brain while simultaneously 
determining its causal evolution, with downward causal powers.  
 
                                                          
278 Hasker, W. (1999), p. 190. The quantum physicist Henry Margenau made a similar claim in his 
(1984): “The mind may be regarded as a field in the accepted physical sense of the term. But as a 
non-material field, its closest analogue is perhaps a probability field.” (p. 97). I will address 
Margenau’s influence on Eccles’ dualist account of the mind-brain relation in section 4.6.2.1. 
279 Cf. Geral Vision’s “emission” account of emergence (2011, p.47). 
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4.5. Neural indeterminism 
 
My account of ontological emergence requires that there be genuine indeterminacy at 
the level where the causal power of the emergent entity is supposed to be effective. In 
the case of an agent, this means that the human brain must work indeterministically for 
mental causation to be possible.  
Many might object to my account with the claim that, at the level of neural events, there 
is no room for genuine indeterminacy, even if contemporary physics accepts it exists at 
the level of particle interactions. Quantum effects are washed out when it comes to large 
numbers and the brain is a machine that no scientific evidence has ever shown works 
indeterministically.  
I will give a twofold answer to this objection. First, I will argue that, even if we cannot 
know whether our neural activity leaves room for alternative possibilities, there is no 
scientific evidence to this day that the human brain works deterministically either. 
Second, I will present scientific evidence that quantum events can have macroscopic 
effects.  
What neuroscientists deal with on a daily basis are stochastic processes. The question 
whether these processes are only indeterministic at an epistemic level or are actually the 
macro manifestation of more fundamental indeterminacies is something empirical 
research cannot tell us just as yet. Adina Roskies, philosopher and neuroscientist, explains 
this very clearly: 
“The picture that neuroscience has yielded so far is one of mechanisms infused with 
indeterministic or stochastic (random or probabilistic) processes. Whether or not a 
neuron will fire, what pattern of action potentials it generates, or how many 
synaptic vesicles are released have all been characterized as stochastic phenomena 
in our current best models. However, whether the unpredictability we perceive is 
really due to fundamentally indeterministic processes, or to complex deterministic 
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ones beyond our present understanding is something neuroscience cannot tell 
us.”280 
The problem with expecting science to give an answer to the question of determinism is 
that it is actually a metaphysical question, not an empirical one. Our quest for the origin 
of phenomena deep into ever more fundamental layers of reality is never concluded: one 
can always postulate one more level underlying the ones we have come to know well. 
That is why Roskies says that neuroscience will never be able to give us a definitive answer 
to the mystery of neuronal indeterminism: 
“Because a deterministic system can radically diverge in its behavior depending on 
infinitesimal changes in initial conditions, no evidence for indeterminism at the level 
of neurons or regions of activation will have any bearing on the fundamental 
question of whether or not the universe is deterministic. That is ultimately a 
question for physical theory, and will be answered by our best theory of the 
fundamental nature of physics, not at the level of brain science.”281 
So even if neuroscientists deal with epistemic indeterminism at the neural level, the 
nature of the causal interactions taking place underneath are out of their reach. And 
maybe the causal nature of the world will always remain ultimately inaccessible to the 
observer, even at the microphysical level of analysis.  
Nevertheless, the fact that what we know so far meets exactly what would be expected if 
the brain worked indeterministically deserves to be acknowledged. Neuroscience has not 
discredited the hypothesis of neurological indeterminism and it keeps accumulating 
evidence that is entirely consistent with it. 
Moreover, the fact that this question has not been settled yet has not prevented major 
neuroscientists such as William Newsome282 or Paul Glimcher283, along with many 
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others284, from expressing their conviction in favor of an indeterministic account of the 
nature of brain processes. From their point of view, the indeterminacy that we find at the 
behavioral level is a result of genuinely random events at the cellular and subcellular 
levels, like for instance the patterns of vesicular release and the variations in membrane 
voltage, which seem to be “the product of interactions at the atomic level, many of which 
are governed by quantum physics and thus are truly indeterminate events”285. In the 
article “Indeterminacy in brain and behavior”, in which he presents a long review of the 
neuroscientific literature related to the problem of the source of variability in the brain, 
Glimcher concludes: 
“Physical indeterminacy seems to be a fundamental property of the brain.”286 
Of course, this depends on the general possibility of quantum fluctuations having 
macroscopic effects in warm and wet environments such as the brain, which is the second 
aspect I committed myself to providing some evidence for at the outset of this section. 
Some years ago this might have seemed much harder. Phenomena like superconductivity 
or the Bose-Einstein condensates were usually cited as examples of indeterministic effects 
at the macro scale but they required temperatures close to absolute zero. Today, 
however, there is increasing evidence that functional quantum effects operate in biology 
as well287. I will now provide two strong examples that have been in the spotlight lately. 
The first case regards electronic quantum effects which occur at ambient temperatures in 
proteins involved in photosynthesis288:  
                                                          
284 Most notably, Björn Brembs has been focusing part of his neuroscientific research on the 
intrinsic source of behavioral variability in biological organisms, a topic on which he has a clear 
position in favor of neural sensitive dependence on quantum fluctuations [Cf. Brembs, B. (2011)]. 
285 Glimcher, P. (2005), p.49. 
286 Ibidem. 
287 In a recent article (2014), Stuart Hameroff and Nobel laureate Roger Penrose, probably the two 
most famous defenders of the idea that consciousness is a product of quantum effects in the brain, 
cited many studies which purport to show evidence of quantum effects in biological processes 
such as: ion channels, sense of smell, DNA, protein folding, and biological water (p.63). 
288 Engel, G. S. et al. (2007), Lee, H. et al. (2007), Mercer, I. P. et al. (2009), Collini, E., et al. (2010), 
Hildner, R. et al.  (2013). 
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“Light-absorbing molecules in some photosynthetic proteins capture and transfer 
energy according to quantum-mechanical probability laws instead of classical laws at 
temperatures up to 180 K. This contrasts with the long-held view that long-range 
quantum coherence between molecules cannot be sustained in complex biological 
systems, even at low temperatures.”289  
The second example of warm quantum effects was discovered in bird brain navigation, 
where “the ability of migratory birds to orient relative to the Earth's magnetic field is 
believed to involve a coherent superposition of two spin states of a radical electron 
pair”290 (a spatially-separated pair of correlated electron spins). The mechanism 
underlying this phenomenon is currently under debate291, but it is quite uncontroversial 
that we are before biological processes in which the effects of quantum phenomena are 
amplified and have chemical consequences292. The greatest novelty of these findings is 
the fact that, in these living systems, quantum superposition and entanglement are 
sustained for at least tens of micro-seconds – a much longer duration than that found in 
man-made molecules. This is a necessary condition for quantum interactions to have 
effects at the macro-scale293. 
Even though these are empirical studies which are clearly out of the range of the present 
discussion, they show us how the scientifically founded objections to an indeterministic 
brain are much weaker now than some years ago. They rely on the idea that micro-scale 
indeterminism would be cancelled out in a warm and wet system like the brain, but there 
is abundant evidence in favor of the presence and efficacy of quantum effects in other 
biological systems, which shows how sensitive dependence to quantum fluctuations in 
the brain is actually plausible. 
                                                          
289 Collini, E., et al., p.644. 
290 Walters, Z.B. (2014), p.1. 
291 E. Gauger et al. (2011), Bandyopadhyay, J. N. (2012), Walters, Z.B. (2014).  
292 There is in fact a new field of research called Quantum Biology, dedicated to studying non-
trivial quantum phenomena in biological systems [Cf. Huelga, S.F., Plenio, M.B. (2013)]. 
293 Max Tegmark, for example, suggested that any macroscopic quantum entanglement in the 
brain would be destroyed in times of the order of 10−13 to 10−20 seconds. [Hodgson, D. (2012), 
p.145]. 
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The concept of plausibility I am mostly interested in is naturalistic plausibility. According 
to Christopher Franklin, plausibility has to do with the demandingness of a theory’s 
commitments: 
“[In order to assess a theory’s naturalistic plausibility,] in addition to considering 
the quantity of empirical commitments that a theory has, we must also consider the 
quality of such commitments — specifically how demanding they are. The 
demandingness of a commitment is partly a function of how radically things must 
change from what we currently take ourselves to know in order for the commitment 
to be satisfied.”294 
What I hope to have shown in this section, and to keep providing evidence for in the 
following one, is that the empirical commitments of an agent-causal theory of action are 
much less demanding than is usually assumed. What mainstream science currently 
considers to be true would not have to change in order to accommodate the agent-
causalist’s requirements. It will only have to increase the resolution of the scientific 
picture of the world that is on the table, adding to it the further details that future 
research is expected to bring.  
 
4.6. Downward causation from consciousness to brain 
 
Despite the optimistic conclusions of the last section, the million dollar empirical question 
remains as to how can the conscious self exercise her downward causal power over the 
brain. Is this some sort of magic?  
One can imagine this influence being exercised by the conscious self on any one of the 
underlying levels, or directly on the bottom-most level. As I explained in the last chapter, 
we have no way of knowing whether the epistemological emergence we find between 
strictly material levels corresponds to an ontological emergence. Also, for the reasons I 
presented in the first section of this chapter, I believe the best attitude to adopt in what 
                                                          
294 Franklin, C. (2013a), p.128. 
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regards the material world is what I called reductionism-by-default. This, however, bears 
as a consequence that the levels of organization of reality are regarded as reducible to 
one another and thus synchronically determined from the bottom up, which entails that 
we cannot postulate a direct downward causal effect of the mental on the biological, for 
example. The mental has to have control over the bottom levels on which the biological 
level supervenes.  
Therefore, I believe we should opt for a model which endows the conscious self with a 
power to affect directly the bottom-most domain (the quantum level, as far as we can 
tell). This means that, when there are alternative possibilities at the quantum level, the 
conscious self must somehow intervene to determine which of these alternatives 
becomes actual. The following diagram will make this clearer: 
 
 
























Fig.8: Synchronically, the conscious self (composed of different mental states M1-Mn but endowed with a new 
causal power that none of them individually has) emerges out of the neural multi-layered substrate. The self is 
an effective cause that can determine at t1 the actualization at t2 of one of the different quantum states that at 
t1 have a certain probability of being partially caused by Q at t2. Depending on the intervention of the conscious 
self, either the 1st or the 2nd psychophysical reality will happen. 
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In this schema we can see how, even if the material world is structurally organized in such 
a way that each hierarchical level fully determines the next one in an upward manner, 
there is room for the emergence of the mental domain where a substantial self 
simultaneously contains and transcends her diverse mental states. The conscious self is a 
unitary individual brought about by the complex organization of the physical brain. The 
fact that the physical world is not causally closed and that quantum laws are only 
probabilistic allows it to exercise its emergent causal powers over the material reality, 
contributing at a given instant t1 to the production of a new state of affairs at t2. In addition 
to these conditions, which we assessed in chapter two, this view of psychophysical 
causation relies on two more assumptions: a coherent metaphysical account of 
substance-causation and the empirical possibility of quantum events being influenced by 
non-physical entities. 




Causation is one of the most intractable problems in philosophy. Many different accounts 
of causation have been given in the years and there is no prospect of consensus295. As 
philosophers very well know, at least since Hume, causality is opaque. It is not a 
transparent relation between objects, properties or events that one might be able to 
experience with the senses or to somehow infer a priori. If we try to analyze the following 
causal process – a bridge collapsed after the explosion of a bomb296 – we will find that it 
can fit many different descriptions. But which one is more faithful to the underlying 
reality? What caused what, in this series of events? Did the bomb cause the collapse of 
the bridge? Did each of the bomb’s particles cause each of the single events that 
collectively amounted to the collapse of the bridge? Did the event of the explosion do the 
                                                          
295 Cf. Beebee, H., Hitchcock, C., Menzies, P., eds. (2009). 
296 This example is used in Lowe E.J. (2008), p.3, 122. 
THE CONSCIOUS SELF 
 146 
causing? Did the single events (e.g. each atom’s energy release) do it? While all these 
sentences seem to be suitable explanations for what happened, the metaphysical 
problem of detecting which one of them is more fundamental (so that all the other 
descriptions can be reduced to it) is not simple. 
The standard view of the causal relation takes its relata to be events297 or states of 
affairs298. One of the problems with the sort of agent-causation depicted in Figure 8, then, 
is that it seems to imply that in cases of action production an exceptional form of 
causation (that in which the cause is a substance) takes place, which renders these cases 
intrinsically different from all other causal processes in nature. While some accounts299 
have no trouble assuming this heterogeneity, such a discontinuous view has been accused 
of implausibility. And in fact, an account of causation will definitely be more elegant and 
parsimonious if it manages to unify several phenomena under the same principle. The 
different horns of this objection have probably led recent agent-causal libertarians to 
either assume that all causation is ultimately substance-causation300, or to adopt a 
pluralist account of causation, according to which there are diverse categories of cause in 
the natural world (events, facts and substances), in each of which case causation is to be 
understood differently301. 
Views on this matter usually depend heavily on one’s preferred ontology, and my case is 
no different. I favor an ontology according to which the world we live in is made of 
substances (persisting entities whose identity does not depend on anything other than 
themselves302), which are the bearers of properties. It is these properties (such as electric 
charge, mass, color, liquidity or phenomenality) that carry the causal powers that each 
substance has and, in doing so, direct the substance towards certain effects. Substances 
are essentially active because the properties that make them what they intrinsically are 
                                                          
297 Cf. Davidson, D. (1980), Lewis, D. (1986). 
298 Cf. Armstrong, D. (1997). 
299 Cf. O’Connor’s view developed in Persons and Causes (2000).  
300 Cf. Lowe, E.J. (2008).  
301 Cf. Steward, H. (2014). 
302 Cf. E.J. Lowe’s definition of substance (2006, p.5). Note that substances can be tiny fundamental 
simples as well as more complex emergent compounds. 
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endow them with certain dispositions and liabilities by which they can affect and be 
affected by other substances around them, and thus make a difference in the world303. 
Causation consists in this difference-making and the laws of nature are the description of 
these regular interactions between substances, given their powers. Laws are not what 
pushes things into behaving in a certain manner. Things are internally directed towards 
their most probable behavior.  
Powers cannot be exercised without a substance that instantiates them and, vice-versa, a 
substance cannot exist apart from the properties that identify it. So we can say that what 
causes effects in the world are substance-power pairs. 
A concern that one might have regarding a substance-causal view of this sort is that it 
might be only the product of ambiguity:  
“It is not unnatural to think of substances generally as causes, but such thoughts, 
more carefully stated, are about events involving those substances, or states or 
property instances of those substances, as causes.  (…)  The concern is that we may 
not have a conception of substance causation that cannot be reformulated as event-
causation.  If this is in fact so, then it appears that the agent-causalist is providing 
only an empty verbal solution.”304 
However, there is no emptiness here. There is a perfectly clear sense in which a ball, 
because of its solidity and weight, has the capacity to smash a window, under the right 
circumstances (by hitting it with a certain speed). Given its mass and density, my body has 
the power to squash the grass beneath my feet, pressing it with a certain force which 
causes my footprints to be marked on the ground. An electron has the disposition to repel 
another electron. There is no language manipulation in saying that when the repelling 
event does happen, it consisted in the first electron’s exercising its power to repel. This 
does not mean that these propositions cannot be “reformulated” in event-causal terms. I 
think they can, I just cannot see what good can come out of it. 
                                                          
303 My view is inspired by Jacobs, J.D., O’Connor, T. (2012). 
304 Pereboom, D. (2004), p.11 of the manuscript. In the cited passage, Pereboom is presenting but 
not endorsing this objection, which was put forward by Alfred Mele (2006). 
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It seems to me that to analyze these cases in event-causal terms would be to describe the 
sequence of events from a certain point of view that we can call external – “My body’s 
pressing the grass caused its squashing” – which can be explanatorily useful, but is actually 
just elliptical for instances of regular substance-causation. In contrast, the internal point 
of view that looks at the causal process from the perspective of a substance and its powers 
is the one that reveals to us the forces that drive causation in the world. Events cannot 
cause anything because they consist in the temporal succession of what happens, not in 
the subjects involved. Only the objects in the world have the right type of properties for 
causing certain events. Only the bomb is appropriately explosive, and it is that property 
that causes the explosion of the bridge (this causing itself being an event that can be 
described).  
Another objection to substance-causation, however, seems to be more disturbing. It 
stems from the following argument by C. D. Broad: 
“It is surely quite evident that, if the beginning of a certain process at a certain time 
is determined at all, its total cause must contain as an essential factor another event 
or process which enters into the moment from which the determined event or 
process issues. (…) How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain 
date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any 
application? And how can the notion of date have any application to anything that is 
not an event?”305 
There are two ideas underlying this objection: first, that insofar as an event is caused to 
happen at a certain time, the cause that determined the timing must itself be dated; 
second, that a dated cause must be an event, because only events are dated entities. 
I suspect that both these assumptions can be called into question by sophisticated 
arguments but I do not intend to do so myself. I actually consider them to be quite 
plausible. What is crucial for my argument is the notion of “total cause”. Broad is assuming 
                                                          
305 Broad, C.D. (1952), p.215. Carl Ginet stated a similar objection in terms of explanation in his 
(1990, pp.13-14).  
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that substance-causation works in a context-free manner, excluding any reference to 
time. But this is not the only way one has to conceive of the substance-causal process. 
On my view, the possibility of a substance’s exercising its causal power is structured by 
the circumstances, which is to say it depends on events that take place in a certain time 
and place. Sugar is always soluble, but it only dissolves if and when it is immersed in a 
liquid. That dated circumstance is what allows for that property, and the causal power it 
carries, to produce the effects it does on the involving substances (e.g. the particles of the 
liquid).  
Let me use again the example of the explosion of the bridge. The bomb is what caused 
the explosion306 due to its properties. However, that causing only took place when the 
circumstances allowed for it – e.g. when the right dose of pressure on the bomb triggered 
the manifestation of the disposition it had to blow up. The fact that a certain event (the 
exertion of a certain pressure on the device) had to happen for the causal power of the 
bomb to be released does not entail that it was that event that caused the explosion. Only 
that substance-causation is a contextual phenomenon and contexts are given in time, in 
the succession of events by which things change. The “total cause”, we may say, includes 
that context. 
The same applies to agent-causation, a complex species of substance-causation. The 
conscious self’s power to affect the unfolding of physical events is what we perceive as 
the agent’s power to decide and to act in a certain way rather than another. This power 
is partially determined by the agent’s standing values, preferences and traits of character, 
together with her present reasons and other motivations (the mental states depicted as 
M1 to Mn in fig.8). All these elements endow the agent’s self with certain dispositions, 
more or less deterministic, depending on the degree of uncertainty in the choice to be 
made. However, being an emergent entity, the agent’s self amounts to more than her 
reasons, preferences and so forth: her causal powers are not merely derivative. And since 
the powers associated with the agent’s properties are not unconditional, they depend on 
                                                          
306 Whether what causes the explosion is each single particle or the bomb as a whole depends on 
whether the causal powers of the bomb are resultant or emergent, as I explained in chapter 3.  
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certain circumstances, like the solubility of sugar manifests only when it is immersed in 
liquid.  
When the agent’s propensities for acting in a certain way are not deterministic, there are, 
by definition, no sufficient reasons for a certain action or decision307. In fact, the problem 
of understanding when something takes place is common to many instances of 
indeterministic causation, independently from the account of causation one assumes. 
Think of radioactive decay, for instance, in which the emission of radiation by an unstable 
nucleus can happen at any time. After the moment when all the necessary conditions are 
in place (which, in the case of agent-causation, means that the reasons that structure the 
agent’s propensities have been acquired and are actively conditioning her decision-
making), the substance at stake has a certain propensity to cause a certain effect. There 
is a certain probability that the causing will happen rather than not, that it will happen 
now rather than latter and that the substance-cause will bring about this effect rather 
than that. But there may not be a contrastive reason that explains any of these 
alternatives308. And that, I repeat, is the mystery of indeterministic causation in general.   
To sum up: an ontology of substances and powers enables us to regard substance-
causation as the regular and universal form of causation in the world. Downward 
causation from the mental to the physical, then, is just a particular subset of causal events 
in which the relata belong to different domains and have radically different natures. This 
might make us question the plausibility of consciousness having effective causal powers 
over material entities, which is what will be assessed in the next section, but it is not 
                                                          
307 In her article “Causality and Determination” (1971), Elizabeth Anscombe took advantage of the 
ambiguity of the notion of sufficiency in ordinary language in order to make this clearer: 
«’Sufficient condition’ is so used that if the sufficient conditions for X are there, X occurs. But at 
the same time, (…) ‘sufficient condition' sounds like: 'enough'. And one certainly can ask: 'May 
there not be enough to have made something happen - and yet it not have happened?’”» 
[Anscombe, G.E.M. (1971), pp.90-91].  Anscombe notes that sufficient conditions is a term of art, 
and that we do not have to interpret it as necessitating conditions. However, it seems to me that 
what the author does is to replace “necessitating” with “necessary”. In other words, by suggesting 
that sufficient could be intended as enough, Anscombe is referring the concept to the conditions 
that need to be in place for the effect to be possible (necessary conditions), instead of the 
conditions the presence of which forces the effect to happen (sufficient conditions). 
308 About the problem of the lack of contrastive explanation in cases of indeterministic causation 
in general and of undetermined actions in particular, see section 5.3.2.1. 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 151 
substance-causation as such what distinguishes these causal interactions from other, 
strictly physical, ones. 
 
4.6.2. Consciousness and the quantum world 
 
Now we have to address the very concrete question of how plausible it can be that the 
conscious self can interact with physical reality at the quantum level. Expressed in 
different terms, it is the same question princess Elisabeth asked Descartes: 
“Given that the soul of a human being is only a thinking substance, how can it affect 
the bodily spirits, in order to bring about voluntary actions?”309 
Given their material monistic assumption that mental states are identical to physical 
states, together with a reductionist account of the self, the majority of scientists believe 
that mental causation is nothing but physical causation. So the problem princess Elisabeth 
raised is nothing they should care about: there is no mind-matter interaction intended as 
the interaction between two distinct entities. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions 
among eminent scientists, such as Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff310, Henry Stapp311, 
and several other scientists who have dedicated their work to exploring the hypothesis 
that consciousness is an essential and irreducible part of the natural world, and who 
consider that quantum physics is the adequate framework for understanding the 
emergence and activity of this property. According to them, quantum theory can provide 
us with the ultimate answer to the age-old question of the mysterious interplay between 
the “matterlike and mindlike parts of nature”312. 
Empirical work is not the object of this dissertation but I believe there are two scientific 
hypotheses that were foundational to all subsequent work in this area and which deserve 
a more extended reference: one by John Eccles and one by John Von Neumann and 
                                                          
309 Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia’s letter of May the 6th, 1643. 
310 Penrose, R. (1989), Hameroff, S., Penrose, R. (2014). 
311 Stapp, H.P. (1993, 2006). 
312 Stapp, H.P. (1993), p.vii. 
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Eugene Wigner. Their proposals allow us to understand two crucial facts for the mind-
brain interaction: 
1) That there are micro processes in the brain which we can describe only 
probabilistically and which are simultaneously small enough for quantum 
influences to be significant, and embedded in networks that amplify those effects; 
2) That quantum mechanics is an epistemological theory which provides a 
description of a system before and after a measurement but which cannot explain 
the transition between the probabilities before, and the defined state of the 
system after. That is where different interpretations come in, and some of them 
consider consciousness to be a fundamental element in this process. 
 
4.6.2.1. John Eccles’ dualist interactionism 
 
The first scientific account I want to present was put forward by Sir John Eccles, a 
successful neurophysiologist who dedicated his whole life’s work to understanding the 
mechanisms whereby the immaterial self can control its brain313. His thorough knowledge 
of the functioning of the brain, especially of the processes of synaptic transmission (for 
which he was awarded with the Nobel Prize in 1963), enabled him to develop a 
comprehensive and detailed theory of the mind-body relation, in which he strived to 
render his dualist convictions consonant with brain science. 
According to Eccles, mind and brain are two independent entities that interact by means 
of quantum physics. Their interaction is enabled by the existence of genuinely 
indeterministic neural processes in the brain, crucial to its functioning, the probabilities 
of which could be influenced by the self. Eccles’ life-long work was dedicated to better 
understanding the mechanisms underlying this influence. 
Eccles centered his attention on exocytosis, the process in which a vesicle containing 
neurotransmitters is released into the synaptic cleft (the space separating two 
                                                          
313 I have already alluded to his work together with Popper in section 3.7. 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 153 
communicating neurons). This momentary opening of a channel in the membrane of a 
bouton (the terminal of the presynaptic neuron) is caused by a nerve impulse that results 
in a large influx of Ca2+. Given the input of four Ca2+ ions to a synaptic vesicle, exocytosis 
may occur with a certain probability. 
Exocytosis is the “basic unitary activity of the cerebral cortex”314. It causes 
neurotransmitters to be released, which then bind to receptors on the postsynaptic cell. 
The opening of the channels gated by those receptors causes transient changes in the 
membrane potential, the summation of tens or even hundreds of which is required for an 
action potential to occur (the discharge of an electric impulse). This spike will then travel 
along the cell’s axon triggering reactions at its many synapses.  
Eccles’ intuition was that this type of neural events was the perfect recipient for the 
intervention of mental events in the brain. For a long period his research on the 
mechanisms underlying this interaction was centered on the hypothesis, inspired by 
Henry Margenau315, that the mind was analogous to a quantum probability field, which 
has neither mass nor energy yet can cause effective action at microsites. If it could be 
shown that the mind acted in this way, this would allow Eccles’ dualist hypothesis to 
overcome the accusation of violating conservation laws. In a later period, however, he 
proceeded to develop a more defined account together with the physicist Friedrich Beck, 
in which they presented a theory of how this process might take place, with precise 
calculations of the energy, time and distance required for quantum effects to be 
significant. The main claim of their theory was that the self’s intentions become neurally 
effective by momentarily increasing the probability of exocytosis in certain cortical areas 
named dendrons – bundles of pyramidal-cell dentrites (the receiving ends of the neurons) 
that have over 100,000 synapses. The structure of these thousands of boutons “provides 
the chance for the mental intention to change by choice the probability of its synaptic 
emission”316. 
                                                          
314 Eccles, J.C. (1994), p.152. 
315 Cf. Eccles, J. C (1970) and (1989). 
316 Eccles, J.C. (1994), p.76 (emphasis added). 
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The dualistic stance of Eccles and Beck’s theory encountered a lot of suspicion and, maybe 
due to that, their overall hypothesis did not have any relevant impact. However, Eccles’ 
work must be recognized as a very serious attempt to understand how the mind might 
control the brain and it still remains a cornerstone for many critics of materialism. Also, 
his suggestion that vesicular release in exocytosis is the sort of event where the minimal 
quantum effects might be relevant and therefore influence the functioning of cognitive 
processes is still present in the work of both scientists and philosophers today. 
 
4.6.2.2. The measurement problem and the “consciousness 
causes collapse” interpretation  
 
It is usually said that the devil is in the details. It is not enough to say that consciousness 
can influence the outcome of a probabilistic event such as exocytosis; it is necessary to 
understand how that can physically happen. Even if I cannot develop an empirical theory 
about this, I will now try to explain briefly what is consensually known about the quantum 
world and how the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics leaves room for the 
causal role of consciousness in the unfolding of events. My goal is not to present any 
uncontentious interpretation (there is no such thing in quantum physics), but rather to 
show how mental-to-physical interaction can fit into our scientific picture of reality 
without contradicting what we currently consider to be our best models of the functioning 
of the world. 
In the world of particles at the subatomic scale, classical physics does not apply. Only once 
a certain measurement is made, is the system in a well determinate state; before, in 
general, it is considered to be in what is called a superposition of states.  There is no way 
of knowing with absolute certainty all the information that fully characterizes a physical 
system: if we know precisely where a particle is located – its position in a certain spatial 
coordinate –, we will miss all knowledge about its momentum (in the same coordinate), 
and vice-versa317. This is radically different from what happens in the macro world where 
                                                          
317 This is, of course, an extreme example of the renowned Heisenberg uncertainty relations. 
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we can describe accurately the complete state of an object, and where, given initial and 
boundary conditions, our theories can, in principle, predict the deterministic sequence of 
its future states (rather than the deterministic evolution of the probabilities of its being in 
this or that state), independently from our epistemic access to it. 
Quantum mechanics was the theory developed in order to cope with the strangeness of 
the quantum world318. It is a theory that describes with extreme precision the evolution 
of the probability distribution of the states of a quantum system. However, it only allows 
us to calculate the complete set of probabilities of the outcomes of a certain measurement 
(using the famous Schrödinger equation that describes deterministically the evolution of 
the wave of probabilities), not their definite values. Let me make this clearer by using an 
example introduced by Eugene Wigner: 
Given any object, all the possible knowledge concerning that object can be given as 
its wave function [which] permits one to foretell with what probabilities the object 
will make one or another impression on us if we let it interact with us either directly 
or indirectly. The object may be a radiation field and its wave function will tell us with 
what probability we shall see a flash if we put our eyes at certain points (…).  
Suppose that all our interactions with the system consist in looking at a certain point 
in a certain direction at times t0, t0+1, t0+2,…, and our possible sensations are seeing 
or not seeing a flash. The relevant law of nature could then be of the form: “If you 
see a flash at time t, you will see a flash at time t+1 with a probability ¼, no flash with 
a probability ¾; if you see no flash, then the next observation will give a flash with 
the probability ¾, no flash with a probability ¼”(…). The wave function in such a case 
depends only on the last observation and may be ψ1 if a flash has been seen at the 
last interaction, ψ2 if no flash was noted. In the former case, that is for ψ1, a 
                                                          
318 As is well known, the quantum world has many other “strange” aspects that are not relevant 
to what I am discussing here. One of them is quantum entanglement, in which two (or more) 
physical systems are in a correlate quantum superposition state whereby the definition of the 
value of a property in one of them will have non-local instantaneous causal effects over the other 
[or to be a little more technical: where two (or more) physical systems are in an eigenstate of a 
certain observable, but neither is in an individual eigenstate of that observable]. This is the 
phenomenon that is currently considered to be crucial to bird brain navigation, as we saw in 
section 3.5.  
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calculation of the probabilities of flash and no flash after unit time interval gives the 
values ¼ and ¾; for ψ2 these probabilities must turn out to be ¾ and ¼. 
(…) The important point is that the impression which one gains at an interaction may, 
and in general does, modify the probabilities with which one gains the various 
possible impressions at later stages. In other words, the impression which one gains 
at an interaction, called also the result of an observation, modifies the wave function 
of the system.”319  
A crucial feature of quantum mechanics if that it is a theory about measurements, not 
about the underlying ontology. It is a set of mathematical postulates about physics that 
allow us to describe probabilistically what we can predict but do not purport to explain 
quantum reality. Hence, the problem of measurement: what happens when the wave 
function of different less-than-unity probabilities collapses320 into one single well-defined 
state? This question is the object of the so called different interpretations of quantum 
mechanics.  
                                                          
319 Wigner, E.P. (1967), pp.171-2. 
320 That there is such a thing as the collapse of the wave function is already an assumption of the 
theory. The “collapse” can be intended in two ways: In its broader sense, it is the name given to 
the transition from the indeterminacy prior to measurement to the definite state that follows it. 
Most interpretations of quantum mechanics assume there is a collapse in this sense, which is to 
say they accept that there is a measurement problem. In its narrower sense, the collapse of the 
wave function is intended as the instantaneous reduction of the superposition of different states 
of the isolated system to one single well-defined state upon observation. In recent decades, this 
idea of the instantaneous reduction as a fundamental phenomenon has given way to theories that 
try to provide a mechanistic explanation of the system’s transition. The most popular one is that 
according to which there is a process of “decoherence” in which the system’s internally ordered 
states loose coherence (the system’s component’s phase angles are decoupled, which leads to the 
loss of its quantum properties) because of their thermodynamically irreversible interactions with 
a large-scale environment. However, decoherence only explains why we cannot observe quantum 
effects in our macroscopic everyday world; it does not allow us to predict which definite state will 
be selected. Also, the theory cannot give us results that are detailed and quantified, as we cannot 
observe nor calculate all the processes that lead to decoherence. Therefore, the fact that quantum 
decoherence is now the mainstream term used to refer to the transition from a quantum to a 
classical state does not imply that there is any consensus among quantum physicists about the 
matter, much less that the measurement problem is solved. In this section, I will still refer to the 
transition as a “collapse” because that is how the authors whose theories I am presenting intended 
it. 
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The orthodox interpretation (often called – albeit misleadingly – Copenhagen 
interpretation) considers that there is an in principle impossibility of knowing what exists 
in the quantum realm before a measurement is made. It thus defends a radical and 
unsurmountable epistemological indeterminism, grounded in our lack of epistemic access 
to the outcome of a measurement before it is made321. Thus the orthodox interpretation 
does not give us an account of what happens in an act of measurement, when the 
probabilistic wave-function collapses into a singular and well defined state. There is an 
instantaneous transition between the quantum (linear superposition of probability states) 
and classical (singular state) descriptions of the physical system, a transition to which 
there is no further explanation to be given by the theory itself. 
There are many alternative interpretations of the quantum formalism. Bohmian 
mechanics, for example, states that the wave function provides only a partial description 
of the system, i.e. that there is at least one property in the physical world that the theory 
is not taking into account – namely, the actual positions of the particle – the knowledge 
of which would allow one to overcome the abovementioned epistemic limitations322. 
Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber interpretation explains the transition by the spontaneous 
reduction of the wave packet in certain particles which would initiate a causal chain of 
correlated reductions of probabilities to well-defined states323. Everett’s famous multiple 
worlds interpretation states that for every measurement all possible outcomes become 
actual, each one in its own universe324. These are but some of the many alternative 
interpretations currently under debate, which have not reached a consensus and have 
even mushroomed in the past decades. The measurement problem is still open today. 
The interpretation I believe is most interesting for the question we have been asking 
ourselves in this section if the one suggested by Nobel laureate Eugene Wigner, following 
the steps of John Von Neumann’s. In the last part of his influential book Mathematical 
                                                          
321 Note that it is not true that the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics has proven that 
there is ontological indeterminism in the quantum world. Given its nature, which makes no 
attempt at knowing what quantum reality is, it talks only of epistemological indeterminism. 
322 Cf. Bohm, D. (1952). This interpretation questions the idea of “collapse” in its broad sense. 
323 Ghirardi, G.C., Rimini, A., Weber, T. (1986). 
324 Everett, H. (1957). 
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Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (1932/1955), which contributed greatly to the 
axiomatization of quantum mechanics, Von Neumann enunciates explicitly the 
measurement problem: What is it that triggers the transition from quantum to classical 
modes of existence? In other words: how is it that, in a measurement process, a physical 
system goes from a superposition state to a “classical” well-defined state? We may want 
to establish it is the detection process performed by a certain measuring device, but the 
boundary between the part of the world that is being observed and the part that 
constitutes the observer is “arbitrary to a very large extent”325. The macroscopic 
apparatus that produces the measurement is a physical system, subject to quantum 
laws326. Thus, it too is a quantum system in a superposition state in need of a measuring 
device that may trigger the collapse. And of course any other measuring device that one 
might postulate could measure the first physical apparatus would also have to be included 
in the quantum description of the composed system [quantum object + apparatus1 + 
apparatus2]. Also, the body of the conscious observer that is located at the end of this 
chain must be included in the joint wave function that describes the composed system, 
for even the interaction of the photons with her retina and the following chemical changes 
in her brain can be included as phenomena that the subject “observes”327. So where does 
the collapse take place in this chain? 
Von Neumann did not answer this question directly but he opened the door for the so 
called Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation that followed, by claiming that the subjects’ 
own state is completely known to her through introspection. The state of the conscious 
observer before the measurement is not indeterminate.  
Seven years after Von Neumann formalized this problem and claimed that the self-
conscious subject was an entity which knows the state she is in before an observation is 
                                                          
325 Von Neumann, J. (1955), p.420. 
326 The quantum theory’s scope is not formally limited. The fact that we usually apply it only to 
microscopic objects has to do with the irrelevance of quantum effects in many-body systems, not 
with any theoretical limit concerning size. 
327 Cf. Von Neumann, J. (1955), p.419. 
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made, Fritz London and Edmond Bauer put forward the first explicitly subjectivist 
interpretation of the collapse: 
“A measurement is achieved only when the position of the pointer has 
been observed. It is precisely this increase of knowledge, acquired by observation, 
that gives the observer the right to choose among the different components of the 
mixture predicted by theory, to reject those which are not observed, and to attribute 
thenceforth to the object a new wave function, that of the pure case which he has 
found. 
We note the essential role played by the consciousness of the observer in this 
transition from the mixture to the pure case. Without his effective intervention, one 
would never obtain a new function.”328 
Wigner followed in 1961 and enriched his aforementioned example in order to help us 
understand this better: what if it were a friend of mine, rather than me, the observer of 
the event of a flash showing or not showing at time t? 
“One could attribute a wave function to the joint system: friend plus object, and this 
joint system would have a wave function also after the interaction, that is, after my 
friend has looked. I can then enter into interaction with this joint system by asking 
my friend whether he saw a flash. (…) If he says no, the wave function of the object 
is ψ2, i.e., the object behaves from then on as if I had observed it and had seen no 
flash (…) However, if after having completed the whole experiment I ask my friend, 
“What did you feel about the flash before I asked you?” he will answer, “I told you 
already, I did [did not] see a flash,” as the case may be. In other words, the question 
whether he did or did not see the flash was already decided in his mind, before I asked 
him.”329  
Wigner’s “friend” is a self-conscious entity whose insight is considered sufficient for her 
own state to be well defined. This reasoning made Wigner conclude that consciousness 
must have a role in quantum mechanics that an inanimate measuring device cannot have. 
                                                          
328 London, F., Bauer, E. (1939), translation in Wheeler, J.A., Zurek, W.H. (1983), p.251. 
329 Wigner, E.P. (1967), p.176 (emphasis added). 
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It is the consciousness of the living observer that breaks the endless chain of measuring 
events, causing the self-triggered collapse of the system’s wave function.  
Even though the Von Neumann-Wigner interpretation is not one of the most popular, it is 
certainly compatible with the formalism and recognized as a serious alternative to the 
orthodox interpretation. It has also constituted the theoretical basis upon which the two 
above mentioned theories of the mind-brain relation were elaborated: Stapp’s as well as 
Penrose and Hameroff’s.  
Neither Von Neumann nor Wigner explained how it is that consciousness causes the 
collapse of the quantum system’s wave of probabilities. This is a form of psychophysical 
causation: how does it work? As a mathematician and a physicist, this question is clearly 
out of their scope. And to this day, it remains an unsolved mystery.  
However, it is of the utmost importance for us to realize that they both felt that the only 
way to solve a theoretical impasse in physics was to reach out for the non-physical 
phenomenon of self-consciousness. According to them, the exclusion of the Cartesian 
mind from the physical realm was put to an end with the advent of quantum physics, the 
laws of which could not be formulated without an explicit reference to the conscious 
observer as a primary reality. 
And as Wigner put it, in spite of our ignorance about what future science will bring:  
“[i]t will remain remarkable, in whatever way our future concepts may develop, that 
the very study of the external world led to the conclusion that the content of the 
consciousness is an ultimate reality.”330 
 
4.6.2.3. Why are these hypotheses relevant 
 
Let us now try to close the circle of the related philosophical problems that have been 
under discussion so far: agency, free will, emergence and consciousness. First, we saw 
how agency requires agent-causation, and how that in turn requires a unified and 
                                                          
330 Idem, p.169. 
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autonomous self. In order to see how such an entity could fit into a naturalistic picture of 
the world, I developed an account of emergence that defeats accusations of scientific 
implausibility and then argued for the irreducibility of consciousness to the material 
world. I then defended that the conscious self as a naturally emerging entity is the best 
candidate for the role of autonomous agent, and this finally led to the question how that 
conscious agent could effectively cause changes in her physical body. 
This is where the proposals by Eccles, Von Neumann and Wigner came in. Note that there 
are no scientific proofs of psychophysical interaction (intended as a causal relation 
between two non-identical entities), nor evidence against it, and, given the nature of the 
relata involved, there may never be any. The arguments that are put forward in favor or 
against emergent dualism are based on interpretations of the ontology underlying our 
observations and have to appeal to metaphysical assumptions and methodological 
principles such as the Causal Closure of the Physical, Occham’s Razor and the like. No 
scientist can have a final word on these matters. The Eccles and Von Neumann-Wigner 
proposals presented here are evidence as to how among the hot debates that have been 
going on in the scientific arena in the past half a century, many questions which were left 
unanswered can draw some light on some parallel philosophical conundrums and be 
amenable to some cautions speculation.  
Eccles revealed to us that some neural processes are probably genuinely indeterministic 
and therefore vulnerable to some extra cause contributing to making one alternative 
more likely than another. Even if his concrete hypothesis was not on the right track, the 
questions that guided him are the same that guide libertarians today, and his empirical 
approach shows that it is reasonable to expect that neuroscience might provide us with 
better accounts of this process in the future. Von Neumann and Wigner’s answer to the 
measurement problem is symptomatic of how quantum physics has an unsolved mystery 
at its core and how its intrinsically epistemic nature breaks the traditional separation 
between objective and subjective reality. Even if their suggestion of consciousness as a 
solution to the open problem of the transition from probabilia to actualia is not the most 
popular, it is still on the table, among tens of other interpretations, many of which 
(Everett’s many-worlds interpretation, for example) are comparatively much more distant 
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from our common intuition. Given my argumentation showing how agent-causation is the 
only metaphysical approach that can vindicate our commonly held distinction between 
actions and unpurposive behavior, and how this requires that the conscious self 
sometimes steers the wheel of neural events, Von Neumann and Wigner hypothesis gains 
greater philosophical interest. Who knows what future science will bring, but if action is 
to be considered possible and free, I am betting on some developments in this direction.     
Some will counter that this is no way to do science. True, but that is not what I am doing. 
I am doing philosophy and my arguments have led me to the conclusion that there are 
two mutually exclusive alternatives, none of which has been confirmed nor refuted by 
science:  
1) There is an irreducible self who can downwardly cause our neurons to fire in 
such a way as to make our body move according to her will, and this implies that 
consciousness can affect our brain; or 
2) Brain events are causally closed to any non-physical influences, which, given the 
argument I developed in chapter two, entails that there is no real agency in the 
world. 
This is the point where the debate comes down to conflicting basic intuitions, and where 
I bet on the first alternative rather than on the latter. For all the reasons I have stated so 
far, it seems much more unreasonable and implausible to me to think that consciousness 
is identical to its physical substrate or epiphenomenal, that actions and non-actional 
behaviors have the same causal etiology and that libertarian free will is an illusion, than 
to think that the brain works indeterministically and that our conscious emergent self can 
affect it. 
If this will imply the discovery of new entities in physics or the transition to a new way of 
regarding the material world altogether, so much the better. As Noam Chomsky noted331, 
there is no consensual and definitive concept of what “material” or “physical” means, for 
if it means (as is usually intended), what is potentially describable by physical science, we 
                                                          
331 Chomsky, N. (2000), chapter 4. 
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are definitely facing a practical problem. For example, Descartes seemed to have the 
physical as opposed to the conscious parts of reality as distinct as could be, and then 
Newton reintroduced strange occult forces into the physical realm by accepting 
mysterious action at a distance. More recently, quantum physics operated a true 
revolution on how the scientific community conceives matter and its frontiers, and its 
consequences are still hard to grasp today, a hundred years after its beginning. And now 
we are told 90% of the universe is dark matter, which by definition is everything our 
present natural science fails to detect and knows nothing about. How can one be sure, 
then, of what a physicalistic account of reality should be, and which falsities should be 
refuted as antiscientific ghosts in the machine? 
Chomsky’s argument serves to say that to take consciousness as a fundamental part of 
reality and to defend its irreducibility to the physical world as we currently intend it is a 
position forced upon us by the contingent frontiers of today’s science. If in the future the 
“physical” will once more be expanded as to include phenomenal consciousness as well 
as third-person descriptions of reality, then we will not have to embrace dualism any 
longer.  
In our present situation, however, emergent dualism is the best option for realists about 
action (whom, I contend, must endorse agent-causalism), and one that is not as 
demanding as usually depicted.  
When assessing a theory’s virtues, we must assess its explanatory power, its internal 
coherence and also its empirical plausibility. Remember Franklin’s definition according to 
which plausibility is a function of how radically our current scientific knowledge would 
have to change for our theory’s commitments to be satisfied. From what we have seen, 
agent-causalism does not conflict with our scientific picture of the world. Its commitments 
regard either metaphysical assumptions such as the Causal Closure of the Physical, 
reductionism or determinism, domains in which scientific knowledge is still “in its 
infancy”332, such as the neuroscientific study of the self, consciousness and self-
consciousness, or interpretations of open scientific problems such as the measurement 
                                                          
332 Kircher, T. and David, A.S. (2003), p.8. 
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problem in quantum mechanics. Hence, according to Franklin’s criterion, agent-causal 
libertarianism is not an implausible theory: things would not have to change radically from 
the point where they are now in order for its empirical commitments to be satisfied. True, 
its most popular alternatives are scientifically plausible as well; however, they would 
imply renouncing to our most basic conceptions of action, mental causation, personhood 
and free will. If we measure them up globally, we can see how agent-causal libertarianism 
is actually the best account available. 
 
4.7. Consciousness and Free Will 
 
There are open problems in both science and philosophy. Sometimes, the sets of open 
problems intersect, which is the case when it comes to consciousness. From what we have 
just seen, this concept seems to be the vanishing point towards which several unanswered 
questions in metaphysics (the problem of emergence), philosophy of mind (the mind-body 
problem), and physics (the measurement problem) converge.  
In order to better understand the journey we have taken from action theory to 
metaphysics, to the mind-body problem, I now wish to close this chapter by pointing out 
that the relation between the free will debate and the problem of consciousness in 
philosophy is not new: it has always been very close. It is also important to note that to 
interpret the irreducible agent as the agent’s conscious self is not to limit agency 
arbitrarily, leaving out all the cases in which an agent would be acting unconsciously. I do 
not believe there are any such cases, as I explained in the first chapter. Agency requires 
conscious control, independently from the requirement of a unitary self. 
As O’Connor has noted, it is a “remarkable feature of most accounts of free will that they 
give no essential role to conscious awareness”333. But it has been an implicit assumption 
in all theories of free action and free will that for any action to be considered such, 
independently from the degree of deliberation involved (cf. Table 1) the agent has to be 
                                                          
333 O’Connor, T. (2000), p.122 
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(at least indirectly) aware of what she is doing, since no one can control what one cannot 
even represent. This assumption is present in all the main views, from libertarians to 
compatibilists, as well as in the “willusionist”334 theses that were produced and fed to the 
social media after Benjamin Libet’s aforementioned experiments on the “illusion of 
conscious will”335. Experiments of this type have repeatedly shown that the brain can be 
predisposed to a certain decision a significant amount of time before the subject becomes 
aware of it, which led many to jump to the conclusion that people do not have free will. 
Even though Libet-type experiments and this way of interpreting the evidence has been 
harshly criticized on various fronts336, they remain extremely influential to this day, hence 
the significance of their relying on the assumption that consciousness is required for free 
will.   
Folk views also share the assumption that consciousness is crucial for freedom and 
responsibility, as several recent experimental philosophy studies led by Joshua Shepherd 
have shown. For example, according to subjects that were enquired in one experiment, 
agents that are behaviorally identical to human beings (for example, humanoid machines) 
are considered to lack free will and responsibility if “[t]hey do not actually feel pain (even 
when they say ‘Ouch!’), they do not experience emotions, they do not see colors, and they 
do not consciously deliberate about what to do”337; in contrast, they can be considered 
free when they are conceived as capable of conscious experience. These considerations 
are quite independent from whether the context of the “zombie” is identical to the 
context of its conscious counterpart (that is, even if it is identically deterministic or 
indeterministic), or not. 
This is not to say that philosophical analysis should rely on intuition. However, I believe 
that to contradict folk intuitions as fundamental as the ones on which our image of 
ourselves as humans is grounded should not be done lightly in philosophy. Ceteris paribus 
                                                          
334 This is Eddy Nahmias’ expression [Nahmias, E. (2011)]. 
335 Cf. Libet, B. et al. (1983), a study which I referred to in sections 1.2 and 2.2. “The illusion of 
conscious will” is the title of Daniel Wegner’s 2002 book, which was partially based on Libet’s 
findings. 
336 See, for instance, Alfred Mele (2014). 
337 Shepherd, J. (2015), p.939. See also Shepherd, J. (2012). 
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(of course, empirical corroboration is a stronger argument than any other), a theory that 
confirms folk intuitions is more plausible than one which conflicts with them. This is why 
I think it’s important to note that my account, according to which the irreducible self that 
is required for an action to be such can be identified with the unitary entity who is the 
subject of our irreducible conscious experience, meets the common intuition that free 
agents must be conscious. 
Also in the field of moral philosophy, despite some dissident voices338, the idea that 
consciousness is crucial for responsibility ascriptions is still the most common position. It 
is interesting to realize that it is shared even by philosophers that address consciousness 
as a brain function that is independent from its phenomenal quality. Neil Levy, for 
example, has very recently published a book on the relationship between consciousness 
and free will, where he argues that “consciousness of key features of our [morally 
significant] actions is a necessary condition of moral responsibility for them”339. But Levy 
endorses this thesis even though he does not side with its traditional defenders on what 
concerns attributing to consciousness unique phenomenal characteristics with which 
persons identify. 
“Consciousness is never more than a tiny sliver of our mental life, and the contents that 
happen to become conscious may not be especially significant for who we are. 
Consciousness is necessary for direct moral responsibility, I claim, not because of what it 
is, but because of what it does.”340 
According to Levy341, the functional role of consciousness is to make information available 
to most of the consuming systems that compose the mind. When that information is not 
conscious, its contents are not “online” for many of those systems and, as a consequence, 
many of our beliefs and moral principles, which are distributed across many areas of the 
                                                          
338 Cf. recent theories by Nomy Arpaly, Peter Carruthers and others on the possibility of 
responsibility without consciousness. See Neil Levy (2003) and Joshua Shepherd (2013) on the 
assessment and critique of these positions. 
339 Levy, N. (2014), p. vi. 
340 Idem, p. ix. 
341 His account was inspired by Bernard Baar’s “global workspace” hypothesis [Baars, B. J. (2001)]. 
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brain, are not accessed. For this reason, Levy claims, the actions (or responses) in such 
circumstances are not expressive of who we are, nor are they controlled by us.   
Levy does not address the phenomenal aspect of consciousness because he believes that 
it is not what defines it, nor is that the aspect that is at stake when one discusses the 
relevancy of consciousness for moral action. 
“What is at issue in debates over moral responsibility is whether agents must have a certain 
kind of access to a certain kind of content in order to be morally responsible.”342 
The advantage of Levy’s functional approach to consciousness as awareness is that it 
avoids discussions around the “hard problem of consciousness”343, by simply moving past 
it and focusing on another type of phenomenon – the informational content that is 
available (for reasoning, for example) at a certain moment in time. Whether it has 
phenomenal content as well, is something that does not concern the author. This may be 
a useful strategy since “the thesis that [phenomenal] consciousness is ontologically 
irreducible to physical phenomena (and manifestly so) is a basic divide among 
philosophers, one that is far more intractable than the question of free will itself”344.  
For all the reasons presented in section 4.2, I cannot be agnostic about this matter. I 
believe it is precisely the phenomenal aspect of consciousness that which renders it 
irreducible and therefore a perfect candidate for the role of that emergent entity on which 
to ground our irreducible self. Nevertheless, Levy’s thesis is useful as it shows how the 
functional aspects of consciousness too point towards its central position in action 
production. 
Pace Levy, it is a fact that phenomenal consciousness exists and that it always appears 
together with its integrative functions. Also, the question of its adaptive value (still under 
debate in the field of evolutionary biology) is another open problem where the 
fundamental relationship between consciousness and free action gets an independent 
vote from.  Why has nature selected this property which, as much as we can tell, seems 
                                                          
342 Levy, N. (2014), p.28 note 5.  
343 Cf. Chalmers, D. (1996). 
344 O’Connor, T. (2000), p.117. 
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unnecessary from a strictly adaptive point of view? It is conceivable that a philosophical 
zombie identical to us in all its physical and mental capacities, except for phenomenal 
consciousness, could deal with the world just as well as we do, at a practical level. Then 
why was this extra first-person perspective added to our being in the world? O’Connor 
suggests that the connection of consciousness to free will is the key to this problem:  
“The [agent-causal] theorist can conjecture that a function of biological 
consciousness, in its specifically human (and probably certain other mammalian) 
manifestations, is to subserve the very agent-causal capacity [of choosing from 
amongst available alternatives].” 345 
In other words, maybe the biological value of consciousness lies in the fact that a zombie 
functions only algorithmically, since it has no personal perspective on things. That entails 
that it cannot choose, because choosing means to intervene in the causal sequence of 
brain and mental events and to author a decision oneself, and the zombie has no self. 
Therefore, since there cannot be agency nor freedom of choice without agent-causation, 
nor agent-causation without an irreducible substance with downward causal powers, 
consciousness was the emergent capacity selected by nature for its adaptive value of 
endowing the organism with that ability. By being conscious, the organism acquires a sort 
of unity that can then be used for acting. The conscious self is hence an emergent entity, 
supervenient on the body but radically distinct from it, who is simultaneously the subject 
who thinks and the agent who acts through that body. 
We have many reasons to think consciousness and free will are intricately connected, 
then. My thesis is just a further argument in favor of a view that links them together.
                                                          





5. FREE WILL AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
 
“I am morally superior to George Washington.  
He could not tell a lie. I can and do not.” 
(Mark Twain346) 
 
5.1. What we have learned so far 
 
We have come a long way. In the first chapter, I presented the foundations of my agent-
causal thesis. The need for the empirical distinction between actions and non-actional 
behaviors to be grounded on a metaphysical distinction, together with the challenge 
posed by the disappearing agent objection, led me to opt for agent-causalism as the best 
account of agency on the market. However, as I explained in section 2.4., agent-caused 
actions may be more or less free. A compatibilist view about free will sees any action 
(intended, as I define it, as an intentional behavior caused by the agent) as a free action. 
Incompatibilists, instead, argue that in a deterministic world (a world in which natural laws 
are such that, given identical physical conditions, there can be only one possible unfolding 
of events), actions are not truly free. Even though a causally determined action may be 
voluntary insofar as it is made purposefully and according to the agent’s will, the lack of 
alternative possibilities will make it so that the agent could not have intended it any other 
way. The agent can do what she wants but she cannot want anything else. And this implies 
that free will, as the ability for self-determination and choice, is just an illusion. In the 
words of Spinoza, who believed in a deterministic world, “men think themselves free, 
because they are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in 
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their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because 
they are ignorant of [those causes]”347. 
Chapters Two and Three have led me to embrace libertarianism (the non-skeptical version 
of incompatibilism) for an independent reason. In order to guarantee the naturalistic 
plausibility of agent-causalism, I chose emergent dualism as the best account of the mind-
body relationship. I addressed the arguments usually put forward in favor of reductionism 
and against ontological emergentism but concluded that none of them is irrefutable and 
that our scientific picture of the world is perfectly compatible with the emergence of novel 
phenomena with downward causal powers. The reasons we have for believing that 
consciousness is distinct from and irreducible to matter, despite being dependent on it, 
provided a further argument in favor of the idea that ontological emergence exists and is 
present in the unified self who is the bearer of conscious properties that each one of us 
experiences.  However, I also argued that, if one wishes to develop an account that does 
not question natural supervenience, one will have to posit fundamental indeterminism as 
a condition of possibility for downward causation. In the case of mental causation, this 
implies positing neural indeterminism, which I argued is a plausible hypothesis.  
My belief in the existence of free agency and my contention that it is impossible without 
downward causation, which in turn is incompatible with determinism, led me to endorse 
libertarianism about free will. It is the only position that can ensure that the emergent 
conscious self, for whose irreducibility I provided numerous arguments, has genuine 
alternatives from which to choose and that, in choosing, it can be an effective cause of 
the actions performed. Nevertheless, I also believe that libertarianism is the best view 
regarding free will because of the classical reasons in its favor: because there is no true 
freedom in an action that the agent could not have failed to choose to do.  
This chapter aims at assessing what I consider to be the main lines of the debate between 
compatibilists and incompatibilists: In section 5.2. I will address the most important 
arguments that have been put forward for and against the compatibility of free will and 
determinism. In section 5.3, I will focus my attention on the arguments that question the 
                                                          
347 Spinoza, B. (1677), p.110.   
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compatibility of free will and indeterminism, hoping to make the case for the view that 
not only is indeterminism not threatening for free will as it in fact can allow for an 
enhanced control of the agent over her action. 
 
5.2. Free Will is incompatible with determinism 
 
It is a commonly held intuition that free will requires the power to do otherwise, and that 
determinism is incompatible with it. Philosophy demands, though, that we sustain our 
intuitions with rational arguments and keep our unargued premises to a minimum. Let 
me do so, then. I will start with presenting the incompatibilist definition of free will I 
endorse and then show how the objections that have been put forward against it can be 
adequately answered: 
Free will is the agent’s ability to choose which physical or mental action she will 
perform, insofar as she could also have chosen to act otherwise given the exact 
same circumstances and laws of nature.  
This implies two fundamental conditions:  
i. Alternative possibilities (AP), so that, in the given circumstances, the agent can 
choose between more than one possible course of action; 
ii. Authorship348 (AS), so that it is up to the agent which choice is actually made. 
The second condition is the one I addressed in the first chapter of this dissertation, 
defending the idea that only agent-causalism can ensure it. The first condition is the one 
over which the compatibilist/incompatibilist divide is drawn. According to 
incompatibilists, in a physical world ruled by causal determinism, there is no room for 
alternative possibilities, which contradicts an essential feature of free action. 
Compatibilists can question this idea on two fronts: 1) they can argue that determinism is 
compatible with AP, or 2) they can object that AP is not a necessary condition for free will.  
                                                          
348 This is what Robert Kane famously calls Ultimate Responsibility [Cf. Kane, R. (1998), p.33-37]. 
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In this section, I will begin by topic (1) above: I will describe the famous “consequence 
argument”, which has been under discussion since its first formulation (under a different 
name) by Carl Ginet in 1966, and still remains one of the strongest arguments in favor of 
the incompatibility of determinism and free will; then I will present some objections that 
have been put forward against it and try to show that they are ineffective. Next, I will 
discuss the Frankfurt-style examples that have been unremittingly used by compatibilists 
to show that it is not true that free will and moral responsibility require alternative 
possibilities of action (topic (2) above). Finally, I will present part of the recent literature 
on manipulation cases, which have been mostly used as a reductio ad absurdum of 
compatibilism. 
 
5.2.1. The “consequence argument” 
 
The most important argument in favor of incompatibilism is clearly the “consequence 
argument”349, also appropriately called the “master argument”350, which gave a formal 
treatment to the traditional concern (that goes back to the ancient Greeks) that 
determinism prevents the possibility of acting otherwise. Stated informally, the argument 
goes like this:  
“If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and 
events in the remote past. But it is not up to us what went on before we were born; and 
neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore the consequences of these 
things (including our present acts) are not up to us.”351 
                                                          
349 Cf. Ginet, C. (1966) and Van Inwagen, P. (1983). Van Inwagen was the one to coin the name by 
which the argument is best known. 
350 Cf. Kapitan, T. (2002), who refers to the consequence argument as a modern version of the 
“Master Argument” by Diodorus Cronos. Fara, M. (2008) also uses this term. 
351 Van Inwagen, P. (1983), p.16. 
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In his influential book An essay on free will (1983), Peter van Inwagen offered three formal 
versions of the argument, using technical operators created for the occasion, such as the 
following (used in the first and third versions of the argument, respectively):  
- Np = df. p (is the case) and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p (is 
the case) 
- Pat (-Q) = df. agent a at t can (has the power or ability to) render Q false 
Since the different versions of the argument are usually considered to be minor variations 
of one main line of reasoning, I will treat them collectively. As one can immediately see, 
both above operators rely heavily on the concept of ability (either as the power to render 
some proposition false or, negatively, as the powerlessness to determine that something 
is the case). Likewise, in the context of van Inwagen’s informal definition presented above, 
to say that the past is “not up to us” means that there is nothing we can now do to change 
it, just like there is nothing we can do to change the laws of nature. Can, to have the ability, 
to have a choice, for it to be up to one - all these phrases will then have to be analyzed by 
both, defenders and critics of the argument, in order to assess the strength of its premises 
and its entailments. 
Let us first identify the different parts of the argument. Van Inwagen’s formalizations 
usually have seven steps, but I think we can condense the argument into a handful: three 
premises, an inference rule and the conclusion. All versions of the argument assume what 
van Inwagen regards as undeniable facts: 
1) no one has the power now, or ever, to change the past  
2) no one has the power now, or ever, to change the laws of nature  
The third premise is entailed by the definition of determinism and the evidence that what 
is necessarily so cannot be changed (rule “Alpha”): 
3) no one has the power now, or ever, to change the fact that, if determinism is 
true, it is necessary that, given the past and laws of nature, our present actions 
occur.  
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In order to proceed to the conclusion, van Inwagen puts forward a Transfer Principle 
(which, depending on the version of the argument at stake, can be either a transfer of 
power or a transfer of powerlessness principle), according to which:  
“If there is nothing anyone can do to change X, and nothing anyone can do to change the 
fact that Y is a necessary consequence of X, then there is nothing anyone can do to change 
Y either.”352 
With the help of this principle, known as rule “Beta”, or of some equivalent, he can then 
conclude that: 
4) (if determinism is true) no one has the power now, or ever, to change the fact 
that our present actions occur.  
Since this reasoning can be applied to any agent in any situation, 4) means that, if 
determinism is true, no one can ever act otherwise. Given the high plausibility of the 
premises and the inference rules, it looks like an uncontroversial conclusion. 
Let us now consider what compatibilists have to say about this argument. Despite its 
apparent logical solidity, the critics say, the consequence argument can be questioned 
both in terms of its logical validity and the truth of its premises. The main line of attack 
regards the possible use of a conditional analysis of abilities which might call into question 
the truth of rule “Beta” and also make it so that, under certain formulations, the structure 
of the argument will lead from true premises to a false conclusion.  
What does it mean to say that, right now, I can clap my hands? By that sentence I can 
often mean that I would clap my hands if I so intended or chose or wanted or tried to.  The 
fact is that I did not clap my hands. I am writing on my computer, and I chose not to 
interrupt my writing in order to prove myself a point. However, I have the clear 
phenomenological feel that I could have done it, had I tried. I know how to clap my hands, 
no one is preventing me from doing so, I am not paralyzed, and so on. All the conditions 
                                                          
352 Kane, R. (2005), p.24. In response to an objection put forward by McKay and Johnson (1996), 
van Inwagen made a partial technical reformulation of rule ”Beta” in his (2000). I will ignore that 
reformulation as it left the consequence argument intact and is irrelevant for the present 
discussion.  
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are in place, so I can clap my hands whenever I decide to. I have alternative possibilities 
of action.  
But this shows only that there are (at least) two senses of the word “can”: 1) a context-
free sense in which it means “to have a certain skill” or “for it to be physically possible for 
me to do something in normal circumstances” (if I am not prevented from doing it by 
another agent, say, or by a disease), and 2) a context-specific sense that has to do with 
the concrete exact moment in which I am supposed to exercise the power (or not) to so 
act, given my past and the laws of nature and, of course, all the details of my present 
situation (up to the very last neuron in my head). Could I have clapped my hands in both 
these senses, or only in the first one? Both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that 
the answer to this question will depend on the truth of determinism. But what they 
disagree about353 is in which of these senses the abilities mentioned in the consequence 
argument should be interpreted. 
Compatibilists say that to assume a sense of can and power that is by definition 
incompatible with determinism is to beg the question. And if one were to use a conditional 
analysis of abilities, compatibilists argue, the argument would become invalid, i.e., the 
first and second premises would still be true (no one can change the past or the laws of 
nature, no matter how hard they try), but the conclusion would be false. It would not be 
true that “no one has the power now, or ever, to change the fact that our present actions 
occur” (in the sense that one could change that fact if one should so try). 
David Lewis (1981) and John Martin Fischer (1983) have independently argued also that 
there are different meanings of “could have rendered false”. In a weak sense, this means 
only that, if one acted otherwise, then the past or the laws of nature would have been 
different in some way (though not because the agent caused them to be different – which 
would be the strong sense of the expression). This non-causal meaning of “rendering 
false” shows it to be compatible with determinism and thus, the authors say, it is sufficient 
                                                          
353 Obviously, not all compatibilists think that the consequence argument is objectionable, and 
very few now call it into question via a conditional analysis of abilities. In this section, though, I 
am using the general term “compatibilists” to refer to the ones that do, such as Gary Watson, John 
Martin Fischer, David Lewis, Donald Davidson, among others.  
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to challenge the intuitive plausibility of the first two premises of the consequence 
argument. 
Van inwagen and many other incompatibilists reacted almost with disdain to these 
interpretations and responded that if conditional analyses imply the invalidity of the 
consequence argument or the falsity of some of its premises, “so much the worse”354 for 
conditional analyses, which are much less intuitively plausible than what they were trying 
to disprove. The only motivation for the “ad hoc”355 move of endorsing “would… if” 
interpretations of “can” in the context of the consequence argument and, even more so, 
weak analyses of “rendering false”, is a prior commitment to compatibilism.  
But this is not an argument. Can incompatibilists actually demonstrate that the non-
hypothetical interpretation of ability is better? 
As a matter of fact, it is commonly considered that classical conditional analyses of 
abilities fail in general in their attempt to provide an adequate interpretation of “can” and 
power, independently of their application in the context of this dispute356. On the one 
hand, the counter-examples are immense. There are many situations in which we cannot 
adopt a “would…if” interpretation of our ability to act differently, as we simply find it 
impossible to try (or choose or intend) to engage in a certain behavior, like petting a dog 
or moving towards the deeper side of a pool (because of a trauma, say). In those cases, a 
conditional analysis would still attribute to us the ability of acting otherwise, even though 
we would in fact be unable to do what our trauma prevented us from trying to do357. On 
the other hand, it is clearly unsatisfactory to say that an agent is able to do A if she should 
want (or try or intend) to do A, without asking further whether she was also able to want 
(or try or intend) to do A. But this will require a further analysis of what it means to want 
                                                          
354 Kane, R. (1998), p.48, quoting van Inwagen. 
355 Cf. van Inwagen (2000), pp.9-10. 
356 Cf. van Inwagen, P. (1983); Wolf, S. (1990), Berofsky, B. (2002), Maier, J. (2014), McKenna, M., 
Coates, D. J. (2015). 
357 Cf. Lehrer, K. (1964, 1968). 
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(or try or intend), and hence imply an infinite regress, unless one drops the conditional 
analysis at some point358. 
Usually incompatibilists argue that a “could…if” analysis is too broad, for it assumes as 
sufficient conditions that are only necessary for the possession of power. However, other 
counter-examples can be evoked for calling into question this analysis as being too 
narrow. Austin’s golfer359 is the most famous case: he misses a three-foot putt, even 
though he “could” certainly have made it, in the usual sense of the word. He has both 
made and missed similar putts in similar circumstances in the past. The conditional 
analysis is inadequate, then, for sometimes people can do something, even though they 
might fail to if they try. 
In order to address this and other criticisms, many variations have been given to the 
conditional analysis in the years, none of which has gained large consensus360. An 
alternative compatibilist line of research that has been pursued recently by authors like 
Kadri Vihvelin (2004) and Michael Fara (2008) suggests that conditional analyses of 
abilities can be improved, via their very close relation to dispositions, which are grounded 
in the intrinsic properties of the agent. According to them, this “new dispositionalism”361 
would allow compatibilism to retain the idea that free will and responsibility require 
alternative possibilities but it would maintain that determinism does not prevent the 
agent from having them. Fara, for example, put forward the following dispositional 
analysis: 
“An agent has an ability to A in circumstances C if and only if she has the disposition to A 
when, in circumstances C, she tries to A.”362 
                                                          
358 Cf. Broad, C.D. (1952). 
359 Austin, J.L. (1966), p.219, n.1. 
360 For a thorough review of the literature see Berofsky, B. (2002). 
361 The term was coined by Randolph Clarke in his 2008 article “Dispositions, abilities to act and 
free will: The new dispositionalism”. For another critical review of Vihvelin and Fara’s positions, 
see also: Franklin, C. (2011b). 
362 Fara, M. (2008), p.848. 
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Fara considers that to have a disposition to A is sufficient for having an ability to A, and 
that to have a disposition is to have some intrinsic property in virtue of which that 
disposition is manifested. With this definition, Fara takes into account the possibility that 
an ability might be masked by external factors that momentarily and involuntarily take a 
certain disposition away from the agent. According to him, this view can both solve the 
problems faced by the conditional analysis (by avoiding the counter-examples which 
showed the “could…if” model to be both unnecessary and insufficient for the possession 
of an ability) and undermine rule “Beta”. 
Recall that rule “Beta” is the transfer principle which allows the incompatibilist to move 
from the first three premises to the conclusion of the Consequence Argument. It states 
that “if there is nothing anyone can do to change X, and nothing anyone can do to change 
the fact that Y is a necessary consequence of X, then there is nothing anyone can do to 
change Y either”. In a case of masked abilities, an agent fails to exercise the power she 
has and continues to have, in virtue of some uncontrollable fact (a gust of wind in the case 
of the unfortunate golfer who misses the short putt). She has the ability and the 
opportunity to exercise it, she tries to exercise it, but she fails. According to Fara, this 
makes it so that while the antecedents of rule “Beta” are the case, the consequent does 
not follow, in the sense that the golfer retains her ability to sink the putt despite the 
uncontrollable gust of wind (X) and the fact that, given the wind, she could not help but 
miss it (Y). 
I do not agree with Fara’s argument, though. When we apply his dispositional analysis to 
rule “Beta” we get the following statement: given that there was nothing anyone could 
do to prevent the gust of wind, nor the fact that it would cause the golfer to miss the easy 
putt, then there is nothing anyone can do to stop the golfer from missing that putt. And 
in fact, this seems to contradict what Fara is claiming to be obvious: that the golfer can 
sink the easy putt. Anyone would agree that when we talk about the ability a certain 
expert golfer possesses, we believe that ability to be retained despite gusts of wind and 
other temporary masks that prevent the agent from exercising it on a given occasion. 
However, that is not what we are discussing when we assess the consequence argument 
and the AP condition. What concerns us in the context of the free will debate are concrete 
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actions in concrete circumstances and the control we can say an agent has over them 
under those circumstances – not the control she generally has for actions of that type. 
What incompatibilists care about is the token ability the golfer has – or lacks – to sink that 
short putt in that specific situation. If compatibilists respond to that worry by means of 
general abilities, they are just changing the subject or simply missing the point.  
As Christopher Franklin noted in a critical article about the new dispositionalism, masks 
are commonly used as excuses. If I promised my son that I would read him a bedtime story 
but an eye infection is blurring my vision for a day making it impossible for me to read, I 
should not be blamed for failing to keep my promise. Anyone (including my son, if he is 
old enough to reason) would tell me that I am excused. This means that I am considered 
to be unable to read, and therefore not free nor responsible for not doing it, even though 
I retain my general ability as a reader. According to Franklin, this shows how “more than 
ability is required for freedom and responsibility”363. It is one thing to possess an ability 
or a disposition, anchored in the agent’s intrinsic properties, and it is another to have the 
possibility of exercising it at a given time. An agent’s power to act otherwise cannot be 
sufficient for her to be considered accountable, if it is exhausted by her intrinsic 
properties. She must also control whether and when she will exercise them in the 
particular situation at stake364. Don Locke could not have expressed this more clearly: 
“It is obvious that what is at issue in the free will-determinism controversy is not whether 
things possess powers and agents possess abilities which they do not exercise, but 
whether things and agents are able to exercise those powers, even at times when it 
                                                          
363 Franklin, C. (2011b), p. 12. 
364 Various authors have defended this idea, despite the differences in their accounts and in the 
terminology used: Van Inwagen (1983) stresses the importance of possessing not only an ability 
but also the “power” to exercise it at a given occasion; Robert Kane (1998) argues for the 
interdependence of AP and UR (the condition of “Ultimate Responsibility”, that corresponds 
roughly to what I call Authorship); Alfred Mele (2003) endorses the distinction between “general 
ability” and “specific ability”; Randolph Clarke (2008) insists on the need for “control” over the 
exercise of an ability; and Christopher Franklin (2011b, forthcoming b) considers that 
“opportunity” is as important a condition for free will as the will itself (which is based on the 
agent’s abilities). 
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happens that they are not exercising them. The ‘can’ of power and ability, in short, is not 
the ‘can’ of the free will controversy.”365 
This is why a conditional or dispositional analysis of abilities is not applicable to the 
consequence argument. The question the argument raises is not whether the agent has 
the general ability to act in a certain way (e.g. to make a short putt in similar situations), 
but whether he has the specific ability to do it (e.g. to sink the putt here and now). Since 
Vihvelin and Fara try to ground moral responsibility in just the general abilities an agent 
possesses, their analyses are inapplicable to the consequence argument, just like the 
conditional analyses of abilities were considered to be, long before their new proposal 
was presented.  
Many other objections have been put forward against the different formulations of the 
consequence argument in the years, and just as many responses have been given366. The 
character of the discussion has become increasingly technical, often grounded in modal 
aspects that would be totally out of context in the present work.  
Before we move on to the next section, it is important to remember that we have arrived 
at this chapter with very strong reasons for endorsing incompatibilism. Agent-causal 
libertarianism proved to be the best account of free action available, and the objections 
that are usually presented against it (which have mainly to do with its empirical 
plausibility) were shown to be adequately soluble. But agent-causation has metaphysical 
implications: substance-causation and indeterminism. This last requirement was what 
first took us to embrace incompatibilism. What we have seen in this section is a further 
argument in favor of the idea that indeterminism is required for free will, insofar as its 
negation would entail the negation of control. 
Compatibilism is in a defensive position when it comes to the consequence argument. It 
has to find sophisticated ways to question its immediate plausibility. I believe that the 
strategies it has reached for are ultimately unsuccessful and that agent-causal 
                                                          
365 Don Locke, “Natural Powers and Human Abilities” [cit. in Clarke, R.(2008), emphasis added]. 
366 For a good review of the literature see Kapitan, T. (2002). 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 181 
libertarianism, which I had embraced for independent reasons, is ever more cogent after 
this discussion. 
 
5.2.2. Questioning the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
 
In the beginning of the present chapter, I presented AP as a pre-condition for libertarian 
free will. This means that an agent can be considered to act freely only when she could 
have done otherwise given the exact same circumstances and laws of nature. In the last 
section we have seen that the idea that the ability to act otherwise is incompatible with 
determinism has been challenged by many. Now we will see how the principle itself that 
relates AP with free will can be put into question, not so much directly, as via the 
questioning of the intuitive notion that moral responsibility requires alternative 
possibilities of action.  
Authors who have taken this move usually take moral responsibility as the empirical 
notion of one being fit for reactive attitudes such as praise, blame, resentment and so 
forth367. Derk Pereboom uses the phrase “basic desert” and defines it as follows: 
“For an agent to be morally responsible for an action in this sense is for it to be hers in 
such a way that she would deserve to be blamed if she understood that it was morally 
wrong, and she would deserve to be praised if she understood that it was morally 
exemplary. The desert at issue here is basic in the sense that the agent would deserve 
to be blamed or praised just because she has performed the action, given an 
understanding of its moral status, and not, for example, merely by virtue of 
consequentialist or contractualist considerations. This characterization leaves room 
for an agent’s being morally responsible for an action even if she does not deserve to 
be blamed or praised for it — if, for example, the action is morally indifferent.”368 
                                                          
367 On the notion of “reactive attitudes”, see P.F. Strawson’s influential paper “Freedom and 
Resentment” (1962). 
368 Pereboom, D. (2014a). 
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In his 1969 paper, “Alternate possibilities and moral responsibility”, Harry Frankfurt 
famously argued that the idea that a person is morally responsible for what she has done 
only if she could have done otherwise (what he calls the Principle of Alternate 
Possibilities369) is false. The reason why we intuitively take it to be true is that, when we 
commonly (and rightfully) judge cases of coercion as cases in which an agent lacks moral 
responsibility, we mistakenly believe those to be just special cases of being unable to do 
otherwise. We think the agent is not responsible for what he has done because, being 
coerced to do it, he was prevented from doing something else instead. However, Frankfurt 
argues, this is not the right way to interpret such situations. For neither does being unable 
to do otherwise entail the agent’s lack of moral responsibility, nor does being coerced 
exclude being morally responsible.  
“Coercion affects the judgment of a person’s moral responsibility only when the person 
acts as he does because he is coerced to do so – i.e., when the fact that he is coerced is 
what accounts for his action.”370 
Frankfurt then proceeds to present his well-known Jones and Black cases, which are 
designed to show that the circumstances that prevent the agent from acting otherwise 
(coercion, for example) can be diverse from the ones that make him act (his own 
motivations, say). This should make us realize that the Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
that we tend to take for granted should actually be replaced by a revised formula that can 
primarily take into account the reasons that explain why the action was performed, rather 
than the fact that there were (or were not) alternative courses of action available. 
Frankfurt suggests the following restatement:  
“A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he 
could not have done otherwise.”371 
                                                          
369 This principle is commonly known in the literature by the acronym PAP, even though the 
terminology varies: sometimes it is called “Principle of Alternate Possibilities”, and others 
“Principle of Alternative Possibilities”. I favor the latter form. Unsurprisingly, Daniel Dennett 
chooses an entirely different name for it: CDO (“could have done otherwise”). 
370 Frankfurt, H. (1969), p.833 (emphasis added). 
371 Idem, p.839 (emphasis added). 
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If, instead, the person acted as she did for her own reasons despite not being able to do 
otherwise, then she is responsible for her action. This move is very significant. Insofar as 
free will is the control condition for moral responsibility, the latter entails the former. 
Therefore, if moral responsibility can exist without AP, free will can too. This implies that 
if the author is right, AP can be challenged as a precondition for free will, which would 
vindicate compatibilism.  
However, Frankfurt’s cases, as decisive as they were for showing the importance of 
Authorship, have been questioned and discussed for more than forty years and are 
definitely far from constituting uncontentious counter-examples to the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities. Let us look at the original372 Frankfurt case: 
“Suppose someone – Black, let us say – wants Jones to perform a certain action. Black is 
prepared to go to considerable lengths to get his way, but he prefers to avoid showing 
his hand unnecessarily. So he waits until Jones is about to make up his mind what to do, 
and he does nothing unless it is clear to him (Black is an excellent judge of such things) 
that Jones is going to decide to do something other than what he wants him to do. If it 
does become clear that Jones is going to decide to do something else, Black takes 
effective steps to ensure that Jones decides to do, and that he does do, what he wants 
him to do. Whatever Jones's initial preferences and inclinations, then, Black will have his 
way.  
(…) Now suppose that Black never has to show his hand because Jones, for reasons of his 
own, decides to perform and does perform the very action Black wants him to perform. 
In that case, it seems clear, Jones will bear precisely the same moral responsibility for 
what he does as he would have borne if Black had not been ready to take steps to ensure 
that he do it.”373 
What this ingenious example helps us see is how, at least in this case, what matters most 
for our attributions of moral responsibility is the causal role that the agent or, 
                                                          
372 Frankfurt acknowledges that Robert Nozick had independently formulated a similar example 
to his in lectures given years before he himself imagined them. 
373 Idem, pp.835-6. The original example was about Jones4, since other three cases involving Jones 
were presented before. As a matter of simplicity, I refer to Jones4 as Jones, here. 
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alternatively, the counterfactual intervener plays in the story, and not the fact that there 
are no alternative futures, given Black’s presence. 
In order to avoid the objection that the possibility of Black’s predicting Jones’ choice 
would beg the question of determinism, Frankfurt needed to add a footnote (no.3), in 
which he denies this logical misstep and introduces a detail that will be central to most 
objections (and counter-objections) in the Frankfurt literature in the decades to come: 
the possibility that a prior sign (the twitching of Jones’ face, for instance) would allow 
Black – based on the previous deliberation process in which Jones systematically 
presented such a sign whenever he considered a certain hypothesis – to know what Jones 
is about to decide. According to Frankfurt, this sign could be indeterministically caused, 
but still be considered to constitute the earlier phase of a process that would unfold 
deterministically, once started. Nevertheless, this earlier phase would not itself be part of 
the decision nor of the action. 
Despite this footnote (which interestingly is seldom mentioned by his critics), Frankfurt 
cannot avoid several objections that I will assess in the following subsections. 
 
5.2.2.1. Prior signs and flickers of freedom 
 
As we have seen, if Black is to know when to intervene, there must be some prior sign 
that can serve as a truthful marker for what Jones is about to do next. Frankfurt had 
already acknowledged this and so did most of his defenders and critics. The sign does not 
have to be external (like blushing or furrowing his eyebrows), it can be just a certain 
neurological pattern that a device Black placed in Jones’ brain374 can detect at t1, 
indicating the decision to be made at t2 to act in a given way at t3. 
Of course the presence of the prior sign can lead one to counter that Jones cannot be said 
to lack alternative possibilities altogether since, even though he is prevented by Black 
from acting differently at t3, he is still assumed to be able to decide otherwise and thus to 
exhibit an alternative prior sign at t1. This would be similar to Locke’s example of a man 
                                                          
374 Cf. Fischer, J.M. (1999) in Kane, R., ed., (2002), p.97. 
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who has been locked up in a room, but stays there of his own free will, since he does not 
know the door is bolted and he is enjoying the company375. The man could still try to leave 
the room, and so he does have some sort of alternative possibility. Likewise, Jones could 
either show a prior sign that is favorable to what Black wishes him to do, or an opposite 
one. This means that he does have different options at t1.  
Also, Frankfurt says the prior sign should be taken as an “earlier phase” of the action that 
is not itself part of it376. However, one can wonder whether a criterion by which such a 
“phase” that is not a “part” is to be identified can be given. This can be a problem since a 
prior sign that was somehow already part of the decision would not allow Black to 
intervene in time, and Jones would retain his alternatives possibilities (Black’s late 
blockage of the action would already count as coercion). 
In any case, if we take Frankfurt’s suggestion for granted and assume the prior sign to be 
an independent behavior, then another assessment is in order: the question whether it is 
voluntary or involuntary. If it is a voluntary act, then it should be considered to be another 
action in need of Black’s counterfactual control, since, by definition, Jones chooses to 
make it, which means he could also choose otherwise. In this case, then, the intervener 
should somehow move backwards in time in order to ensure Jones’ appropriate sign, 
which would lead to an infinite regress.  
If instead the sign is an involuntary one, libertarians seem to have a problem, for it will be 
just a mere “flicker of freedom”377, like a random swerve, an option the agent can hardly 
be considered to be able to make. If the only alternative option Jones has is involuntary, 
then it is not robust enough for the libertarian to ground his moral responsibility on. John 
Martin Fischer has been defending this idea for many years, and I believe his most 
interesting argument is that the “flicker theorist” is mixing up “possibility” and “ability”.  
“Even if another event (or set of events) occurs in the alternative sequence of a Frankfurt-
type case, it does not follow that the agent has the ability (in the relevant sense) to bring 
                                                          
375 Locke, J. (1689), p.238. 
376 Frankfurt (1969), note 3. 
377 This is John Martin Fischer’s famous phrase. 
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about this alternative event (or set of events). (…) The mere possibility of a different 
event’s occurring does not entail that the agent has the ability to do otherwise.”378 
Several responses can be given to Fischer’s argument, but, first of all, one must 
understand exactly what he is trying to prove. Fischer believes Frankfurt-type cases do 
show that moral responsibility can be attributed to an agent in spite of the lack of 
alternative possibilities, since she retains “guidance control” (even though she lacks 
“regulative control”, thus lacking libertarian free will379). So he does not think Jones needs 
robust alternatives in order to be considered responsible. His point is that if libertarians 
think so, then they should also require that the alternative possibilities be voluntary. If 
not, they are not real alternatives Jones could choose from. 
I believe a possible answer to this contention is that Jones has actually a much more 
robust alternative than Fischer is thinking. His alternative is not acting at all. 
As we have seen in the first chapter, actions must be agent-caused by definition. The fact 
that Jones was the source of his choice rather than Black is not a causal detail that we can 
consider to be independent from the action he performs. We are not talking about one 
and the same action being brought about by two different causes in alternative situations: 
either Jones or Black. We are talking about one action (the one performed by Jones on his 
own) versus one sub-actional behavior (him performing apparently the same behavior 
because of Black’s intervention).  
In the actual sequence, Jones exhibits a certain sign at t1 that informs Black that he has 
somehow set himself on a path that leads to A. In the alternative sequence, he exhibits a 
different sign at t1 but the story is prevented from unfolding as it normally would because 
of the counterfactual intervener. Even though at t2 and t3 the two sequences seem to be 
identical, their history is different in what concerns an aspect that is essential to their very 
nature.   
                                                          
378 Fischer, J.M. (2011), pp.260-261. 
379 See the presentation of these two types of control in section 2.4. of the present dissertation. 
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Margery Bedford Naylor380 uses the example of a child who tells the truth on her own, 
instead of having to be forced to do so. Does she not deserve some praise for her action? 
Of course she does. Even though, given the circumstances, she might lack the alternative 
of not telling the truth (and she might even know that, contrary to Jones), she does choose 
to tell it voluntarily381 and this fact is essential to her praiseworthiness. Therefore, Naylor 
argues, the child (just like Jones) is responsible for telling the truth on her own, despite 
not being responsible for telling the truth tout court382. Kane disagrees with Naylor’s 
response to Frankfurt and asks: 
“[I]f Black does not intervene, how can Jones be responsible for doing A-on-his-own and 
yet not be responsible for doing A itself? That makes no sense. If someone is responsible 
for voting for the presidential candidate on his own, then he or she is responsible for 
voting for the presidential candidate.”383 
One must agree with Kane’s objection if one is to assume an event-causal account of 
action. According to this view, the identity of an action is independent from its causes and 
the fact that, in the alternative sequence, Black is the cause of Jones’ overt behavior does 
not render that behavior any different from Jones’ autonomously caused action in the 
actual sequence. 
On the contrary, according to an agent-causal perspective such as my own, the event 
caused by Black is not identical to the event caused by Jones. In order to better show this, 
let me use a two stage argument.  
Imagine I lived in a corrupt country in which elections were tricked in such a way that my 
vote would always be electronically changed for a vote for a certain presidential 
candidate. In this scenario, I might not have the possibility not to officially vote for that 
candidate but, if I deliberately chose to do it, I would still be responsible for making that 
                                                          
380 Naylor, M.B. (1984), pp. 250-251.  
381Voluntarily, according to Naylor’s terminology, is to be distinguished from freely, which implies 
the power not to do the action altogether. 
382 Like Franfurt and most authors discussing the Frankfurt-style cases, Naylor leaves the concept 
of Moral Responsibility unanalyzed. 
383 Kane, R. (2005), p.85.  
FREE WILL AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
 188 
choice of my own free will and acting accordingly. If we consider the overall history of the 
two events (voting for the candidate because I chose to, or voting for him because a 
machine changed my vote), we can easily see that one is an action that regards only me 
as an agent, whereas the other is a more complex process that involved the electronic 
device that ignored my voting intention and changed the course of events. The two events 
can hardly be considered identical. 
Now, let us imagine a scenario in which the corruption process was somehow transferred 
to my head (like in a Frankfurt case), so that a device would alter my intention if I were 
about to decide to vote for a different candidate. If I decided to vote for the corrupt 
candidate without the machine having to intervene, I would be responsible for voting for 
him on my own, since I did it voluntarily, instead of having to have my voting intention 
shifted. And we can now see that, if we consider the overall history of the decision process 
(the connection between the overt behavior, the agent’s motivations and, most 
importantly, the agential intervention) to be definitory of the action, then we are before 
two very robust alternatives: either acting or failing to act. Like in Jones’ case, the “garden 
of forking paths” that Kane usually imagines to be lying in front of the libertarian agent384, 
is actually lying behind me at the moment of my decision to vote. I can vote (behavior) 
because of the device or I can vote (action) on my own. These are two alternative 
pathways that lead both to what only apparently seems to be one only possible future. 
The unicity of this future is illusory since only in one of these cases am I truly performing 
an action. Therefore, Frankfurt’s case for the irrelevance of AP for responsibility 
ascriptions has not been made. 
Let us now see how this view is different from that of Fischer and Naylor’s. Fischer’s 
argument against the flicker of freedom theorists (among whom he places Naylor) is that 
the alternative possibilities they are attributing to Jones are not robust enough to account 
for his responsibility. I claim they are, since Jones’ alternative of not acting at all is as 
robust as can be. Instead, Naylor’s point is that, strictly speaking, Jones is not responsible 
for his action, contrary to what both Frankfurt and Fischer take for granted. Since PAP is 
                                                          
384Idem, p. 7. 
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not to be questioned on her view, the fact that Jones lacks alternative possibilities on what 
concerns the action itself takes away his responsibility for it. He is only responsible for 
what he has a choice about, namely, acting-on-his-own. However, contrary to Naylor, I 
consider that Jones is actually responsible for his action, via the responsibility he has for 
doing it on his own. If voting on my own and voting because of the activation of a Frankfurt 
device are to be considered fundamentally two different events (a proper action and a 
mere non-actional behavior), then the event that actually takes place in the world is one 
for which I am either responsible or not. Likewise, Jones is either responsible for the action 
he performs (when he does A on his own) or he is not responsible for his behavior (when 
he does A because of Black).385 
But what about Fischer’s accusation that flicker theorists are mixing up “possibility” and 
“ability”? If Jones’ alternative is not acting altogether, then how can we consider him to 
be able to do otherwise? We can a posteriori say that he acted on his own in the sense 
that he was motivated by his reasons rather than moved by Black’s discrete intervention, 
but that does not imply that he is a libertarian agent - it does not imply that, at t1, he could 
have regulative control over what he was doing.  
Despite its ingenuity, Fischer’s objection is missing a very important qualification of the 
libertarian requirement for alternative possibilities. This requirement is not temporally 
limited to the moment of the decision or the action. If, in the past, the agent had the 
possibility (and the ability) to freely choose the path that led to his presently exhibiting 
the prior sign he did, then we can consider him to be responsible in the libertarian sense. 
In his libertarian theory, Robert Kane repeatedly stresses the fact that the condition of 
Alternative Possibilities cannot be separated from what he calls the condition of Ultimate 
Responsibility386, which has to do with how we acquire the motivations we have and 
                                                          
385 Other authors have pursued strategies that, in a way similar to mine, stress that the Frankfurt-
agent has the power to be the author of his action or not: Michael McKenna (1997), Keith Wyma 
(1997) and Michael Otsuka (1998), to all of whom Fischer replies in (2011).  
386 “(UR) An agent is ultimately responsible for some (event or state) E’s occurring only if (R) the 
agent is personally responsible for E’s occurring in a sense which entails that something the agent 
voluntarily (or willingly) did or omitted either was, or causally contributed to, E’s occurrence and 
made a difference to whether or not E occurred; and (U) for every X and Y (where X and Y 
represent occurrences of events and/or states) if the agent is personally responsible for X and if Y 
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become the kind of persons we are. When Dennett presents his well-known Luther 
example (in which he argues that Martin Luther was obviously claiming to be responsible 
when he proclaimed Hier stehe ich, ich kann nicht anders - “Here I stand, I can do no 
other”), in order to show that responsibility does not require the ability to do otherwise, 
he is ignoring what Aristotle had already made clear: that if a man is responsible for his 
character, then he is also responsible for the actions that outflow from it387. That is why 
Luther can be considered a libertarian agent even though, at the moment of his famous 
statement, he was probably really unable to act differently. The inner struggle during 
which he self-formed his character in several difficult decisions was what led him to that 
circumstance and anchored his present freedom. 
Likewise, Jones’ ultimate responsibility depends on the past choices which, having been 
made under normal circumstances – as opposed to the highly unlikely Frankfurt-style case 
– made it so that he would present the prior sign A rather than the prior sign B, thus 
determining Black’s intervention, or lack thereof. 
Laura Ekstrom also chooses this way of responding to Fischer’s attack on flicker strategies 
(which she nevertheless criticizes for different reasons): 
“[T]he strongest incompatibilist view concerning responsibility and determinism does not 
rest its case upon the ‘robustness’ of alternative actions available to the agent at the time 
of acting, but rather upon the requirement for moral responsibility of an 
indeterministically generated self.”388 
This means that, even if the last moment in which Jones is given the opportunity to act (or 
merely behave) differently just provides him with a flicker of freedom – an involuntary 
neuronal pattern or facial twitch over which he can hardly be said to have control –, he 
can nonetheless be considered to be responsible in a libertarian sense if, in the past, 
                                                          
is an arche (sufficient condition, cause or motive) for X, then the agent must also be personally 
responsible for Y.” [Kane, R. (1998), p.35]. 
387 Cf. Sorabji on Aristotle’s views about necessity, cause and blame [Sorabji, R. (1980)]. 
388 Ekstrom, L.W. (2000), p.190. 
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indeterminism allowed him to make choices that were relevant for his present day 
tendencies and preferences389.  
But is the libertarian not presupposing indeterminism as a precondition for the safeguard 
of Jones’ alternative possibilities of action, despite Black’s presence? There is a whole line 
of argument, which came to be known as the “dilemma defense”, that is centered 
precisely on how the Frankfurt cases are to be interpreted under the assumptions of 
determinism or indeterminism. This is what I will discuss in the next subsection. 
 
5.2.2.2. The dilemma defense 
 
The challenge that was put forward independently by Widerker, Kane, Ginet and Wyma390 
is this: either the Frankfurt cases assume a deterministic link between the prior sign and 
Jones’ decision or they do not. If they do, then they will not be accepted by the 
incompatibilist as counter-examples against PAP, since she will consider Jones as lacking 
moral responsibility under determinism.  If they do not, then they will not work, because 
if the causal link is indeterministic, the passage from the prior sign at t1 and the decision 
at t2 cannot be assured and then there may still be alternative possibilities391. Black will 
not be able to know Jones’ decision in advance (and to say, as Frankfurt does, that “Black 
is an excellent judge of such things” is not enough to make this a coherent hypothesis). 
When he does learn it, it will already be too late for him to intervene in such a way as to 
prevent Jones from having AP, whereas if he steps in too early, the choice will be 
                                                          
389 Cf. section 2.2. for the distinction between spontaneous actions (routine behaviors which can 
nevertheless be considered actions insofar as they are based on standing intentions and are 
reasons-responsive) and actions-on-the-spot (in which the agent makes fast conscious decisions). 
As I explained then, even though in the former type of actions the agent is not consciously 
intervening, her behavior is nevertheless expressive of conscious decisions made in the past. We 
may consider that Jones’ case, in spite of Black’s early intervention which prevents the natural 
development of an autonomous decision, is similar to a spontaneous action. 
390 David Widerker (1995), Robert Kane (1998), Carl Ginet (1996) and Keith Wyma (1997). 
391 This objection is partially what Frankfurt was aiming at in footnote 3, but he does not make it 
clear how the presence of a guaranteed marker for Jones’ decision can avoid the charge of 
determinism. 
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determined by him, taking away Jones’ responsibility. Basically, in an indeterministic 
world, there is no reliable prior sign. If you are a compatibilist, these examples might 
convince you, but if you are not, they just do not make sense. 
The deterministic horn of the dilemma is usually considered to be a dead end for the 
Frankfurtian. Fischer, however, tried to respond to it by questioning the idea that Jones’ 
possible lack of responsibility depends on his lack of AP. According to Fischer, since all the 
causes of Jones’ behavior remain the same if we subtract Black, and “Jones’ moral 
responsibility would seem to be supervenient on what has an influence or impact on him 
in some way”392, then his accountability (or lack thereof) cannot depend on the fact that 
he cannot act otherwise. Thus, the presence of alternative possibilities appears to be 
irrelevant to ascriptions of moral responsibility. Once this becomes clear, the question 
that needs to be asked is whether determinism itself threatens moral responsibility apart 
from ruling out AP – a question which he answers negatively.  
I do not follow Fischer in this two-step argument, though, because I do not agree that the 
way in which Black takes away Jones’ alternative possibilities is analogous to the way in 
which determinism does. Black’s presence removes the alternative sequence from the 
metaphysical space of logical possibilities without changing the actual sequence, whereas 
determinism’s effect is much more radical. It makes it so that laws of nature predetermine 
what Jones’ motivations will yield. They somehow “push him”393 into the only possible 
future in such a way that, as we have seen in chapter three, even his ability to agent-cause 
his actions becomes impossible. If the unfolding of the world’s history is entirely 
dependent on the past and the laws of nature, then there is nothing left for the agent to 
choose, nothing he can ultimately be the author of. Of course, these considerations can 
be questioned by compatibilists, but I believe the controversy they disclose is sufficient 
for us to be suspicious of Fischer’s premises and to refuse to accept them as 
uncontentious in the context of this debate.  
                                                          
392 Fischer, J.M. (1999), p.100. 
393 Laura Ekstrom (2000) often uses this expression when speaking about determinism. 
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The indeterministic horn of the dilemma, which is considered to be the most promising 
one for vindicating the examples’ efficacy, has been given several replies, most of them 
as reformulations of the cases in such a way as to conceive an indeterministic causal 
sequence without AP and, sometimes, as to remove the prior sign altogether. I will briefly 
consider three approaches that I do not believe are capable of achieving this purpose, and 
finally I will assess Pereboom’s case, which I also do not find convincing but that I think 
represents a deeper challenge for Frankfurt critics.  
Alfred Mele and David Robb394 have suggested the following strategy: there are two 
parallel sequences that operate simultaneously in Bob’s brain, an indeterministic 
deliberative one that can lead to the desired outcome or not, and an unconscious 
deterministic one (that was set up by Black, the alien intervener) which functions as a 
backup plan. The deterministic sequence will bring about the action that Black wants Bob 
to perform, and preempt the causal efficacy of the indeterministic sequence, only in case 
Bob does not indeterministically decide on his own to do it. 
This is an ingenious example but I believe it is actually contradictory. If the deterministic 
sequence is in place, how can we still claim that the link between the previous sign and 
the action is indeterministic? Bob’s decision will be deterministically blocked were it to be 
different from what has been established, so I think the nature of Bob’s deliberative 
process has actually been altered!  
Mele and Robb have intentionally left a non-robust open alternative to Bob: he can still 
involuntarily become distracted and stop deciding, in which case the deterministic 
sequence will not be activated. Some have said that this would just be a “flicker or 
freedom” to which both the objections and replies presented in the last section would 
apply. But I actually think this is a very different situation, since the alternative would lead 
to a distinct action altogether (not deciding at all). However, the problem raised above 
still applies: although the agent can decide to A or not decide at all, he cannot decide 
differently. Is he still responsible for his decision? No, he is responsible for having made a 
                                                          
394 Mele, A., Robb, D. (1998). 
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decision, and not for the concrete decision he made. The lack of AP has not been proven 
to be dispensable for the attribution of responsibility.  
David Hunt395 suggested another “blockage case” without a prior sign. In his example, he 
transforms the counterfactual agent into an actual one who directly intervenes in the 
agent’s brain processes, by physically “blocking” all neural paths besides the one selected. 
By hypothesis, the remaining brain process is still indeterministic, although no other 
pathway can be activated. One might wonder, however, and similarly to the question 
raised above about Mele and Robb’s case, how can the only remaining possibility be 
considered to be nondeterministic, if there is such a predetermination396 of which neural 
path will be activated in the agent’s brain. Pereboom asks: 
“Could neural events bump against, so to speak, the blockage? If so, there still may be 
alternative possibilities for the agent. But if not, it might seem (…) that the neural events 
are causally determined partly in virtue of the blockage.”397 
I think such a determined indeterminism is just a plainly incoherent notion, so I will turn 
directly to Eleonore Stump’s proposal398, which seems more promising. In order to 
develop her argument, she assumes an identity theory according to which a mental event 
is identical to the completion of a series of neural firings. If the neural sequence is 
interrupted halfway, it will acquire no meaning at all at the mental level and so there will 
be no choice or decision. If we assume the neural sequence to be indeterministic, then 
we can interpret Black’s intervention in Frankfurt cases as the prevention of there being 
any decision whatsoever. There would be no mental act in Jones’ mind. 
This is a very interesting argument, I believe, for it relies on the empirical fact that the 
mental-physical relation is a one-to-many correlation, which in fact clears out some of the 
doubts that these examples sometimes raise. But I do not see how this can help the 
compatibilist case. If neural events are caused indeterministically and Black interrupts a 
                                                          
395 Hunt, D. (2000). 
396 Kane refers to Hunt’s example as a case of predetermination or even predestination in (2005). 
397 Pereboom, D. (2002), p.116.  
398 Stump, E. (1996, 1999). 
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sequence that had already started at the physical level, then Jones had already exercised 
his power to choose. The fact that, at the mental level, Jones cannot consciously begin to 
make a choice (for the mental event we call a choice does not happen if the neural 
sequence on which it supervenes does not come to completion) is metaphysically 
irrelevant at this point. The libertarian might endorse an identity theory of the mind-brain 
relation and not be committed to the thesis that a free action has to be made consciously. 
What matters in this case, is that some events involving Jones, as a psychophysical system, 
lead to the neural sign that triggered Black’s failing to intervene – but might have led to 
some different event that would have made him enter the scene instead.    
For a thesis such as mine, according to which the agent’s conscious self is the one who 
authors the free decision, the response to Stump’s case is less straightforward. 
Consciousness has a natural supervenience relationship with the brain. However, if the 
conscious self is an emergent entity, it is endowed with non-derivative causal powers 
whereby she can downwardly influence neural events. That influence takes place in time: 
the conscious self at t1 causes certain indeterministic neural events at t2. Let us take the 
event at t2 to be the one that Black prevents from unfolding. Now remember that there is 
no immediate conscious state at t2, since there must be a complete sequence of neural 
events for any conscious mental state to emerge, which in this example we take to be the 
sequence of events happening from time t2 to time t3 at the neural level. This means that 
at time t2 the agent has no consciousness of having made a decision. However, at t1 the 
agent’s conscious self had already been the cause of the initiation of the neural sequence 
at t2. Even though no decision was made, there was a causing that Black did not prevent. 
And if we were to push back his intervention to time t1, then the agent-causal libertarian 
may simply go further back and say that at time t0 there was a downward causal process 
whereby a previous influence of the self on its neural substrate led to the neural state the 
agent is in at t1. Ultimately, Stump cannot develop her reasoning without falling prey to 
an infinite regress. 
The last indeterministic Frankfurt-type case I would like to assess is Derk Pereboom’s. It 
concerns Joe, a libertarian agent who is considering whether or not to claim an illegal tax 
deduction.  
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“Crucially, his psychology is such that the only way that in this situation he could fail to 
choose to evade taxes is for moral reasons. (…) In fact, it is causally necessary for his 
failing to choose to evade taxes in this situation that a moral reason occur to him with a 
certain force. A moral reason can occur to him with that force either involuntarily or as a 
result of his voluntary activity (…). However, a moral reason occurring to him with such 
force is not causally sufficient for his failing to choose to evade taxes. If a moral reason 
were to occur to him with that force, Joe could, with his libertarian free will, either choose 
to act on it or refrain from doing so (without the intervener’s device in place). But to 
ensure that he choose to evade taxes, a neuroscientist now implants a device which, 
were it to sense a moral reason occurring with the specified force, would electronically 
stimulate his brain so that he would choose to evade taxes. In actual fact, no moral reason 
occurs to him with such force, and he chooses to evade taxes while the device remains 
idle.”399 
After presenting the case and highlighting its merits, Pereboom explains that the 
nonoccurrence of a reason does not ensure Joe’s tax evasion, since it is always possible 
that a reason will still occur to him. The future is always open until the intervener comes 
into play, but he will not, not until a moral reason occurs to Joe. 
Notice that this case is able to avoid the accusations of incoherence of some of the 
previous ones, for the indeterministic nature of both the actual sequence and the 
alternative one (the one in which the intervention takes place) seems to be assured. 
Neither the occurrence of a moral reason is sufficient for Joe to decide not to evade taxes, 
nor does the nonoccurrence entail the opposite decision. Because of this, Pereboom’s 
case purports to have succeeded in creating a third alternative to Widerker et al.’s 
dilemma: one in which the agent’s decision is inevitable given the prior sign, but not 
because of the deterministic nature of the situation. So, if the counterfactual intervention 
is not triggered by any prior sign, the agent is responsible and he could not have acted 
otherwise. The fact that the prior sign is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
action is what, according to Pereboom, makes his case work. 
                                                          
399 Pereboom, D. (2002), pp. 118-9. 
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It is interesting that Pereboom leaves the voluntary versus involuntary nature of the prior 
sign (the occurrence of a moral reason) unsettled. Let us flesh out these two hypotheses. 
If the occurrence of a moral reason is voluntary, I believe the case fails, for that could 
already be considered to be a robust option onto which to anchor Joe’s responsibility, 
prior to the neuroscientist’s possible intervention. It is true that, given the occurrence of 
the moral reason, the decision might still have been different, but responsibility for an 
action does not depend on the certainty of success of the voluntary steps that lead to that 
action. So Joe is responsible plus (and the libertarian could say because) he has AP. 
On the other hand, if the occurrence of the moral reason is just a random event, Joe’s 
responsibility will depend only on the step that follows this event. However, according to 
the case’s description, if a moral reason does not occur to him, provided no one 
intervenes, Joe will decide to evade taxes.  This means that his inclination to evading taxes 
is sufficient to ensure that, in that situation, he does. Joe cannot act otherwise, under 
those circumstances. Now note that the random possibility that a moral reason might still 
come to his mind does not constitute an alternative possible action, but just the physical 
possibility, given causal indeterminism, that the circumstances might be different. This is 
definitely not what a libertarian is after. And besides, at the moment of decision, this is 
not a possibility any more. And if, alternatively, a moral reason did occur to him 
involuntarily, the device would be triggered and his action would be coerced. 
Hence, my main response to this very ingenious example is that I do not believe it to be 
describing a libertarian agent in the first place – even though Pereboom explicitly qualifies 
Joe as such. He says: “If a moral reason were to occur to him with that force, Joe could, 
with his libertarian free will, either choose to act on it or refrain from doing so” (emphasis 
added). But if that happened, then the neuroscientist would intervene, which would 
prevent Joe’s libertarian free will from being exercised. What makes Joe responsible is his 
free will, and what makes his choice free is his power to act differently in the same 
circumstances. Could he retain this power in spite of the neuroscientist’s presence? No, 
he could not, since, at the moment of decision: 
a) if a moral reason has not yet occurred to him, he does not have this power in the 
first place 
FREE WILL AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
 198 
b) if a moral decision has occurred to him, then the counterfactual intervener will 
have compelled him to evade taxes, taking away his freedom. 
I think we can now move towards a conclusion. The dilemma defense put forward by 
Kane, Widerker and others constitutes a powerful objection against the Frankfurt cases’ 
coherence. Their dependence on a prior sign that can be a reliable marker for the alien 
intervention without simultaneously determining (or being a symptom of the previous 
determination of) the agent’s decision makes them susceptible to criticism, for that is not 
an easy hypothesis to make sense of. I believe the several reformulations of Frankfurt 
cases that were presented as a response to this problem, albeit extremely ingenious, 
either fall prey to the same objections as the original one, or to new ones. Therefore, I 
contend that they do not manage to prove that the libertarian idea that alternative 
possibilities are required for free will and responsibility should be called into question. 
 
5.2.2.3. The irrelevance of Frankfurt cases for agent-causalism 
 
There is one more brief point I need to make before we turn to the manipulation 
arguments that have been actively presented as an objection against compatibilism. The 
point is this: the arguments revolving around Frankfurt-type cases, despite their 
enormous importance in the philosophical debate on free will over the last fifty years, are 
ultimately irrelevant for an agent-causal thesis such as mine.  
I believe Frankfurt-type cases do not succeed in proving the falsity of the Principle of 
Alternative Possibilities and I have tried to show why that is so. However, even if they did 
succeed, that would not have been a problem for my account, as the main argument I 
have for defending libertarianism is that indeterminism is necessary for the agent’s 
irreducible self to have downward causal effects over her bodily movements. Given the 
assumption of natural supervenience, if determinism were true of the world, every 
physical event would be fixed by the past and the laws of nature, and there would be 
nothing left for the emergent self to cause. Therefore, even if moral responsibility (and 
thus free will) did not require the metaphysical condition of alternative possibilities, 
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agency would still require it, for different reasons. Agent-causalism would nevertheless 
have to side with incompatibilism.  
 
5.2.3.  Manipulation arguments  
 
Usually compatibilists and other critics complain that libertarianism is a very “expensive” 
philosophical position. It entails several empirical commitments such as indeterminism or, 
in my case, an irreducible self, which are open to the accusation of being implausible.  
However, some recent thought experiments have been designed to show that 
compatibilism comes at a high price as well. This means both that committed 
compatibilists have to be aware of what their position implies (and see if they are 
prepared to accept it) and that agnostics have to think better when weighing up 
alternative accounts regarding free will.  
These thought experiments typically describe a multiple-case scenario in which one or 
more manipulation cases are shown to be different from an ordinary deterministic case 
in ways that are not relevant to responsibility ascriptions. The characters which are judged 
to be unfree and not morally responsible in the former cases, should therefore be judged 
in the same way in the latter. 
Pereboom was the first to present this sort of multiple-case argument in 1995. His main 
character, Mr. Green (who later became Professor Plum400), decides to kill Ms. Peacock 
(later called White) for egoistic reasons, and in doing so meets all main compatibilist 
requirements for moral responsibility: 
 his act “is caused by desires that flow from his ‘durable and constant’ character”, 
though they are not irresistible (Hume); 
 his first-order desire to kill Ms. Peacock conforms to his second-order desires “in 
the sense that he wills to murder her and wants to will to do so” (Frankfurt); 
                                                          
400 Cf. Pereboom, D. (2007). 
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 he is “reasons-responsive” in the sense that his desires are modified by rational 
considerations (Fischer and Ravizza) 
 he retains the capacity “to grasp, apply and regulate his behavior by moral 
reasons”401 (Wallace), even though in the present situation his egoistic reasons are 
stronger. 
By listing all these non-mutually-exclusive properties, Pereboom wants to make sure that 
Green possesses the agential powers that compatibilists claim to be sufficient for moral 
responsibility (which, on their view, would entail free will). Then he proceeds to describe 
the four scenarios in which his character decides to kill Ms. Peacock. 
In the first case, Green is locally manipulated by neuroscientists who can produce his 
reasons by radio waves. His reasoning process is what brings about his decision, but that 
process is externally controlled by the neuroscientists. 
Since many compatibilists might object that Green’s obvious lack of responsibility in this 
case is due to his being directly manipulated, Pereboom moves on to a second case. Now 
Green is a regularly functioning person who was created and programmed by 
neuroscientists in such a way as to weigh reasons for action exactly as he does. His 
reasons-responsive process that is active right now was therefore causally determined to 
take place in circumstances such as these. 
It seems unprincipled, Pereboom says, to retain the second Mr. Green morally responsible 
for killing Ms. Peacock, just because the time lag between his programming and the action 
is longer than in the first case scenario. The difference between the two scenarios is not 
sufficient (as it seems irrelevant) to account for any difference in responsibility 
attributions, for what makes us judge the first Mr. Green as non-responsible is most 
probably the causal determination of his action by factors beyond his control, and this is 
equally present in the second case. 
In the third scenario, Mr. Green becomes even more similar to an ordinary person under 
determinism: there are no invasive neuroscientists in the story. Instead, his character and 
                                                          
401 All the foregoing quotes are from Pereboom, D. (2007), p. 94. 
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reasoning principles were determined at a very early age “by the rigorous training 
practices of his home and community” aimed at making him a “rational egoist” 402. 
In case 3, just like in cases 1 and 2, Mr. Green fulfills all the pre-requisites of a compatibilist 
responsible agent. So whatever might make one judge this third version of him as 
responsible, while judging the others differently, would have to rely on something other 
than these conditions. What could it be? Again, Pereboom argues that causal 
determination by factors beyond the agent control is what explains Green’s lack of 
responsibility in the second case and, forcefully, in the third one as well.  
What happens when we move on to the ordinary scenario? In it, “physicalist determinism 
is true”403 and Green is just a rationally egoistic normal human being. The main difference 
between this case and the other three is that now the causal determination of Green’s 
behavior is not brought about by other agents. But if we were to reformulate the first 
cases, in such a way that the generation of Green’s reasons would not be induced by 
neuroscientists or other agents, but by a spontaneously created machine, unconscious 
and unpurposive, our intuition about his lack of responsibility would likely persist. 
Pereboom’s conclusion is that Green’s exemption from responsibility in the first case, 
which is grounded in the fact that his action results from a deterministic causal process 
that traces back to factors beyond his control, generalizes to normal cases in a 
deterministic universe. 
Pereboom’s strategy is clever: by making it clear that these four cases are similar in what 
concerns aspects that are most relevant for responsibility attributions (which makes it so 
that this series of cases is not a sorites), he strongly pushes agnostics into choosing the 
incompatibilist view according to which causal determinism is responsibility-undermining. 
At the same time, he forces compatibilists into accepting that if the agent in the fourth 
scenario is to be considered responsible, then so should his other counterparts. This 
implies that compatibilism brings with it the heavy load of attributing responsibility to 
manipulated agents, which seems to contradict our most basic intuitions.  
                                                          
402 Pereboom, D. (1995), p.24. 
403 Idem, p.25. 
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Michael McKenna, a renowned compatibilist, welcomes this move and argues that we 
should, in fact, foreground our intuitions about normal scenarios over those that the 
manipulation cases suggest: 
“The compatibilist should fix, not upon hidden causes, but upon the sorts of agential 
properties that typically serve as a basis for ascribing responsibility. Once it is established 
that actions issuing from a (possibly) naturally determined agent invite certain sorts of 
evaluations in terms of responsibility, one can then hold that actions issuing from an 
appropriately manipulated agent should be evaluated no differently.”404  
So McKenna’s “hard-line reply”405 to the manipulation argument is, basically, that if 
compatibilism implies that a manipulated agent must be judged as responsible, so be it! 
The conclusion to which these examples point varies, he says, according to the elements 
to which one draws greater attention, when assessing the four cases: agential properties 
versus the hidden causes of action. If we focus on the former, we will move from the 
attribution of moral responsibility in the fourth case to its attribution in the previous case, 
all the way down to the first one. Alternatively, if we focus on the latter, we will move in 
the opposite sense, as Pereboom intended us to. So we are before a stalemate which adds 
little to the debate406. 
However, as we saw at the outset, Pereboom was careful enough to flesh out the details 
of Green’s agential properties. What the incompatibilist recommends, he says, is that we 
draw equal attention to them and to the hidden causes made salient by these examples. 
What these cases purport to show is precisely that the compatibilist conditions are 
necessary but insufficient to ensure the agent’s responsibility: the absence of causal 
determination by factors beyond her control is also necessary. 
                                                          
404 McKenna, M. (2005), cit. in Pereboom, D. (2005), p.241. 
405 McKenna calls the type of counterarguments that question the idea that a manipulated person 
is not morally responsible for her action “hard-line replies”, as opposed to the “soft-line replies” 
that question the premise that manipulation cases are no different in any relevant respect from 
normal cases of agency under causal determinism [cf. McKenna, M. (2008)]. 
406 This is also Fischer’s position in (2011). 
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I believe McKenna is actually ignoring the disturbing consequences of accepting the 
validity of this argument. If compatibilism implies that an agent such as Mr. Green in the 
first or second scenarios is morally responsible for what he does, does this not mean that 
this position loses any credit as a serious and plausible view on free will? A recent 
experimental philosophy study conducted by Eddy Nahmias and colleagues407 has shown 
that the presence of actual manipulation is crucial for judgements about the lack of free 
will. Subjects in this study were presented with two scenarios: both described a future 
reality in which technological developments have reached the point where 
neuroscientists can predict with 100% accuracy the full behavior, decisions and actions of 
an agent, Jill, who accepts to wear a brain scanning device for a month. However, while in 
one scenario, “the neuroscientists cannot do anything to change brain activity and hence 
they cannot directly influence thoughts and actions”, in the other they “can even use this 
technology to alter a person’s decision by altering the person’s brain activity without the 
person being aware of it”408. The subject is the same in both scenarios, thus her “agential 
properties” do not change. What changes is the fact that she is the sole cause of her 
actions in one case, while her brain activity is altered by an external agent in the other. 
The results of the experiments were clear: 91,7% of the subjects did not perceive the 
possibility of prediction as threatening to free will in concrete decisions (e.g. voting for a 
presidential candidate) in the “Cannot Manipulate” scenario, while 88,1% retained that 
Jill lacked free will whenever her actions were manipulated in the “Can Manipulate” 
scenario409. To deny this common intuition is to underestimate the importance people 
give to the role of the manipulator.  
Nevertheless, time and again scientific knowledge and philosophical reasoning have 
challenged folk intuitions, which offer no guarantee of truth and are very often 
contradictory. McKenna’s strategy is precisely to show that the incompatibilist intuitive 
                                                          
407 Cf. Nahmias, E., Shepard, J., Reuter, S. (2014). 
408 These quotes are part of the text the subjects of the experiments were presented with.  
409 In the study, there are three different experimental scenarios (each with the “Cannot 
Manipulate”/”Can Manipulate” variation). In all three the results confirm the hypothesis, but the 
values I refer to in the text are those of experiment 1, as reported in table 3 [Nahmias, E., Shepard, 
J., Reuter, S. (2014), p.511]. 
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reaction to Pereboom’s case 1, in which Green is directly manipulated by neuroscientists, 
is unfounded.  
In fact, folk intuitions would count for nothing if, upon reflection, we should find the 
manipulator’s intervention to be innocuous, as McKenna claims it is: 
“The compatibilist needs to make clear that once the manipulation is so qualified that 
all an agent’s current time-slice compatibilist-friendly structures are properly installed 
through a process of manipulation, then the role of the manipulator begins to shrink 
into the background”410. 
McKenna rightly notes that manipulation cases are non-starters if the “compatibilist-
friendly agential structure” is not in place in the first scenario (the one on which the whole 
argument depends). Pereboom’s four-case argument, however, has the merit of assuring 
that it is, especially if one interprets the moment-to-moment intervention of the 
neuroscientists’ radio waves as not being too invasive (in McKenna’s words, for 
Pereboom’s argument to work, the manipulation in the first case must be a sort of “causal 
prosthetic”411). The team of neuroscientist must intervene in such a way as not to preempt 
Green’s agency: 
“[Green] must have an internally coherent and properly causally integrated mental life. 
His memories about past considerations must be able to inform and causally influence 
his current deliberations. And he must be causally linked to the external world in the 
proper way. If a bus is careening along out of control ready to hop up on the sidewalk 
and crush him, he is able to respond to those facts and leap from danger, and so on.”412 
I agree that a more invasive interpretation would prevent the argument from being 
effective, insofar as compatibilists would not accept the premise that there are no 
relevant differences between the cases. However, I disagree that a causal prosthetic is not 
responsibility undermining. Even if the agent retains her agential properties, she cannot 
use them autonomously whenever they are hijacked by the manipulator. Green’s 
                                                          
410 McKenna, M. (2005), cit. in Pereboom, D. (2005), p.241. 
411 McKenna, M. (2008), p.150. 
412 Idem, p.149. 
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escaping from a bus is an action of his, but killing Ms. Peacock is not. Hence, he is 
responsible for the former but not for the latter.  
According to Pereboom’s description of case 1, the neuroscientist’s intervention takes 
place “before [Green] begins to reason about his situation, thereby causing his reasoning 
process to be rationally egoistic”413. His first-order desires conform to his second-order 
desires because his process of reasoning “by which his desires are modified and 
produced” is “directly manipulated”414. All this is made in such a way that his decision is 
not compulsory, it fits his character, etc. But insofar as it is caused by a prosthetic 
reasoning from the start, Green cannot be considered himself to have brought it about. 
He was just the pawn in the game.  
Therefore, even if the agent’s mental structures are in place, the fact that their content is 
not autonomously formed but rather put into her by some other agent entails that she is 
not in control of her present decision nor of its future consequences any more. The burden 
of proof is still on compatibilists to show that all four cases Pereboom described are cases 
of free and responsible action, rather than four cases in which free will is lacking. 
A similar manipulation case was put forward by Alfred Mele415. Mele’s goal, however, was 
to use his manipulation argument in order to show how determinism is irrelevant for free 
will. His case is the following. Diana, a supremely intelligent being, creates Fred because 
she wants him to do something which, given what she knows about the state and laws of 
the universe and the desires and values she implants him with, he will not possibly fail to 
do a year later. He will decide to do it on the basis of rational deliberation (he is an 
autonomous agent, according to Mele’s own defined conditions for autonomous agency), 
but that process of decision production had been foreseen and intended by Diana when 
she created him. If the universe is deterministic, even though he could (in a compatibilist 
sense of ‘could’) change his values, desires and decisions, “there is no chance that he 
will”416. Mele’s point with this example is much similar to what McKenna objected to 
                                                          
413 Pereboom, D. (1995), p.23. 
414 Ibidem. 
415 Mele, A. (1995, 2006). 
416 Mele, A. (2006), p.185. 
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Pereboom: the fact that Fred was created as he was with the purpose of fulfilling Diana’s 
wishes does not change the nature of his autonomy, which is grounded in personal 
characteristics of his, such as self-control, his capacity for informed deliberation and the 
lack of compelled motivational states. 
But surprisingly for Mele, the compatibilist Tomis Kapitan countered (in a much typically 
incompatibilist way) that Fred’s case might actually be used to falsify Mele’s own 
conditions for free action, for Diana endowed him with pro-attitudes which will 
deliberately cause him to act in a certain way under certain circumstances, “in much the 
same way that designers of robots program the responses of their machines to various 
stimuli”417. Given this consideration, Mele asks what might justify the fact that Norm, 
another character who is just like Fred albeit having been born naturally, is judged by 
compatibilists to act freely in a deterministic world, except for historical factors which a 
traditional compatibilism does not usually give much relevance to418.  
In order to avoid considerations based only on the argument that, on the basis of 
externalist theories of mental states, a fully grown instantaneously created and mentally 
developed Fred is simply impossible, Mele put forward a very interesting variation on the 
original case in his 2006 book, Free Will and Luck419. The new “zygote argument”, which 
has inspired many discussions lately, describes also a deterministic universe in which the 
powerful goddess Diana decides to create a person who will eventually do certain things 
that she wishes the person to do. However, in this case, she manages to mix up some 
atoms in the appropriate way so as to implant a zygote in a woman named Mary. Given 
Diana’s total knowledge about the state of the universe and natural laws, the zygote will 
successfully become Ernie, the person she intended to create, who will act in a certain 
way thirty years after his creation, just as planned. 
“Thirty years later, Ernie is a mentally healthy, ideally self-controlled person who 
regularly exercises his powers of self-control and has no relevant compelled or coercively 
                                                          
417 Kapitan, T. (2000), ”Autonomy and Manipulated Freedom”, cit. in Mele, A. (2006), p.187. 
418 Note that Mele believes compatibilists should opt for a quite history-sensitive approach to 
moral responsibility [cf. Mele, A. (2013)]. 
419 Mele, A. (2006), p.188. 
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produced attitudes. Furthermore, his beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation 
about all matters that concern him, and he is a reliable deliberator.”420  
What do our intuitions tell us regarding Ernie’s responsibility when he acts? Does 
Kapitan’s analogy with a robot apply to this case too? At this point, Mele presents us 
Bernie, who has exactly the same properties as Ernie. In his 2014 Dialogue on Free Will 
and Science, Mele even fleshes out the details better: Diana has written a novel with a 
character she now decided to make real; while in the first case scenario her total 
knowledge made her deduce that, in order to create Ernie, she had to mush some atoms 
together in a certain way as to produce his zygote ex novo, in the second case she realized 
that there was a naturally conceived baby named Bernie who was such that he would do 
all the things that her novel’s character did, which allowed her to sit back and relax, 
without having to actually intervene in the natural order of the world in order to create 
him421. 
If one assumes a compatibilist stance, then Bernie should undoubtedly be considered a 
free and responsible agent. But if Bernie is just like Ernie, both in what concerns his 
properties and abilities and the actions he will perform in the future, then why should the 
historical aspects of his creation make us judge him any differently?  
These considerations led Mele to present an incompatibilist argument that he believes 
can be more successful than Pereboom’s four-case argument, even though he will not 
embrace its conclusion, given that he is agnostic about the truth of its first premise: 
“1.  Because of the way his zygote was produced in his deterministic universe, Ernie is 
not a free agent and is not morally responsible for anything. 
2. Concerning free action and moral responsibility of the beings into whom the zygotes 
develop, there is no significant difference between the way Ernie’s zygote comes to 
exist and the way any normal human zygote comes to exist in a deterministic 
universe. 
                                                          
420 Ibidem. 
421 Mele, A. (2014a), pp.15-18. 
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3. So determinism precludes free action and moral responsibility.”422 
Some critics like McKenna or John Martin Fischer423 might simply deny premise one, while 
retaining premise two. Intuitions are crucial here: incompatibilists will tend to take the 
first premise to be true and compatibilists (pace Kapitan) will tend to consider it to be 
false. What should be assessed is whether their intuitions about this particular case can 
be defended without relying on their previous independent intuitions about the possibility 
of free agency in a deterministic world. 
I will try my best to defend the zygote argument without begging the question now. First, 
premise 1 states that the reason why Ernie is not free and responsible for his actions has 
to do with his having been created by Diana. I agree. If it were not for that fact, it would 
not be possible to assert his freedom and responsibility independently from compatibilist 
or incompatibilist considerations. Like in a case of compulsion or direct manipulation, 
determinism becomes close to irrelevant here and what primarily prevents the agent from 
being free are the specific contours of his case.  
Ernie’s creation was not casual, it was intended as a way to fulfill Diana’s plan regarding 
events that she wanted to make sure would happen. She had to put together his atoms 
into his DNA and all the parts of his cells in such a way that the resulting zygote would 
bring about the desired outputs. As the product of these ingredients and this “recipe”, 
Ernie is like an actor who has been given this role to play. When he reasons, decides and 
acts, he is just fulfilling a previously designed plan. Kapitan is right: this sounds exactly like 
a computer engineering process and the result is analogous to an adequately 
programmed science-fiction robot.  
What could a compatibilist argue the difference between Ernie and a future reasons-
responsive computer to be? By hypothesis, the difference cannot be the robot’s 
deliberative capacities, for the way in which I am using Kapitan’s analogy supposes a 
future computer to be able to reason just like a human person. But the compatibilist might 
just bite the bullet: well, if the robot reasons like a human person, it will be just as free, 
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for what endows an agent with free will and responsibility, on our view, are precisely her 
intrinsic capacities to decide on the basis of reasons. 
I believe the heavy price of defining free will only on the basis of intrinsic properties 
becomes very clear once we follow such a dialectic way of reasoning. For if a programmed 
robot is to be judged free and responsible, then it will probably become hard for many 
agnostics to accept the compatibilist premises that have led to this conclusion. The reason 
for my saying this is not the robot’s silicon constitution and deterministic functioning – as 
that may not be a problem for agnostics – but rather the fact that its responses to the 
stimuli are directly programed by designers, which is clearly problematic when it comes 
to control. If the designers have set an algorithm that determines that the robot will react 
to the stimulus A by doing B, then how can one say that the robot is the one is control of 
its performance when it comes to reacting to A? There is no room for agency here, as the 
robot is merely following rules. 
Maybe it could be easier for compatibilists to argue for the falsity of the second 
premise424. Why should one consider that the differences between Ernie and Bernie (or 
Fred and Norm) are not relevant to their free will and moral responsibility? Why should 
historical important details such as Ernie’s purposeful production not be significant? For 
instance, one could contend that the fact that Diana is the machiavellian mind behind 
Ernie’s life, behind everything he ever did and all the consequences of everything that 
happened because of his coming into the world, then she is the one to be ultimately 
blamed or praised for all these things, not him. None of it would have happened if it were 
not for her, and he is only an intermediate link in this causal sequence, someone who has 
been “trapped” into being a willing puppet in Diana’s hands 425. And if we choose to define 
free will only on the basis of responsibility, then Ernie is not free either. On the other hand, 
Bernie, whose story is just the unfolding of regular and natural events, can be 
                                                          
424 Cf. Barnes, E.C. (2013) and Waller, R.R. (2014). 
425 Cf. Todd, P. (2013), p.194. 
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appropriately considered blameworthy or praiseworthy for what he does, according to 
compatibilist conditions. And if he is responsible, then he must possess free will426.   
This is an interesting suggestion but I believe it is based on an illegitimate swapping of 
levels of analysis. A compatibilist that choses to challenge the second premise of Mele’s 
zygote argument will consider that there are responsibility-relevant differences between 
Ernie and Bernie (or Ernie versus anyone living in a deterministic universe) whereby they 
should be judged differently. But what are the criteria for these different judgements?  
When the compatibilist considers that Ernie’s lack of free will and responsibility, 
unbeknownst to him, is to depend on the fact that Diana is ultimately responsible for what 
he does, she is talking about responsibility as something that can be attributed to an agent 
by an observer in function of contextual circumstances, not only in function of the intrinsic 
features of the action production event. Also, on such an analysis, free will ceases to be 
the power an agent has to control his action, and becomes a derivative concept, one that 
corresponds to a capacity whose possession can be inferred via the external assessment 
of who is responsible for the action. Since identical agents in identical circumstances can 
have it or not, depending on how someone else might be considered to be more 
accountable for the action than any one of them, this capacity seems not even to be a 
feature of the psychological structure of the agent. I suggest that this type of analysis can 
be classified as externalist. 
On the other hand, when the compatibilist considers Bernie to be responsible on the basis 
of his mental health, self-control and deliberative capacities, he is moving to an internalist 
level, one which has to do with Bernie’s psychological process of intentional decision 
rather than with the broader context of that decision (this is, in fact, what allows 
compatibilists to ignore the threat of determinism). This does not mean that the 
compatibilist does not take into account certain historical factors such as Bernie’s 
upbringing (since a possible trauma might be responsibility diminishing). However, these 
historical factors would have relevance only insofar as they might impair some of the 
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Mele, A. (2014a), pp. 17-18. 
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actual capacities Bernie possesses at the moment of decision. In Mele’s story, however, 
both Ernie and Bernie decide on the basis of “sheddable” values, which means that they 
are able to change their values if they put their minds to it.  
So if one were to question premise 2 on the basis of the above considerations, one would 
be shifting from an internalist analysis by which Bernie should be considered responsible, 
to an externalist one by which Ernie should not. I believe this kind of move can hardly be 
considered legitimate. Either both Bernie and Ernie are responsible, based on internalist 
considerations, or none of them is, if one assumes an externalist point of view. My 
position is obviously the latter. I believe historical factors are crucial insofar as they could 
undermine the agent’s ability to be the ultimate author of her action – the control 
condition for moral responsibility. In Ernie’s case, that authorship belongs to Diana, as she 
was the one who set him up for the actions he is predetermined to perform. In Bernie’s 
case, Diana did not interfere in his making, but blind natural causes ended up determining 
that he be just as effective a tool for her purposes as Ernie.  
My conclusion, then, is that manipulation arguments such as Pereboom and Mele’s help 
the case of the incompatibilist insofar as they make clear that compatibilist conditions are 
insufficient to prevent the attribution of free will and responsibility to agents one would 
likely let off the hook. The subtle transition between cases in Pereboom’s examples, just 
like in Mele’s zygote argument, allow us to see how the hidden causes in a deterministic 
scenario are very similar to distant manipulation by external agents, which means that 
they are much more responsibility-undermining than what the compatibilist wishes to 
admit.  
 
5.3. Free Will is compatible with indeterminism 
 
The arguments that have been presented in the previous section, aimed at defending the 
incompatibility between free will and determinism, as well as at attacking rival views, are 
not crucial for my account. As became clear in chapter 3, given the structure of my 
reasoning which is based on the need for an irreducible agent with downward causal 
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powers, I have independent reasons for endorsing an incompatibilist account of free will. 
Therefore, the consequence argument, the incompatibilist responses to Frankfurt cases, 
and the more recent manipulation arguments, albeit interesting and enriching, are 
inessential to my libertarian stance. 
The arguments that will be presented in the present section, however, could, if sound, 
shake the foundations of libertarianism and force me to embrace hard incompatibilism427. 
In fact, it is not enough to postulate neuronal indeterminism as a precondition for 
downward causation from the self to its brain; human free will requires also that the agent 
be able to decide for reasons while retaining the ability to choose otherwise, under the 
exact same circumstance, i.e., given the complete state of her mind (including all the 
reasons that are present to it) at the moment of decision. Many have complained that it 
is impossible to give an intelligible account of this type of metaphysical freedom. 
According to critics, it would be nothing but an ideal aspiration that is internally 
incoherent.  
I will now present these arguments and show that they can all be given a satisfactory 
response. 
 
5.3.1. Doing away with determinism 
 
While the most common compatibilist contention is that free will is not made impossible 
by the truth of determinism, a traditional argument put forward by David Hume and 
restated by many in the twentieth century claims that determinism is actually a most 
fundamental requirement for free will. In his influential 1943 article, “Free will as involving 
determination and inconceivable without it”, R.E. Hobart argues that, even though our 
phenomenology grants us alternative possibilities (“I could have willed otherwise”, in the 
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according to which, just as determinism renders free will impossible, so does indeterminism. 
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sense that I as a person could have produced some other volition, had I so wanted428), it 
is incoherent to think that our motives incline us without necessitating429, if this means 
that there would be an undetermined “interposition of the self” which would supersede 
the strength of our reasons and decide autonomously. 
“In proportion as an act of volition starts of itself without a cause it is exactly, so far as the 
freedom of the individual is concerned, as if it had been thrown into his mind from without 
– “suggested” to him – by a freakish demon. (…) In proportion as it is undetermined, it is 
just as if such an agent’s legs should suddenly spring up and carry him off where he did 
not prefer to go. Far from constituting freedom, that would mean, in the exact measure 
in which it took place, the loss of freedom.”430 
According to this argument, an action is free insofar as it is controlled by the agent, and 
that control is rendered impossible by the presence of indeterminism which introduces 
chance into the causal etiology of the agent’s behavior. If the agent’s motives are not 
sufficient to ensure her decision and her action, then it is as though her intention to act 
(and hence her action) was not really hers, but “had been thrown into her mind from 
without”. 
Hobart is actually following a long tradition that was brilliantly defended by Hume both in 
his Treatise of human nature and in An inquiry concerning human understanding. 
Causation in nature works deterministically, in the sense that, from what we can tell after 
repeated observations of one event following another, there is a necessary431 connection 
                                                          
428 Hobart, R.E. (1934), p.7. He assumes a conditional analysis of “could” (see section 5.2.1), and 
only in that sense does he consider that an agent has the power to act and will otherwise. 
429 As in Leibniz’s often quoted phrase. 
430 Hobart, R.E. (1934), p.7. 
431 Note that Hume’s ground-breaking definition of causation as “constant conjunction” did not 
prevent him from considering causal connections as necessary, both in nature and in human 
psychology, in the following sense: “Necessity may be defined in two ways, conformable to the 
two definitions of cause, of which it makes an essential part. It consists either in the constant 
conjunction of like objects, or in the inference of the understanding from one object to another”. 
It is in this empirical sense of inductively learnt regularity that necessity and causation can be 
considered to be common features of the physical and human world: “Now necessity, in both 
these senses (…) has universally, though tacitly, in the schools, in the pulpit, and in common life, 
been allowed to belong to the will of man; and no one has ever pretended to deny that we can 
draw inferences concerning human actions, and that those inferences are founded in the 
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(albeit not logically necessary) between physical causes (like the interplay of material 
forces) and physical effects. The same happens in the human realm: people’s (re)actions 
are often predictable given their character and circumstances, and when they are not, 
that is because of our epistemic difficulties that prevent us from identifying all the causes 
involved. Rather than being problematic for our responsibility ascriptions, deterministic 
causation constitutes their fundamental precondition.  
“Where actions proceed not from some cause in the character and dispositions of the 
persons who performed them, they can neither redound to his honor, if good, nor infamy, 
if evil. The actions themselves may be blamable; they may be contrary to all the rules of 
morality and religion: but the person is not answerable for them (…). According to this 
principle, therefore, which denies necessity, and consequently causes, a man is as pure 
and untainted after having committed the most horrid crime as at the first moment of his 
birth, nor is his character any way concerned in his actions; since they are not derived 
from it, and the wickedness of the one can never be used as a proof of the depravity of 
the other.”432  
Insofar as a person’s action is brought about by her character (motives, inclinations), 
together with the specifications of the circumstances, that person will be accountable for 
that action. If, on the contrary, an element of contingency should enter the picture (which, 
as a matter of fact, was considered by Hume to be impossible in our world), then the 
action would become an uncaused event – something that nothing, much less a free and 
responsible agent - contributed to bring about. And, he said, this is absurd. 
Like Hobart’s, Hume’s reasoning too is grounded on the assumption that causation equals 
necessitation, which leads to his very influential idea that either an event is determined 
or it is purely random. David Hodgson, a contemporary libertarian, calls this (false) 
dilemma “Hume’s mistake”433 and shows how it is at the basis of many classical 
                                                          
experienced union of like actions, with like motives, inclinations, and circumstances.” [Hume, D. 
(1748), p.97]. 
432 Hume, D. (1748), p.98 (second emphasis added). 
433 Hodgson, D. (1999). 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 215 
compatibilist arguments434 and of some apparently harsh accusations against 
libertarianism, like Galen Strawson’s following: 
“If the agent is to be truly self-determining in action this cannot be because it has any 
further desires or principles of choice governing the decisions about how to act that it 
makes in the light of its initial desires or principles of choice. For it could not be truly self-
determining with respect to these further desires or principles of choice either, any more 
than it could be self-determining with respect to its initial desires or principles of choice. 
(…) But if it does not have any such desires or principles of choice governing what decisions 
it makes in the light of its initial reasons for action, then the decisions it makes are 
rationally speaking random: they are made by an agent-self that is, in its role as decision-
maker, entirely non-rational in the present vital sense of ‘rational’ – it is reasonless, lacking 
any principles of choice or decision.”435.  
In this quote, Strawson is presenting his version of a very serious objection against non-
skeptical forms of incompatibilism, the “luck objection” (which originates in Hume-
Hobart’s argument), that I will address in full detail in the following subsection. For now, 
what I wish to unveil is the assumption that lies beneath his lines: that the only possible 
causal link between the agent’s reasons and her decision is a deterministic one, in the 
absence of which choice would become unreasonable. Strawson’s argument that self-
determination is incoherent because it would either imply an infinite regress (of ever 
further motivations) or be based on purely random swerves, is grounded on the unargued 
premise that rationality either works as a deterministic algorithm (as if it were a matter 
of calculating the vector sum of all the Newtonian mechanical forces in the agent’s head), 
or it does not work at all. 
But Strawson is wrong. First, because causation can be probabilistic and, second, because 
human rationality need not be susceptible to be captured by deterministic rules, in order 
for it to retain its reasonableness.  
                                                          
434 Like Alfred Ayer’s (1956) or J.J.C. Smart’s (1961). 
435 Strawson, G. (1986), Freedom and belief, cit. in Hodgson, D. (1999), p.204. 
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Today it is widely understood that causation is not to be identified with, nor does it entail, 
necessitation. One can conceive the causal relation as production436, counterfactual 
dependence437 or interpret it in some other way still, but in all these accounts there is 
nothing contradictory in imagining that different possible events can be alternatively 
derived from a single cause. Especially given the incredible success of quantum 
mechanics, whose standard interpretation is indeterministic, considerable work has been 
made in twentieth-century philosophy of science aiming at developing an account of 
causation that includes this possibility. It can be read as a case of causation of probability 
(the first event A is the cause of there being a 0.3 probability that a second event B will 
happen, a 0.6 probability that an alternative event C will happen instead, and 0.1 
probability that nothing happens) or probability of causation438 (in the present 
circumstances, there is a 0.3 probability that A will cause B, a 0.6 probability that A will 
cause C, and 0.1 probability that A causes nothing at all). Under both these interpretations 
of the probabilistic connection between A and its alternative effects, A would 
unquestionably be the cause of B or C, albeit an indeterministic one. 
Strawson’s unargued premise lies also on a conception of human rationality as an 
algorithmic function in which certain inputs lawfully lead to certain outputs. However, 
that does not have to be the default perspective and, as a matter of fact, our personal 
experience gives us evidence of the opposite: we often have equally persuasive reasons 
for making contradictory decisions and we feel that either one of those alternatives is 
rationally defendable. When we eventually decide, we can properly explain our choice 
based on the reasons we had, even though those reasons were insufficient to ensure that 
we would decide the way we in fact did. So, choice can be said to constitute precisely a 
capacity that superior conscious animals have for qualitatively resolving non-conclusive 
                                                          
436 Anscombe, G.E.M. (1971). 
437 Lewis, D. (1973). 
438 I am borrowing these two contrastive formulations from Timothy O’Connor and Jonathan 
Jacobs’ 2012 article, in which the authors defend that only the “probability of causation” 
perspective is adequate, in the context of their neo-aristotelian metaphysics. 
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reasons439. In his last book Rationality + Consciousness = Free Will, David Hodgson 
developed this idea at length:  
“Most human reasoning is not overtly algorithmic: it does not overtly proceed precisely 
as determined by rules of logic and/or probability and/or mathematics, or any other 
rules that could be incorporated into a computer program. When we are trying to 
make a reasonable decision as to what to believe or what to do, very often the reasons 
we see for and against alternative beliefs or actions are inconclusive, and there is an 
apparent gap between reasons on the one hand and decisions about what to believe 
and what to do on the other.”440 
Hodgson argues that this non-algorithmic reasoning, which he calls “plausible reasoning”, 
is at the basis not only of most of our everyday activities but also on the basis of science. 
Criteria like simplicity, explanatory content and coherence with other theories, which are 
the subject of ceteris paribus rules, are crucial in fundamental processes in science such 
as the selection of which unrefuted hypotheses should be provisionally accepted (given 
the problem of the underdetermination of theory by data441) or the judgement of how 
two things are sufficiently similar for an analogy between them to be adequate. Even 
though plausible reasoning cannot be fully formalized, it is certainly not random as it has 
provided us with abundant and reliable knowledge about the world. Most importantly, 
Hodgson argues, plausible reasoning is what “enables us to reach decisions that resolve 
conflicting reasons, which are of different types and cannot be explicitly compared on a 
common scale”442. 
I cannot develop this argument any further here. My aim is not to tackle the complex topic 
of human rationality. What I meant to stress with the help of Hodgson’s concept of 
plausible reasoning is that most of the time in our lives, we human beings have to make 
fallible judgements about what to believe or what to do and most often than not we are 
successful in this endeavor. Our decisions are intelligible to others despite their fallibility 
                                                          
439 Cf. Hodgson, D. (1991, 1999, 2012). 
440 Hodgson, D. (2012), p.110. 
441 Cf. Goodman’s “new riddle of induction” in Goodman, N. (1965), ch.3.  
442 Hodgson, D. (2012) 
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and unpredictability, and we recognize that many of the problems we face in our daily 
lives have more than one reasonable solution. We should beware, then, of thinking about 
psychology in Newtonian terms, as if our desires could be assimilated to classical forces. 
An argument such as Strawson’s, according to which the “putative, freedom-creating 
power of partially reason-independent decision becomes a some entirely non-rational 
(reasons-independent) flip-flop of the soul”443, is likely to be based on such a mechanistic 
assumption. 
However, the most important objection to libertarianism is yet to come. Even if we accept 
that an agent can produce one or more different decisions given the exact same 
circumstances and laws of nature, does this imply that the Hume-Hobart objection fails? 
Not yet, for at least in Hobart’s case, the argument was not only that indeterministic 
causation of an action was most likely false but also that, if it were true, it would reduce 
(rather than enhance) the agent’s control. But this brings us fully to the luck problem, one 
which has been abundantly discussed in the recent literature on free will and constitutes 
arguably the greatest threat against libertarianism. 
 
5.3.2. The luck problem 
 
The luck objection against libertarianism has assumed several different formulations in 
the literature. The two main lines have to do with explanation and control. The problem 
underlying both of them can be appropriately described by means of the following 
example by van Inwagen: 
“Let us consider the case of a hardened thief who, as our story begins, is in the act of 
lifting the lid of the poor-box in a little country church. He sneers and curses when he 
sees what a pathetically small sum it contains. Still, business is business: he reaches for 
the money. Suddenly there flashes before his mind's eye a picture of the face of his 
dying mother and he remembers the promise he made to her by her deathbed always 
to be honest and upright. This is not the first occasion on which he has had such a 
                                                          
443 Strawson, G., op.cit. 
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vision while performing some mean act of theft, but he has always disregarded it. This 
time, however, he does not disregard it. Instead, he thinks the matter over carefully 
and decides not to take the money. Acting on this decision, he leaves the church 
empty-handed.”444 
If we assume that the thief’s decision was undetermined, then there can be an alternative 
world (a hypothetical world that is as similar to the actual world as possible) in which, in 
spite of the identical conditions preceding the decision, he decides to steal instead. 
However, this possibility results in a problem with two horns: 
1) If all the reasons and considerations that preceded his decision in the alternative 
world were exactly the same as they are in the actual world, what is it that explains 
his deciding to steal rather than to refrain, and vice-versa? 
2) If all the conditions were already settled and still the future was open, then how 
can we say that the thief is in control of his decision? 
If the difference between worlds cannot be adequately explained and the decision cannot 
be controlled by the thief445, then one can say that the fact that he refrained in the actual 
world is not a doing he should be praised for. It was just a matter of moral luck. 
Even though these two horns are intertwined (for instance, the putative lack of 
explanation is said to be revealing of the putative lack of control) I will address them 
separately for the sake of clarity. 
 
5.3.2.1. The lack of contrastive explanation 
 
Why should the lack of an adequate explanation be a problem? What Alfred Mele (one of 
the main proponents of the explanatory formulation of the luck problem) is worried about 
is that if there is nothing that accounts for the difference between the actual world in 
                                                          
444 van Inwagen, P. (1983), pp.127-8. 
445 Cf. Mele, A. (2006), chapters 1 and 3, for an often cited presentation of the luck problem in 
terms of cross-world differences.  
FREE WILL AND ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITIES 
 220 
which the thief decided to refrain and an alternative world in which he decided to steal, 
then this difference is just a matter of luck. And luck is incompatible with free will, which 
leads us to conclude that indeterminism precludes the thief from being free, rather than 
allowing him to be so. 
There are many assumptions in between the lines of this formulation. First, what counts 
as an adequate explanation of an indeterministically caused action? Second, what makes 
one infer that the lack of explanation for an action implies that it was just a matter of luck? 
Third, why should we assume that luck undermines free will? I will now address these 
assumptions one by one. 
 
a) What counts as an adequate explanation of an indeterministically caused 
action? 
In the context of the free will debate, it has sometimes been assumed that any non-
deterministically caused action would be unintelligible (Ayer, for example, said that if a 
choice is explicable, then “we are led back to determinism”446). Nevertheless, most 
contemporary authors agree that for any action made for reasons, determined or 
undetermined as it may be, we can have a satisfactory and reasonable explanation that 
refers to the reasons on which the agent acted.  For instance, regarding the above 
mentioned case, Mele would not question the fact that we can cite the memory of the 
promise the thief made to his mother as the reason that explains why he refrained. 
However, since that memory was present in the alternative scenario as well, it cannot 
contrastively explain the action, which is to say it cannot explain the difference between 
the two worlds from the moment of the decision on. In fact, the explanation that many 
consider to be lacking in cases of undetermined actions is contrastive explanation: the 
explanation of why the thief decided to refrain rather than to steal447.  
There are two complementary answers to this problem. One is to question the assumption 
that a contrastive explanation cannot be given in cases of undetermined decisions and 
                                                          
446 Ayer, A.J. (1954) cit. in Clarke, R. (2003), p.31. 
447 Cf. Sorabji, R. (1980), Russell, P. (1984), Nagel, T. (1986). 
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actions. The other is to question that that form of explanation is the only adequate 
explanation in these cases448. 
First of all, we must acknowledge that there are many different kinds of situations in which 
an agent performs a free action and that, depending on the peculiarities of each case, 
more or less satisfying explanations will be available.  
On an agent-causal account such as mine, actions are caused, but not necessitated, by the 
agent. The agent’s reasons (her beliefs and desires) influence the probabilities of each 
outcome, insofar as the agent has a greater tendency to act on a stronger reason than on 
a weaker one. When the agent acts on her stronger reasons, contrastive explanation is 
not a problem. Peter Lipton’s account of contrastive explanation449 shows why this is so. 
According to him, one can have a good contrastive explanation for an indeterministically 
caused event if there is an explanatorily relevant factor that raised the probability of the 
actual event happening and which was in a certain relation to that event, without there 
being any corresponding factor in the causal history of the alternative event. Randolph 
Clarke presents this with the help of an example he borrowed from Humphreys: 
“The bubonic plague bacillus (Yersinia pestis) will, if left to develop unchecked in a 
human, produce death in between 50 percent to 90 percent of cases. It is treatable 
with antibiotics such as tetracycline, which reduce the chance of mortality to between 
5 percent and 10 percent.”450 
In this case, despite the less-than-unity probabilities of both events (surviving and dying), 
the antibiotic can contrastively explain why a certain patient died and another one lived 
(or why a certain patient lived in the real world while his counterfactual twin died in an 
alternative world) by referring to the fact that the survivor took the antibiotic while the 
untreated patient did not. There is no corresponding event in the causal history of the 
latter patient that raised the likelihood of his death to close to 1.  
                                                          
448 Randolph Clarke (2003), Timothy O’Connor (2000) and Christopher Franklin (2011a, 
forthcoming a) are amongst the authors that in the past years have strived (in my view, 
successfully) to make their case against the luck problem based on both these strategies. 
449 Lipton, P. (1990, 1991, 1993). His account stems from Mill’s “Method of Difference”.  
450 Humphreys, P. [(1989), p.100] cit. in Clarke, R. (2003), p.41. 
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Assuming that rational explanation is a species of causal explanation, Lipton’s model 
applies straightforwardly to cases of reasons-based decisions: if there is a strong reason 
or group of reasons that makes decision A preferable to decision B (but still not 
inexorable), then if the agent acts on those reasons his action will be contrastively 
explainable by citing them451.   
Not all decisions are like this, however. There is always the possibility that the agent will 
do something that was very unlikely. In other cases still, she will find herself before tied-
for-best options, both sustained by equally good and motivationally strong reasons: 
reasons for A on which the agent will act in case he decides to do A, and reasons for B on 
which the agent will act in case he decides to do B. In situations such as these, when the 
agent does not act on her better and stronger reasons, the action can still be rationally 
explained by citing those reasons that did support it – but there is no contrastive 
explanation available.  
This is not a problem, however, since a noncontrastive explanation is not incomplete. It is 
informative, rational and causal and if it fails to show how a certain decision was inevitable 
or more probable than its alternative, that is simply because it was not and there is no 
more information to be had. Clarke believes the frequent misjudgment about the 
adequacy of a noncontrastive explanation that cites all the relevant information about the 
causal history of the explanandum has to do with the false assumption that a full 
explanation is one that tells us why the event had to happen, which is obviously fallacious 
in the case of indeterministic events: 
“It might be accepted that nondeterministically caused events can be explained but 
objected that they cannot be completely or fully or adequately explained because it 
cannot be explained why they had to happen. But the question why such an event had 
to happen carries a false presupposition; the event did not have to happen. And it is 
                                                          
451 This is no novelty. On Hempel’s model of scientific explanation, the possibility of an inductive-
statistical explanation relied also on the degree of inductive support that the explanans gave to 
the explanandum. That degree could not be numerically fixed but it was required that it be close 
to one. 
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no incompleteness or inadequacy in an explanation that it fails to answer to a false 
presupposition of an explanatory question.”452 
Another very important consideration is that the criteria for the adequacy of an 
explanation depend on the knowledge we have prior to the presentation of the data cited 
in the explanation. As Christopher Hitchcock has shown453, we can have technically correct 
contrastive explanations which are nevertheless pragmatically inadequate (and thus fail 
to explain the contrast between the actual event and its alternative) because they cite 
information that was already presupposed. The exact same datum may be relevant or not, 
just as the same fact may be explainable or not, depending on epistemic conditions. In 
the aforementioned case of the bubonic plague patient who was treated with the 
appropriate antibiotic, referring to that treatment may be perceived as inadequate, say, 
by the family of a roommate of his, whom, by hypothesis, was in the same condition as 
him but died despite having taken the antibiotic. In such a case, that family would already 
know that the surviving patient had taken the antibiotic and that it had raised enormously 
his probabilities of healing, and what they would want to know was some further cause 
that made it so that, given the same probabilities, he survived while their loved one did 
not. But if we assume that, given the condition of both having been appropriately treated, 
the event of dying or surviving is truly indeterministic, then there is no more information 
to be had. The family of the patient who died already knows everything that can be cited 
in an explanation, and thus any explanation will be unsatisfactory for them. 
Once again, this reasoning applies to the explanation of actions as well. If we imagine God, 
an omniscient being, as being in possession of every single detail of a free agent’s mental 
life, then we may say that no explanation of why the agent chooses to act as she does can 
sound pragmatically adequate to His ears. However, God can give a contrastive 
explanation of the agent’s most probable actions to anyone who does not possess all the 
relevant information in advance, as well as a reasonable explanation of those actions that 
                                                          
452 Clarke, R. (2003), p.36. On the idea that contrastive explanations can sometimes be given for 
undetermined actions, but they are not necessary for a rational and adequate explanation of 
action, see also O’Connor, T. (2000), section 5.3. 
453 Hitchcock, C. (1999). 
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result from choices that were unlikely. Both explanations will allow one to claim that the 
agent’s actions, having been done for reasons, are not random nor arbitrary. 
 
b) What justifies the inference that the lack of explanation for an action implies that 
it was just a matter of luck? 
This question requires one to make clear what luck is supposed to mean. In his 
aforementioned argument, Mele used a definition of luck that is actually question-begging 
and cannot serve as a justification for the inference from the lack of contrastive 
explanation to the conclusion that the cross-world difference is just a matter of luck: 
“[I]f the question why an agent exercised his agent-causal power at t in deciding to A 
rather than exercising it at t in any of the alternative ways he does in other possible 
worlds with the same past and laws of nature is, in principle, unanswerable (…) and his 
exercising it at t in so deciding has an effect on how his life goes, I count that as luck 
for the agent.454”  
Mele defines luck as the absence of contrastive explanation, which is plainly circular. But 
maybe we could use a different definition. Neil Levy also points out that the luck objection 
is crucial, but he grounds his definition of luck differently. According to him, luck is the 
agent’s lack of control over the occurrence of a rare event of personal significance to 
her455. Could the definition of luck as lack of control over an improbable event fare better 
in sustaining the implication from the lack of contrastive explanation to the presence of 
luck as the determinant of the undetermined event? I do not think so, since issues 
                                                          
454 Mele, A. (2006), p.70.  
455  Neil Levy considers there are two types of luck, both grounded on the lack of control the agent 
has for an improbable event that is significant for her: “An event or state of affairs occurring in 
the actual world is chancy lucky for an agent if (i) that event or state of affairs is significant for that 
agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct control over that event or state of affairs, and (iii) that event or 
state of affairs fails to occur in many nearby worlds (…). An event or state of affairs occurring in 
the actual world that affects an agent’s psychological traits or dispositions is non-chancy lucky for 
an agent if (i) that event or state of affairs is significant for that agent; (ii) the agent lacks direct 
control over that event or state of affairs; (iii) events or states of affairs of that kind vary across 
the relevant reference group, and (iv) in a large enough proportion of cases that event or state of 
affairs fails to occur or be instantiated in the reference group in the way in which it occurred or 
was instantiated in the actual case” [Levy (2011) p.36, emphasis added]. 
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regarding explanation are different from issues regarding control. Again Randolph Clarke 
helps us clarify the matter: 
“A good explanation answers well a question that we have, or one that we could 
sensibly ask about an occurrence. In some cases, there may not be available an 
explanation that answers well a quite sensible question, but such unavailability need 
not correspond to any lack of active control. Further, if substance causation is possible, 
then some causes may contribute crucially to the exercise of active control and yet 
citing them, while explanatory, may not yield the sort of explanation in which we are 
typically interested. And finally, an explanation may succeed without citing 
phenomena that constitute an exercise of that variety of active control that is required 
for acting freely, for such phenomena may not be present. Hence, we may have 
adequate rational explanations where free will is lacking.”456 
Hence, we can sometimes have a good explanation for facts which are beyond any 
agential control, as well as no explanation for facts that are in fact controlled by an agent.  
Also, as Hitchcock’s account showed us above, lack of contrastive explanation depends on 
epistemic and pragmatic conditions. Matters of free will and control are matters of what 
is the case in the world (what causes what and who can ensure that something will occur 
rather than something else), and thus they cannot be subject to such factors as the 
previous knowledge one has about an event.    
 
c) Why should we assume that luck undermines free will?  
The last unfounded inference in Mele’s argument is that if an action is a matter of luck, 
then it cannot be free. This seems highly intuitive if we, like Levy, take luck to mean lack 
of control for an improbable event. If the first time I play basketball I score a three-point 
field goal, I will consider that to be due to the so called “beginner’s luck” and certainly not 
to my skills. The reason for this judgment is that I am perfectly aware that if I try to score 
                                                          
456 Clarke, R. (2003), p.32. 
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again, I am very likely to miss, so much so if I try to many times. I am not in control of my 
performance, hence my scoring happened in spite of me.  
However, we have seen above that such a definition of luck is not suited for the entailment 
Male wants to make. For Mele’s argument to work, we must assume luck to be just 
another word for the absence of factors that account for the cross-world difference, but 
then the conclusion that luck undermines freedom will not follow. From the fact that there 
is no prior difference between the causal histories of the two alternative worlds that might 
account for the two different decisions, one cannot infer that the agent was not free to 
act as she did. Incompatibilist freedom means being able to choose differently under the 
same circumstances, and the lack of explanation cannot undermine this ability without 
undermining some further feature that proves essential for it.  
The idea that the lack of contrastive explanation reveals lack of control is one way to make 
this move, but, as we have seen, a fallacious one. We can have control without 
explanation and explanation without control. Another way to link the lack of contrastive 
explanation to free will is to say that the former reveals that the agent’s reasons were 
insufficient to account for her decision, which means that the action was not made for 
reasons. If nondeterministic causation would preclude acting for reasons, that would 
certainly undermine human free will457 and the possibility of action, for that matter. 
However, this strategy relies on the assumption that the availability of a reasons 
explanation of an action depends of the availability of a contrastive explanation of it, 
which is false, as we also have seen above. Any intentional action is made for reasons 
(albeit often unconscious ones) and we can adequately explain it by citing those reasons. 
If we cannot access them due to our epistemic limitations, that does not entail that the 
action was not motivated by a belief-desire pair and caused by the agent for that reason.  
 
 
                                                          
457 Cf. Levy, N. (2011). 
Joana Rigato The possibility of free action 
 227 
5.3.2.2. The problem of diminished control 
 
Let us now go back to van Inwagen’s case of the thief who, upon deliberation, refrains 
from stealing, in order to tackle the second horn of the luck problem. Does the fact that 
he could have chosen otherwise under those exact same circumstances diminish his 
control over his decision, with respect to an alternative scenario in which his action was 
causally determined?  
No, it does not, for the thief’s decision was a causing of his. In deciding, he exercised his 
downward causal power over his brain and body and made sure that his action was to 
refrain. The fact that he could have decided differently means only that he could have 
exercised this same power in another direction. And if the universe were deterministic, 
he would not have been able to exercise that power at all, since the complete state of his 
brain and body would have been entailed by their previous state, immediately preceding 
the decision. Therefore, not only is indeterminism not threatening for control, as it is an 
absolutely necessary condition in order to avoid causal redundancy458. 
As we have seen in section 5.3.1, indeterministic causation does not amount to any causal 
gap in the unfolding of events. Therefore, the fact that there are two or more possible 
sequences does not diminish the agent’s active role in the actual sequence that does 
happen. In the words of Randolph Clarke: 
“The nondeterministic nature of the causation (or of the governing causal law) is just a 
matter of similar agents’ elsewhere behaving differently, something that does not imply 
any weakening of any token relation between token mental events involving this agent 
and her token action.”459 
Clarke460 suggests we can see this clearly if we imagine two identical agents in two parallel 
worlds, a deterministic and an indeterministic one, that share the same physical history 
(every single event that has taken place in their bodies and surroundings) up until the 
                                                          
458 I will develop this idea in section 5.3.3. on the problem of enhanced control. 
459 Clarke, R. (2003), p.73. 
460 Clarke, R. (1995; 2003), ch.5 
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moment of decision. In analyzing their decision process, one will endorse a particular 
account of causation (a humean account or a realist account, for instance), and logically 
one will have to keep that account as the suitable description of the causal process that 
will take place in each of the two worlds. This means that either there is no real connection 
between events in any of the worlds (humean account of causation), or there is an 
effective link between them (realist account). What changes between worlds is the nature 
of the higher-level laws that regulate (in a necessitarian versus probabilistic manner) the 
causal relation. If we are imagining the same decision in both worlds, we will find one 
cause (the agent and/or her mental events, according to the libertarian account at stake) 
that will produce the same effect (a certain decision), via the same type of causal relation, 
with the only difference that, in the indeterministic scenario, some other decision would 
have been possible as well. 
But maybe this response can still be countered by further arguments. Let us now address 
two influential examples that van Inwagen has used in favor of the thesis that 
indeterminism is control undermining. The first one is known as the “rollback argument” 
and it features Alice, who is having to choose between lying and telling the truth. Since 
she is a libertarian agent and this will be a free choice, both alternatives are compatible 
with her past and the laws of nature. Then van Inwagen suggests we do a thought 
experiment: 
“Now suppose that immediately after Alice told the truth, (…) God a thousand times 
caused the universe to revert to exactly the state it was in at t1 (…). [W]e cannot say 
what would have happened, but we can say what would probably have happened: 
sometimes Alice would have lied and sometimes she would have told the truth. As the 
number of "replays" increases, we observers shall – almost certainly – observe the 
ratio of the outcome "truth" to the outcome "lie" settling down to, converging on, 
some value. (…) If we have watched seven hundred and twenty-six replays, we shall be 
faced with the inescapable impression that what happens in the seven-hundred-and-
twenty-seventh replay will be due simply to chance.”461  
                                                          
461 Van Inwagen, P. (2000), pp.14-15. 
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Van Inwagen’s conclusion is that Alice’s action, just like any undetermined action, is just 
a matter of chance (he never uses the word luck, even though his example is considered 
to be one of the formulations of the luck argument). Given the fact that there is an 
objective chance she might lie (a chance the value of which we can define with increasing 
precision as the replays take place), we should consider ourselves fortunate if she were 
to tell us the truth. Her action is a lucky event, and this prevents it from being free. 
“If she was faced with telling the truth and lying, and it was a mere matter of chance 
which of these things she did, how can we say that – and this is essential to the act's 
being free – she was able to tell the truth and able to lie? How could anyone be able 
to determine the outcome of a process whose outcome is a matter of objective, 
ground-floor chance?”462 
In order to show that objective chance prevents control, van Inwagen adds another 
example still, which I will adapt to his rollback case, for the sake of simplicity. Imagine that 
I am a libertarian agent and that, instead of having to choose between being truthful or 
false like Alice, I am asked to promise that I will not reveal a secret. There are good reasons 
both for telling the secret and for keeping it. Just like in the previous case, there would be 
a less than unity chance for each alternative: a 0.43 probability of my telling the secret, 
against a 0.57 chance of my keeping it, to be more precise. The question is: if I would come 
to know the value of the probability of my failing to keep my promise, would I dare to 
make that promise nonetheless? Van Inwagen says I should not: 
“Am I in a position to promise you that I will keep silent? – knowing, as I do, that if 
there were a million perfect duplicates of me, each placed in a perfect duplicate of my 
present situation, forty-three percent of them would tell all and fifty-seven percent of 
them would hold their tongues? I do not see how, in good conscience, I could make 
this promise. I do not see how I could be in a position to make it. But if I believe that I 
am able to keep silent, I should, it would seem, regard myself as being in a position to 
make this promise. What more do I need to regard myself as being in a position to 
                                                          
462 Idem, pp.15-16. 
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promise to do X than a belief that I am able to do X? Therefore, in this situation, I 
should not regard myself as being able to keep silent.”463 
Are these two cases knock-down arguments against libertarianism? Do they make my 
response to the control formulation of the luck argument ineffective? I will now move 
on to analyze them. Just like in the explanatory formulation presented in the previous 
section, here too we find different steps that need to be addressed: first, the idea 
that indeterminism implies objective probability; second, that objective probability 
implies lack of control. I will contend that they are both unwarranted assumptions. 
 
a) Does indeterminism imply objective probability? 
The first assumption leads van Inwagen to take for granted that, in a hypothetical situation 
of numerous replays of the same decision under identical conditions, we would “most 
certainly” find that the ratio between the two alternatives converges to a real number. 
Lara Buchak makes a very strong case against this supposition. Van Inwagen’s inference is 
based on the laws of large numbers. This is very clear in an endnote where he adds that 
“as the number of replays increases, the probability of ‘no convergence’ tends to 0”464. 
However, Alice’s case is very different from a coin flip case in which, given that we know 
there is an objective probability associated with each toss, we can reasonably expect there 
to be convergence: as the number of trials increases, the ratio of each outcome to the 
total number of trials will reflect the objective probability of each single outcome. In 
Alice’s case, however, the objective chance of each decision is precisely what we are trying 
to demonstrate! As the law of large numbers presupposes the objective probability of the 
outcomes, it cannot be used to prove it. In the words of Buchak: 
“The rollback argument directly begs the question of whether Alice’s lying has an 
objective probability. Without the assumption that it does, (…) there is nothing at all 
to rule out, for example, the following series of choices: the first time God reruns the 
                                                          
463 Idem, p.17. Ishtiyaque Haji’s renowned “ensurance formulation” (2001, 2004) of the luck 
problem is very similar to the argument put forward by van Inwagen with the promise case. I 
consider that the responses I present here against the latter can also be used against the former. 
464 Idem, p.19, note 16. 
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situation, Alice lies; the next 9 times, she tells the truth; the next 90 times, she lies; the 
next 900 times, she tells the truth; and so forth. In this example, the proportion of lies 
never converges (it will alternate between roughly 1/11 and 10/11, after each 10n 
trials). Contra van Inwagen, there is nothing in his setup even to make this unlikely. 
Unlike in the coin-flipping case, there may not be a chancy mechanism – or a 
mechanism that behaves as if it is governed by chance – grounding Alice’s actions.”465 
And, if there are no objective values to be attributed to the probabilities associated with 
each outcome, then the promise example loses its basis as well466. 
 
b) Does objective probability entail the lack of control? 
The main question the rollback formulation of the luck argument raises is whether, in case 
Alice and I do have an objective chance of doing A and an objective chance of doing B, we 
can say that we are able to cause A or B. Van Inwagen says we cannot and he uses the 
case of me being unable to assure that I will keep my promise as an argument for this. 
Even though both his examples seem very intuitive and strong, I believe they fail to prove 
his conclusion, and I will now show why this is so. 
Christopher Franklin467 notes – and I follow his lead on this – that one of the problems 
with van Inwagen’s account is that it has the location of indeterminism wrong. He is 
describing a case in which I decide to keep a secret (and therefore I make a promise not 
to tell), but there is an indeterministic link between my intention to keep my promise now 
                                                          
465 Buchak, L. (2013), p.24. 
466 In his rollback case, van Inwagen makes use of a frequentist interpretation of the concept of 
objective probability. The problem that Buchak’s objection reveals can actually be seen as a special 
case of the more general problem that this interpretation faces: circularity. For example, when 
one defines the law of large numbers as follows: “In repeated, independent trials with the same 
probability p of success in each trial, the percentage of successes is increasingly likely to be close 
to the chance of success as the number of trials increases” [Stark, P.B., “Glossary of Statistical 
Terms”, cit. in Buchak, L. (2013) p.23], one is assuming that p exists; however, according to the 
frequentist definition of probability, there is no such thing as the objective probability of a single 
trial. The value p that figures in the law is to be defined as the limit to which the value of 
the relative frequency with which each outcome occurs in an infinitely extended series of trials is 
supposed to converge.  
467 Cf. Franklin, C. (2011). 
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and my action in the future. In such a scenario, the fact that the objective probabilities 
are already fixed would be control-diminishing as this type of account opens up the 
possibility that the agent’s intention might not lead to what was meant. The objective 
probabilities that I come to know in advance will in fact prevent me from making any 
promise because they reveal to me my lack of control over my future action, regardless 
of my present decision. In this situation, indeterminism would in fact introduce an 
element of risk in the causal relation that connects together my intention to act and my 
overt action, which would make it so that after exercising my active role in the deliberative 
process, I might as well just sit back and wait to see if, luckily, my intention leads to the 
best action or not. The outcome is still open but there is nothing left for me to do. 
Real situations in which libertarian agents are implicated are not like this at all. When I 
decide to make a promise not to tell a secret and I make it, I am acting now (first action) 
and changing the future probability of my telling that secret (a second action). That 
probability had kept changing for various reasons up until now, the moment when I finally 
intervene in the course of events and make my final decision. If my character and 
background have endowed me with self-control and values such as truthfulness and 
loyalty, from this moment on my action will outflow from my decision with a probability 
close 1.  
If libertarianism is to avoid the problem presented by the promise case, it has to postulate 
the location of indeterminism between the agent’s reasons (what Franklin calls “non 
actional mental states”468) and her choice. The choice is the moment when the agent 
causes the action to happen: in Alice’s case, it is the moment when she determines 
whether she will lie or tell the truth. From that moment on, her action is as determined in 
an indeterministic world as it would be under determinism: it will take place, unless 
something external to the agent’s agential apparatus (her reasons and her will) prevents 
it (for example, in case she faints or dies, or if something calls her attention and she 
interrupts what she was doing, etc.). Thus located, indeterminism does not diminish the 
                                                          
468 Franklin, C. (2011), p. 205. 
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agent’s control, it gives her the possibility of exercising the rational control she is endowed 
with in one direction as well as in another469.  
At this point it is important to note that indeterminism is not an extra causal element in 
the course of events. Indeterminism is the negation of determinism: when we admit that 
something was “just a matter of chance”, what we mean to say is that it was not inevitably 
determined to happen by what took place before nor by the agent-causal capacity of an 
agent. Indeterminism is a negative condition, not a positive intervener in the world. This 
is a relevant consideration because it opens room for the agent to be that positive 
intervener, taking advantage of the openness the absence of determinism grants her. The 
agent has reasons for and against each alternative and she has the ability to exercise her 
power to cause one of both alternatives, since indeterminism opens up the possibility for 
her to do so.  
 
5.3.3. The problem of enhanced control 
 
In the previous section we have seen that libertarianism can address the luck objection 
under its various formulations and I hope to have shown that, unlike what the objection 
seemed to stress, indeterminism per se does not diminish the agent’s control. However, 
some might doubt that I have also made clear that indeterminism can enhance the agent’s 
power to choose, relative to the power she possesses in a deterministic world. 
Compatibilist agents are “free” in the sense that they can, in normal circumstances, act 
according to their reasons. Is a libertarian agent free also in the deeper sense of being in 
charge of her intentions, and thus having genuine alternative possibilities of action?  
Opinions differ, even amongst libertarians, of course. Event-causalists470 consider that 
their version of action causation is sufficient to ensure that the libertarian agent possesses 
more control in an indeterministic rather than in a deterministic world, while agent-
                                                          
469 Cf. Franklin, C. (2013) on the most appropriate location of indeterminism. 
470 Cf. Mele, A. (2006), Franklin, C. (2011, 2014b). 
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causalists471 disagree. As one might expect, given the account that I have developed in the 
previous chapters, especially in the first one, my view is that event-causalist accounts do 
fall prey to the luck objection, because of the associated problem of the disappearance of 
the agent, which I have already presented in section 2.6. In her 2010 article “Why agent-
caused actions are not lucky”, Megan Griffith shows how the two problems are associated 
and how they make it so that only an agent-causal agent possesses the type of control 
required for free will. According to her, the unavailability of a contrastive explanation for 
cross-world differences is not a problem for libertarianism but reveals the real threat 
facing it: the lack of control over which decision is made. And that problem can only be 
overcome by an agent-causal account, in which the agent’s prior mental states do not 
exhaust the action’s total cause.  
“In both the event-causal and the agent-causal cases, the unavailable explanation 
corresponds to the causal openness of the decision, given the prior states of the agent. 
But this does not indicate lack of control for the agent-causal case, since the prior 
states of the agent are not the whole story. It does indicate a lack of control for the 
event-causal case because the agent has no further causal involvement in the action 
(…) As such, it just happens to her that the decision is to A rather than to B because 
she is missing the power to determine the decision.”472 
The opportunity to choose that is granted to the agent by indeterminism is differently 
explored in the event-causal and the agent-causal scenarios. In the former case, the agent 
controls the choice she makes insofar as she is the one who produces it, but she does not 
possess what I shall call contrastive control over which alternative becomes actual. In turn, 
in the latter scenario, the opportunity is explored by the agent-causal agent by exercising 
her ability to choose. 
Interestingly, van Inwagen’s primary intention in presenting the above two examples (the 
rollback and the promise case) was to show that agent-causation could not save the 
                                                          
471 Cf. O’Connor, T. (2000), Griffin, M. (2010). Also the agnostic Randolph Clarke (2003) and the 
skeptic Derk Pereboom (2004, 2014) claim that only agent-causal libertarianism can enhance the 
agent’s control. 
472 Griffith, M. (2010), p.51. 
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agent’s control, given objective chance. After presenting the promise example, he 
imagined a situation in which God would reveal to him that he would agent-cause his 
action, whichever alternative would eventually occur. And so he asks: 
“Why should [the revelation that I am the agent-cause of events in my brain that will 
result in the bodily movements that constitute my act] lead me to conclude that I am 
in a position to promise to keep silent and therefore that I am able to keep silent? Its 
content simply does not seem to be relevant to the above argument for the conclusion 
that it is false that I am able to keep silent.”473 
Remember Franklin’s response to van Inwagen’s first presentation of the promise 
example: given the location of indeterminism between the coming to mind of the reasons 
to act and the agent’s decision, we can reasonably consider that the openness of different 
alternatives does endow the agent with the possibility to be the determining cause of the 
occurrence of the action of keeping the promise as well as of the action of breaking it. But 
I would add: in order for that possibility to become an actual ability, the agent as such 
must be the cause of the action – apart from her reasons, which have all been previously 
given at the moment of decision. If the agent is reduced to (some of) her reasons, then 
there is no way she can choose which of the alternatives will become actual. I believe, in 
fact, that in the event-causal context Franklin should not refer to the act of making a 
decision with the term “choice”. Deciding, in his sense, is causing, but not choosing.  
The incompatibilist event-causal account endows the agent with the possibility of 
behaving differently for different reasons and, as we have seen, this does not represent a 
reduction of the type of control that her compatibilist counterpart possesses. However, 
given the disappearing agent objection, that control is not sufficient. The agent-involving 
appropriate mental states cause one of the alternatives, true, but it is not up to the agent 
which of them they cause. Instead, I believe that in order for the agent to have “freedom-
                                                          
473 Van Inwagen, P. (2000), p.18. 
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level”474 control, she needs to be the author of her action – its “source”475, its 
“originator”476. In Clarke’s words: 
“The presence in the indeterministic world of a chance that is absent from the 
deterministic world does not by itself give the indeterministic agent a further ability. 
To have a better variety of control over her behavior than that exercised by her 
deterministic counterpart, an agent in an indeterministic world must have a further 
power to determine which of the actions, each of which she might perform with 
control, she will actually perform.”477 
The type of control that agent-causation grants the agent in an indeterministic 
context is contrastive control: the control not only over “A” and over “B” but also 
over “whether A or B”. That, I contend, is the enhanced control the agent needs in 
order to perform actions that are both appropriately authored (as any agent-caused 
determined action is) and free. And as we have seen in the previous chapters, this 
type of control is what the agent’s emergent conscious self can exercise with its 
downward causal power over the brain that brings it about. 
                                                          
474 Clarke, R. (2003) p.67. 
475 Pereboom, D. (2003). 
476 Clarke, R. (2003), p.160. 





6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
The itinerary we have undertaken in this dissertation has reached its endpoint. I presented 
a new argument for incompatibilism and showed how we have no reasons for endorsing 
a nihilist position. Agent-causal libertarianism is the only way to vindicate our experience 
as agents and it comes at a much lower cost than is usually assumed. 
Some of the theses that sign this itinerary have been presented along the way, others still 
need to be stated explicitly. Let me now sum them all up.  
First, regarding what an action is. Being caused by some of the agent’s mental states and 
events is not a sufficient condition for a behavior to be considered to be an action. For an 
action to be such, the agent must be its ultimate substance-cause. What I mean by this is 
that the agent’s self makes a choice about what to do, thus producing an intention to act. 
The agent’s action is the composite event of the agent’s producing an intention to act 
which then causes the bodily movement to occur. 
Second, regarding the agent as cause. The agent’s intentionally causing an action 
amounts to more than its parts (e.g. neurons, muscles) being involved in natural causal 
sequences (e.g. synapses, movement), which sometimes take place in the absence of the 
phenomenal experience of agency. The distinctiveness of agent-causing requires a self as 
an irreducible entity with non-derivative causal powers. The agent’s conscious self, which 
emerges naturally from a sufficiently complex brain and is the bearer of the agent’s 
conscious properties, is such an entity.  
Third, regarding the conditions for agent-causation. Given the supervenience of mental 
states and events on physical states and events, the agent’s self can only produce an 
intention to act by downwardly causing the occurrence of certain neural events which, in 
turn, will cause some bodily movements. In order to avoid causal redundancy and 
epiphenomenalism, the possibility of downward causation requires the break of both 
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bottom-level determinism and causal closure of the physical. Hence, agent-causation 
entails physical indeterminism. 
Fourth, regarding freedom of the will. For the agent to be the determiner of an action, 
her will, i.e., her power to make decisions or to form intentions to act, cannot itself be 
determined to choose in a certain way. Nevertheless, the agent’s will is partially 
constrained by her beliefs and desires which, in turn, are a consequence of her biological 
traits and environmental factors. That influence does not determine the agent’s choice; it 
structures the probabilities of the various alternatives she can choose from and then 
leaves room for her downward causal power to be exercised. This is made possible by 
neuronal indeterminism whereby the state of the agent’s brain at a certain instant is 
compatible with more than one immediate after-states.  
Fifth, regarding action explanation. At the mental level, neuronal indeterminism 
corresponds to the agent’s having different inconclusive reasons in favor of different 
options. Given this openness of possible futures, the agent’s self can intervene in the 
world and cause one state to happen, rather than another, without thus contradicting any 
laws of nature. Still, her action is influenced, though underdetermined, by the physical 
constrictions and psychological reasons that raised its likelihood and which ought to figure 
in its adequate rational explanation.  
Sixth, regarding the possibility of unfree actions. Involuntary action is a contradiction in 
terms. All actions are agent-caused and the agent’s self cannot cause anything that 
already has a sufficient cause that the agent cannot control. Hence, all actions stem from 
a choice the agent makes from amongst open alternatives. I endorse an incompatibilist 
view of action (there can be no deterministically caused actions) that is also an 
incompatibilist view of free will (there can be no free will in a deterministic world). All 
actions are free in a libertarian sense. 
Seventh, regarding the role of consciousness. Even though all actions are free, not all of 
them are directly free, insofar as people sometimes act on standing intentions of which 
they are not presently aware. When that happens, those behaviors can nevertheless 
count as indirectly free actions, since they are the expression of preferences and 
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tendencies to act that were formed through previous conscious and deliberate choices of 
which the agent was the direct cause.  
Eighth, regarding the scope of agency. Despite all the physical, environmental and 
psychological constraints that limit the range of possibilities an agent has at the moment 
of choice, very seldom are the possibilities reduced to one. Most of the time, our 
supposed actions are not determined behaviors in disguise – they are true actions, 
brought about by our emergent selves who have the ability to make choices and to settle 
how our lives, and the portions of the world they influence, unfold. 
 
An account such as mine is not easy to defend in the context of current analytical 
philosophy. It relies on metaphysical assumptions that are insusceptible of empirical 
control and it goes against the important requirement of parsimony. However, as Daniel 
Dennett once wrote, we must never mistake “a failure of imagination for an insight into 
necessity”478. Ironically, while Dennett meant this motto to be a warning against the risks 
of making statements about reality (such as, for instance, arguments for the in-principle 
impossibility of functionalizing consciousness), based only on our present partial 
knowledge about the world and our psychological and theoretical biases, I find it very 
appropriate when it comes to deflationist positions such as his.  
I certainly believe philosophy must be scientifically informed, and that is why, throughout 
this dissertation, I had the concern to show how the positions I endorse do not contradict 
what science is currently committed to. This is the common ground one should assume as 
a fixed point. Nevertheless, the requirement for empirical plausibility must be well 
balanced with that of broad rational plausibility. And under this criterion, many of 
Dennett’s (and others’) positions are highly implausible, despite their metaphysical 
unproblematicity and scientific appeal. I believe they limit their imagination to scientific 
inquiry and assume science’s method of posing questions to nature to be our only way of 
having an insight into reality.  
                                                          
478 Dennett, D. (1993), p.401. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 240 
My agent-causal theory provides us with theoretical tools to account for the (auto and 
hetero) phenomenological experience we have as agents in the world, allowing us to 
justify the empirical distinctions we make between the cases in which our behavior merely 
outflows from our mental states and those in which we are the protagonists of the choices 
that sign our path. By exploring the idea that the agent-cause is the agent’s conscious self, 
my proposal conjoins the already entangled subject matters of free will and 
consciousness, which are recognized as open problems both in philosophy and in science. 
Despite its eagerness to go beyond the limits of what can be empirically tested, my 
account is compatible with neuroscientific knowledge about the functioning of the brain, 
as well as with what physics shows to be the truth behind the myth of reductionism.   
I obviously do not expect to have given a definitive answer to the philosophical problems 
that I am tackling here. I suspect that they have no solution. Nevertheless, I do hope to 
have added a new line of argument to the debate, to have justified it with honest 
reasoning and proven its possibility, reasonableness and even plausibility with sufficient 
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